VZCZCXRO1153
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHNH #0025/01 0710847
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 110847Z MAR 08
FM AMCONSUL NAHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0911
INFO RHMFISS/18WG CP KADENA AB JA
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUSFNSG/CDR10THASG TORII STATION JA
RHMFISS/CG FIRST MAW
RUHBABA/CG III MEF CAMP COURTNEY JA
RUHBBEA/CG THIRD FSSG CAMP KINSER JA
RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/COMFLEACT OKINAWA JA
RHMFISS/COMMARCORBASESJAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RHMFISS/COMMARFORPAC
RHHMHAA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHBVMA/CTF 76
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
RUESOK/FBIS OKINAWA JA
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 0289
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0971
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA OKINAWA JA
RUHBANB/OKINAWA AREA FLD OFC US FORCES JAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 0365
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 0321
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0908
RUALBCC/YOKOTA AB HQ USFJ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAHA 000025 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/11/2033 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PINS JA
SUBJECT: APPEASEMENT STRATEGY BEHIND REPUTED FRF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROCEDURES DELAY? 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Kevin K. Maher, Consul General, U.S. Consulate 
General, Naha, Japan, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  At the March 6 meeting of the Alliance 
Transformation Agreement Working Group for Okinawa, GOJ 
representatives raised the possibility that environmental 
procedures related to the landfill portions of the replacement 
facility for Marine Corps Air Station Futenma would be extended 
and delayed for eight months.  Japanese participants assured us 
that there would be no insurmountable engineering or political 
difficulties with completing the overall project on schedule. 
They admitted they anticipated that Okinawan opposition to the 
project also might delay land-based work in undetermined ways, 
and promised to provide new timelines.  Local media in the 
weekend papers headlined the story as a year-long delay, while 
central government officials here told ConGen Naha privately 
that the eight-month delay was a "worst case scenario."  The 
Okinawa Vice Governor, meanwhile, privately scoffed at these 
reports and stressed that only a three-month delay would be 
necessary.  The Vice Governor also told us that prefectural and 
national environmental and defense officials had nearly 
completed coordination that would allow the Governor to issue 
permits this month which are needed for the next stage of the 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) to begin.  In view of this 
conflicting information, we think it is incumbent upon us to yet 
again stress to the GOJ our expectation that the Okinawa base 
realignment plan will be implemented as agreed, on schedule, and 
as a package.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  At the March 6 Alliance Transformation Agreement 
Working Group for Okinawa (ATAWG-O), Japanese participants 
presented a new timeline for environmental procedures relating 
to the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF).  Japanese officials 
claimed that because a coral survey covering four seasons had 
not begun by the end of winter (February 2008), the survey would 
have to extend to the end of the next winter (February 2009). 
Compared to the schedule presented at the September 2007 ATAWG-O 
meeting, the on-site survey and period for drafting the 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) both start four months 
later, and take four months longer, for a total delay of eight 
months.  As a result, the expected date for the prefectural 
governor's approval for the landfill became late August 2010, 
which is nearly a year later than the schedule we have been 
shown to date.  This new schedule would put the Governor's 
permit approval less than 90 days before the next prefectural 
gubernatorial election.  Under current Japanese law, a landfill 
project cannot begin unless the governor approves. 
 
¶3.  (C)  ConGen Naha's representative questioned the length of 
the delay, and noted the foreseeable difficulty of attaining the 
governor's approval for the landfill shortly before the 
gubernatorial election.  There could be tremendous pressure on 
the governor not to approve the landfill, even from the 
conservative Liberal Democratic Party, which will want to retain 
the seat.  The Okinawa left and media will portray the 2010 
gubernatorial election as the last best chance for the people of 
Okinawa to make their voices heard on the FRF, i.e., to prevent 
its completion.  Japanese participants claimed that their hands 
were tied, as the eight month delay was required by law, and 
asked the U.S. side just to trust them and their ability to gain 
the governor's approval for the landfill. 
 
¶4.  (C)  U.S. Military engineers asked what impact delays in 
environmental procedures would have on the land-based 
construction.  Japanese officials from Tokyo initially insisted 
there would be no delay, as the EIS applies only to landfill, 
but Okinawa Defense Bureau (ODB) participants said they expected 
the prefecture would "be sensitive" to construction.  They 
 
NAHA 00000025  002 OF 003 
 
 
admitted that they had not yet discussed with the Okinawa 
Prefectural Government (OPG) any construction that was unrelated 
to the EIS.  Japanese participants insisted that work, including 
demolition scheduled to begin in April, must be kept under wraps 
due to "local sensitivities."  Note:  We found this puzzling, 
since the contracts for the demolition work have been let and 
this has been widely reported in the local press.  The work will 
be visible from off-base.  End note.  The Japanese side agreed 
to get back to the U.S. side with detailed timelines for 
land-based work.  Japanese officials insisted that the revised 
schedule would not affect the planned FRF completion date of 
¶2014.  U.S. Military engineers expressed grave doubts about 
maintaining the completion date if there were serious delays in 
sea-based portions of the project, and if the GOJ was hesitating 
to move ahead on land-based portions. 
 
¶5.  (C)  After the ATAWG-O meeting, Consul General Maher met 
separately with MOFA Status of Forces Division Director Iizawa 
and ODB Director General Manabe.  Japanese participants in the 
ATAWG-O had fully explained neither the justification for, nor 
the full impact of, the eight-month delay.  Iizawa shed no more 
light on the reasons for the delay, but assured the Consul 
General that the GOJ would endeavor to ensure there was no 
overall delay from the 2014 target.  The Consul General stressed 
to Iizawa that failing to meet interim milestones on the FRF 
could put at risk U.S. political support --and funding-- for 
other portions of the Okinawa-centered package, including the 
move of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam. 
 
¶6.  (C)  When the Consul General raised the issue with ODB's 
Manabe on March 6, Manabe seemed unaware of the central 
government's reasoning behind an eight-month long delay in 
environmental procedures.  He promised to get back to the Consul 
General on the issue.  On March 9, following headline coverage 
of a reputed one-year delay in the local press, Manabe told the 
Consul General that an eight-month delay is a worst case 
scenario, and ODB is still discussing the start date for the 
next stage of the EIA process with the Okinawa governor's 
office.  Manabe said he believes it will be possible to keep 
delays in the environmental process to a minimum.  The problem, 
Manabe said, was that Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura recently 
directed MOFA and MOD to use an "appeasement strategy" in 
dealing with Okinawa Prefecture Governor Nakaima.  He noted 
Foreign Minister Koumura and Finance Minister Nukaga are 
opposing the appeasement strategy, but he was curiously silent 
on Defense Minister Ishiba's position. 
 
¶7.  (C)  On March 10 Okinawa Prefecture Vice Governor Nakazato 
told the Consul General that reports of a one year or eight 
month delay are nonsense.  Nakazato was adamant that the 
inability to start coral sampling by the end of February would 
delay EIA procedures by no more than three months.  The only 
delay, he repeated, would be the need to do the "winter" survey 
in the next December to February period, vice the immediate past 
December to February, so there is only a three month overall 
delay.  No other EIA procedures would change.  Nakazato added 
that OPG and ODB officials currently are working the details the 
requests for permits from the OPG to begin several surveys (such 
as coral sampling) which will begin the next phase of the EIA 
process.  Nakazato said he expects the details to be 
completed-and the governor's permits for the surveys to be 
granted-in this month, March 2008. 
 
¶8.  (C) Nakazato said he had spoken recently with Vice Minister 
of Defense Masuda about this, and that both Masuda and MOD 
 
NAHA 00000025  003 OF 003 
 
 
Defense Policy Bureau Director General Takamizawa are well aware 
of the current state of play and of the fact that only a 
three-month shift in the timeline is required.  When asked why 
the national government would tell us there will be an 
eight-month delay, Nakazato dismissed the idea.  While it is 
true, Nakazato said, that the Prefectural environmental advisory 
committee had asked for a multi-year environmental survey and 
other measures that could create delays, the governor himself 
had rejected such requests.  Governor Nakaima has not given up 
on his demand that the runways be shifted seaward, but he 
nevertheless wants the FRF to proceed as quickly as possible, 
and is careful not to do anything to delay the EIA.  Nakazato 
said he does not know why, but it appears to him the GOJ is 
intentionally misleading ("damashite iru") the USG. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Comment:  We confess that we are confused by the 
explanations, or lack thereof, from GOJ officials about delays 
to the EIA process.  We are not experts on Japan's EIA 
procedures, but from what we know we can find no rationale for 
more than a three-month delay.   Based on the ATAWG-O meeting 
and conversations with GOJ officials, it appeared to us that 
some national officials had become too focused on Okinawan 
"sensitivities," and the resulting appeasement strategy, and may 
have thought it necessary to delay the EIA to satisfy the 
Governor.  But we now have it on good authority from the Vice 
Governor that the governor's office wants the next phase of the 
EIA underway this month, and sees no reason for extended delays 
in environmental procedures.  In light of this, we think it is 
incumbent upon us to yet again stress to the GOJ our expectation 
that the Okinawa base realignment plan will be implemented as 
agreed, on schedule, and as a package. 
MAHER