VZCZCXRO9232
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHPOD #0104/01 0911603
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311603Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0717
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHPOD/AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 0795

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PODGORICA 000104 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR SR MW
SUBJECT: MONTENEGRO'S FINAL PRE-BUCHAREST BLITZ ON NATO 
 
 
PODGORICA 00000104  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Affirming that Montenegro is ready and capable 
of entering a "new phase of relations with the Alliance," PM 
Djukanovic called on NATO Ambassadors 3/31 to support his 
country's inclusion in Intensified Political Dialogue (IPD) at 
the upcoming Bucharest Summit.  Granting IPD to Montenegro would 
help prevent the deepening of gaps within the region following 
NATO invitations to Adriatic Charter countries; would provide a 
positive stimulus to Serbia; and would help build stronger 
public support for NATO among Montenegro's population, he said. 
 Regarding Serbia, the PM feared that that country is 
"determined to have a last experiment with a Radical government" 
and that the GOS' "satanization" of NATO would retard Serbia's 
integration into NATO for years to come.  Most of the ten NATO 
countries present explicitly indicated their support for IPD, 
although the UK Ambassador (protect) told us he had received 
unclear signals from London.  END SUMMARY 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) Recently-elected PM Djukanovic emphasized to NATO 
Ambassadors 3/31 that his Government is firmly committed to 
Montenegro's integration into NATO and that he plans to 
intensify ("dynamize") the country's efforts vis-a-vis NATO 
during the 18 months left in his mandate.  He called on NATO 
representatives to support Montenegro's inclusion in IPD at the 
Bucharest Summit later this week, affirming that Podgorica is 
"ready for the challenge of entering a new phase of relations 
with Alliance."  He also stressed repeatedly that Montenegro 
"has the capacity to be a credible partner" of NATO, pointing to 
significant progress it had already made since joining PfP. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In terms of progress to date, the PM pointed 
specifically to institutional defense reform; committing to at 
least 2 percent of GDP for defense spending; the creation of a 
high-level "PFP Council" and inter-Ministerial commission; and 
the adoption of IPP, PARP, and IPAP documents.   He added that 
the creation of a "Council for National Security" chaired by the 
President, combined with an enhanced parliamentary role in 
adopting Defense and National Security strategies, had 
strengthened civilian oversight of the military.  Montenegro was 
a party to the Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC) agreement 
signed earlier between SAM and NATO, had initiated the process 
of acceding to the PfP SOFA; and was close to receiving 
certification from NATO regarding its protection of classified 
information.  The GOM was committed to participating in 
international peacekeeping operations, including "within the PfP 
framework," and had already identified various resources for 
this purpose (e.g., a medical unit; an infantry capacity; a 
general-purpose helicopter, and a tugboat). 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The PM argued that IPD for Montenegro would be in the 
interest of both the Alliance and of Montenegro, as it would 
have important and positive consequences for regional stability. 
 Such an invitation would minimize the risk of "deepening gaps" 
within the region in the event of membership invitations to the 
A3 countries (which the PM said he fully supported).  It would 
also be a positive impetus to Serbia, just as Croatia's progress 
toward NATO had had positive repercussions in Montenegro.  It 
would also help Montenegro make up for the "time it had lost" as 
a member of the state union with Serbia and would help build 
public support for NATO in Montenegro.  The PM expressed his 
hope that NATO would maintain its "Open Door" policy at and 
beyond Bucharest and that it would continue to judge aspirants 
on their own merits. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The PM said he was "absolutely convinced" that the 
Montenegrin leadership would be able to build majority public 
support for the country's orientation toward NATO.  "We must be 
active, persistent, and serious" in implementing our NATO 
Communications Strategy, he said.  The GOM is also enlisting the 
support of NGOs to support this campaign and suggested that NATO 
Embassies could also play a role.   The current low levels of 
support (around 30 percent) derive largely from the "trauma" of 
the 1999 NATO intervention, a trauma that had been exploited by 
some opposition politicians during the ongoing Presidential 
election campaign.  This was particularly true among the 
population in the North, which still looks toward Serbia, he 
averred. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Serbia is, and always has been, the central question 
(and problem) of this region, the PM said.  Problems that had 
cropped up relating to the RS, Kosovo, and Montenegro could all 
be traced back to Belgrade.  The PM was not optimistic that that 
a major change in Serbian strategy would be forthcoming anytime 
 
PODGORICA 00000104  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
soon.  He expected that Belgrade's policy of blaming the 
international community for its woes -- rather than recognizing 
that Kosovo and other problems stemmed from disastrous Serbian 
policies -- would continue.  While the international community 
needed to help the democratic forces in Serbia nudge that 
country toward Euroatlantic integration, he was pessimistic that 
Serbian support for NATO, at least, would be in the cards 
anytime soon.   While the May elections in Serbia would result 
in a consolidation (regardless of the outcome) of pro-European 
forces, Belgrade's "satanization" of NATO in recent times would 
make it difficult for any future government to adopt a pro-NATO 
policy.  The best antidote would be continued enlargement of the 
Alliance, as the inclusion of other countries in the region in 
NATO would lead Belgrade to conclude there is no alternative to 
NATO membership.  He predicted that the elections in Serbia 
would show that Serbs are "determined to have a last experiment 
with a Radical government."  Nonetheless, he argued against 
"disqualifying anyone in advance as a potential partner," 
pointing to the transformation of Croatia's post-Tudjman HDZ as 
an instructive example. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) COMMENT:  This meeting was the last in Montenegro's 
pre-Bucharest blitz to press for IPD.  This blitz included two 
meetings with NATO Ambassadors at the Prime Minister level, one 
at the DefMin level, a meeting by the DefMin with NATO DATTs, 
and the IPAP presentation in Brussels on 3/12 by the Ministers 
of Defense and Foreign Affairs.  The PM left no doubt that NATO 
will figure heavily in his government's foreign policy, and he 
expressed deep conviction that the GOM is capable of taking the 
relationship to the next level. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) COMMENT (CONT'D):  Most of the ten NATO countries 
gathered around the table expressed explicit support for 
Montenegro's IPD, and NATO, aspirations.  Interestingly, the UK 
Ambassador (protect) told us that he had received unclear 
signals from London and suggested that a USG nudge to the UK 
would have an impact in bringing London along. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) COMMENT (CONT'D):  The PM appealed to NATO Ambassadors 
not to misinterpret the fact that President Vujanovic will not 
be in Bucharest.  With Presidential elections scheduled for 
April 6 and the sole pre-election television debate conflicting 
with the Bucharest schedule, the President had to revise his 
earlier plans to travel to be at the Summit, he said. 
MOORE