VZCZCXRO0451
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0106/01 0801344
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201344Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6098
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000106 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: 03/07/18 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF CASCSU CD
SUBJECT: FRENCH READY FOR ONE LAST CHAD EVACUATION, 
ACTIVE IN PROMOTING POLITICAL REFORM PROCESS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND 
(D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: According to the French Charge 
D'Aaffaires, a reprise of the February 2-3 attack on 
N'Djamena is less likely, particularly in view of the 
thinning Zaghawa forces Timan Erdimi's RFC.  France is 
ready to perform another evacuation if need be, but a 
second evacuation would trigger the downsizing of the 
French mission in Chad.  U.S. interest in assisting 
the Commission of Inquiry into the event surrounding 
the disappearance of opposition leader Ibni Oumar is 
warmly welcomed, but the EU is still concerned about 
the credibility of the Commission and is discussing 
changes to the mandate and composition with the 
Government of Chad.  This meeting is part of our 
efforts to consult closely and communicate 
continuously with the French on the security situation 
in N'Djamena.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) The Ambassador met with French Charge 
D'Affaires Francois Barateau on March 19 for a 
discussion of security and political developments in 
Chad.  French Pol Officer Ahlm Serija-Noy and DCM 
(notetaker) attended. 
 
SECURITY SITUATION IN CHAD 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) CDA Barateau recognized that Sudan was 
resupplying and rearming Chadian rebels but felt that 
rebel ability to re-launch attacks against N'Djamena 
was undermined by dissension among the rebel groups 
and difficulties in recruiting to fill losses suffered 
in January-February.  Barateau said that the Zaghawa 
RFC of Timan Erdimi had "practically fallen apart" as 
the Zaghawa ethnic group reunited to defend itself, 
including pro-Deby Zaghawa, Sudanese Zaghawa in the 
JEM and Tora Bora groups and former RFC Zaghawa.  He 
reiterated the point made by his Ambassador in a 
previous conversation with Ambassador Nigro that while 
the west pressed President Deby to cut ties with the 
JEM, Deby needed them more and more to protect 
himself.  Barateau did not think that there would be 
an attack on N'Djamena similar to the last one - at 
least before the rainy season.  He did not eliminate 
the possibility of other destabilizing events within 
the city, such as a coup d'etat or rebel infiltration. 
 
FRENCH PLANS TO ASSIST CHAD, 
EXPATRIATES IN ANOTHER CRISIS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Barateau recalled that French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy had made clear that France would not 
intervene in Africa - "at least alone."  But in 
referring to the UN Security Council Resolution that 
gave France a mandate after the last attack, he 
appeared to be hedging bets that France might look for 
similar "cover" in the future. Asked if France would 
perform another evacuation along the lines of the 
early February air lift of expatriates, Barateau 
responded without hesitation "yes."  But he went on to 
explain that they would only do it "one more time." 
If such an evacuation were to take place, France would 
downsize its mission in Chad and probably suspend 
bilateral assistance.  Even now French authorities 
were not sure that they wanted to fully rehabilitate 
the French cultural center - looted and vandalized 
during the last attacks. 
 
¶5.  (C) Concerning the protection and evacuation plan 
for expatriates, CDA Barateau explained that this 
would remain largely the same as that activated in 
February.  The French would alert expatriates to come 
to four or five protected assembly areas before being 
conducted to the French base at the airport for 
evacuation.  He said that the assembly areas were 
still the same, although the French would likely 
direct those arriving at the French School to proceed 
directly to the base as they had concluded that the 
school was difficult to protect.  Barateau confirmed 
that he planned to test the Embassy radios we had 
given the French (utilizing a reserved frequency) and 
that this would improve our ability to coordinate in 
the event of another crisis.  The French are also 
equipping themselves with Cameroonian mobile 
telephones in case the Chadian cell phone network goes 
down as it did in February. 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000106  002 OF 002 
 
 
IMPLEMENTING THE AUGUST 13 ACCORD 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) CDA Barateau appeared confident that a new 
government would be announced soon, hopefully with a 
Prime Minister empowered to move the August 13 
political process long.  The key element in such a new 
government, he said was a Prime Minister with real 
power to direct the ministers.  He was at a loss to 
name any one person among the current political 
opposition who might fit the bill (he explained that 
all of them had served in previous governments and 
none stood out).  One name of interest might be that 
of Minister of Decentralization, Abdraman 
Djasnabaille. (Comment: Djasnabaille is a southerner 
and a former dissident in exile who returned to serve 
as Minister of Human Rights two years ago before 
assuming his current position.  End comment) 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Concerning the Commission of Inquiry into 
the events surrounding the disappearance of opposition 
leaders and other alleged human rights violations in 
February, Barateau shared EU concerns that the first 
decree setting up the commission had not been 
acceptable in terms of the mandate.  Even the name: 
"Commission of Inquiry in Sudanese Agresssion" was a 
problem.  The EU did not want to be associated with a 
Commission that was just a paper tiger.  An 
EU/French/German troika was working with the 
government to come up with a new decree for a 
Commission that would be more along the lines of what 
they had in mind when they recommended it to President 
Deby.  They also planned to create a second, 
international commission working alongside the 
national commission.  The troika would participate on 
both commissions, as would, he expected, the Office of 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva. 
The AU was named in the Commission, but, according to 
Barateau, did not have much appetite for participation 
(most likely because of the Commission's clear anti- 
Sudan which did not sit well with AU neutrality.) 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Ambassador asked whether the United 
States could be helpful to the Commission.  Barateau 
welcomed U.S. interest, saying that the Chadian 
commission needed all the help it could get, but asked 
that we wait a few days when the EU had formulated a 
final position.  The Ambassador emphasized that giving 
a concrete area of competence (such as forensics) and 
a defined scope of work would help us explain to 
Washington how best to respond. 
 
COMMENT: 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) We look forward to working with the EU-led 
troika on the Commission and the follow-up to the 
August 13 accord process.  This meeting is part of our 
efforts to consult closely and communicate 
continuously with the French on the security situation 
in N'Djamena.  We are also meeting regularly with 
French military involved in the security area. 
 
Nigro