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DE RUEHUL #0454/01 0671042
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O 071042Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8812
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3924
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4066
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8563
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 2531
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA CC SEOUL KOR
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000454 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2018 
TAGS: KS KN PROG PREL PINR
SUBJECT: NEW MOU MINISTER KIM HA-JOONG: OLD MOFAT HAND, 
NORTHEAST ASIA SPECIALIST 
 
 
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Kim Ha-joong, the current ROK Ambassador to China and 
a career diplomat, has been named Lee Myung-bak's first 
Unification Minister.  Resistance to his nomination from the 
opposition United Democratic Party is unlikely to be strong; 
he was one of the architects of the Sunshine Policy when he 
served as Kim Dae-jung's Senior Secretary for National 
Security.  His nomination surprised many conservatives, 
including some who question his conservative bona fides with 
regard to the DPRK. Kim brings significant DPRK, Northeast 
Asia, and diplomatic experience into the position; he will be 
comfortable in this policymaking role.  The fortunes of the 
Ministry, however, remain unclear, except that it will be 
reduced in manpower and interagency authority.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
What Kim Brings To The Job: DPRK Experience... 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (C) Kim brings experience working on engagement strategies 
with the DPRK, having served as Senior Secretary for National 
Security during the Kim Dae-jung administration (2000-2001). 
Media reports state that he was one of the guiding hands 
behind the Sunshine Policy, and has met high-level North 
Korean visitors to Seoul.  Kim was considered as a possible 
MOU Minister during Roh Moo-hyun's administration, but was 
ultimately passed over for Lee Jae-joung, who stepped down as 
MOU Minister this week. 
 
¶3. (C) Kim's nomination marks the second time that a former 
Korean Ambassador to China has been nominated as MOU 
Minister.  Kim has served as Ambassador to China since 2001 
and is expected to be well-versed in issues related to the 
Six Party Talks and DPRK defectors; his background also gives 
him significant experience on trade issues, which could have 
an impact on how he views inter-Korean economic cooperation. 
 
¶4. (C) Some MOFAT colleagues note, however, that while Kim 
was briefed while in Beijing on the state of play in the Six 
Party Talks, he was not intimately involved in the Six Party 
Talks.  His forte, rather, was in PRC-ROK bilateral issues, 
including trade and DPRK refugees. 
 
----------------------- 
...NE Asia Expertise... 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Kim's MOFAT career also reflects a heavy focus on 
Northeast Asia, which could bode well for the Lee Myung-bak 
administration's efforts to build regional cooperation.  In 
addition to his seven-year tour as Ambassador to the PRC, he 
has served as Director-General for Asian Pacific Affairs, 
Minister at Embassy Beijing, and Counsellor at Embassy Tokyo. 
 Kim majored in Chinese Literature during undergraduate 
studies at Seoul National University and speaks fluent 
Mandarin Chinese. 
 
------------------------------ 
...Policymaking Experience... 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) As previously mentioned, Kim has had two assignments 
in the Blue House, both during the Kim Dae-jung 
administration.  Kim has also served three tours in Foreign 
Minister's office, each time under a different minister. 
 
---------------------------- 
...And MOFAT's Work Culture. 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) MOFAT colleagues and media reports have characterized 
Kim as a tough, hard-working boss who often kept his 
employees at Embassy Beijing working until late at night. 
His work ethic should fit in well with an administration that 
has staffed its senior foreign policy positions with former 
or current MOFAT personnel, and with a president who has 
already indicated that he expects his senior staff to put in 
long hours.  Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan was in the same 
MOFAT entering class as Kim, which could help the two to 
 
frankly exchange views and coordinate on relevant issues. 
 
--------------- 
The Mood at MOU 
--------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Kim is going into a ministry that was almost 
eliminated entirely.  Now, the administration has announced 
large-scale layoffs and a wholesale restructuring of the 
Ministry.  In short, he will face morale issues.  He will 
certainly be pressed by conservative hardliners to take a 
stronger line vis-a-vis the DPRK on inter-Korean economic 
cooperation.  Working-level MOU contacts are taking a 
"wait-and-see" approach to the new Minister, and remain 
hopeful that he will have no choice but to continue 
inter-Korean economic projects such as the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex and the Mount Kumgang Tourism site.  Our 
understanding is that these two main inter-Korean projects 
will continue but not expand further. 
 
----------------------------- 
What His Appointment Suggests 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) All indications are that Kim,s appointment is 
another sign that the new administration's North Korea 
policies will be viewed through a diplomatic rather than a 
domestic lens.  That is, the new ROK government will view 
North Korea as a security issue to be resolved through 
diplomatic initiatives, rather than a problem that is shared 
by Koreans, as characterized by the Roh administration.  This 
will have policy implications ranging from economic 
assistance to human rights to denuclearization efforts. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Another policy issue that could be affected by 
Kim's appointment is the new administration,s emphasis on 
the issue of DPRK refugees in China.  Blue House spokesperson 
Lee Dong-kwan, in his March 2 announcement of Kim,s 
appointment, mentioned that Kim,s past role in handling the 
refugee issue with China was recognized as a valuable asset 
for the Unification Minister job.  In an interview with the 
JoongAng Ilbo on March 3, Kim Ha-joong noted that he had 
handled around 430 refugee cases during his ambassadorship in 
China. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Some editorials and news articles have suggested 
that the appointment of a China expert to the Unification 
Minister post reflects the new government,s effort to ease 
Chinese anxiety over signs that the ROK is moving closer to 
the United States and Japan, as demonstrated by the recent 
appointments of Kim Byung-kook (an old U.S. hand) as Foreign 
Affairs Advisor and Yu Myung-hwan (former Ambassador to 
Japan) as Foreign Minister. 
 
¶12. (C) Since his nomination, Kim has stuck to the party 
line; in a March 3 interview with the JoongAng Ilbo, Kim said 
that the new administration,s NK policy will be to "build a 
Global Korea, promote pragmatism, and bring about North 
Korean reforms and openness."  Faced with an uncertain 
mandate about inter-Korean engagement, an MOU that looks to 
lose significant interagency clout, low staff morale, and a 
North Korea that is increasingly unhappy with the direction 
of inter-Korean relations, Kim faces a long walk across a 
tight-rope. 
VERSHBOW