VZCZCXRO7393
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMO #0859/01 0881340
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281340Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7361
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000859 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNDP RS IR
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DEPUTY SECURITY COUNCIL NAZAROV ON IRAN 
AND "123" 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  In a March 21 meeting with SFRC Staff 
Member Puneet Talwar and DCM, Russian Security Council Deputy 
Secretary Nazarov praised P5 1 unity on Iran, but argued that 
 
SIPDIS 
a lack of a roadmap, the failure to lay out positive 
inducements for Iranian action, over-reliance on sanctions, 
and the absence of a trusted intermediary complicated 
progress.  Nazarov said it was "incorrect" to expect Iran to 
completely halt its enrichment activity, and argued for full 
transparency, adherence to the Additional Protocol, and a 
full accounting of past activities as the basis for Iran's 
reemergence as a "normal state."  Nazarov urged the U.S. to 
address Iranian concerns over regime change, and to engage 
more broadly on Iran's role in the region.  Nazarov conceded 
that different threat perceptions made Iran a lower priority 
for the GOR than U.S.  Nazarov expressed concerns over 
congressional legislation that could block a future "123" and 
underscored the importance Russia attached to its relations 
with the U.S.  End Summary 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶2.  (C)  In a two-hour meeting on March 21 with Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee Senior Staff Member Puneet Talwar 
and DCM, Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Vladimir 
Nazarov stressed that the most significant accomplishment of 
the P5 1 was maintaining a common front in demanding Iranian 
compliance with UN and IAEA demands.  Noting that he could 
speak freely as a non-diplomat (hailing from the security 
services), Nazarov added that the greatest failure of the 
P5 1 was in failing to craft a roadmap that charted a clear 
path towards its strategic goals.  Nazarov argued that, 
unlike the Six Party process, the P5 1 lacked an effective 
intermediary with Iran.  While China brought energy and 
initiative in its behind-the-scenes encouragement of North 
Korea, no P5 1 interlocutor enjoyed both the trust of Iran 
and the confidence of its P5 1 partners.  Noting that EU 
Solana lacked the authority and "weight" to engage 
successfully with Iran and explicitly ruling Russia out as an 
alternate, Nazarov saw few opportunities for a near-term 
breakthrough, but speculated that new EU structural reforms 
might bring forth a new personality. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Continuing his comparison of the P5 1 to the Six 
Party format, Nazarov argued that Iran needed a positive 
vision of its reintegration into the international community 
laid out in explicit terms.  Nazarov said it would be 
"incorrect" to think that Iran will give up its enrichment 
activities entirely.  In return for "utter transparency," 
adherence to the Additional Protocol, and a full accounting 
of its past activities, Iran needed to understand that it 
will be treated as an "absolutely normal" state, with the 
full rights of any other NPT member.  Nazarov sidestepped a 
detailed discussion of which Iranian nuclear activities would 
cross Russian red-lines.  Stressing that this was his 
personal view, Nazarov maintained that Iran would insist on a 
level of enrichment activity commensurate with its existing 
centrifuges, and that transparency would be critical to 
assuaging international community concerns. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Nazarov recapped Putin's failed effort to convince 
Ahmedinejad and the Supreme Leader to "declare victory" in 
demonstrating to the world its mastery of enrichment 
technology, while accepting Russia's offer of reprocessing 
services.  While Putin had argued that this would create the 
diplomatic space for a direct dialogue, Iran "turned a deaf 
ear" to the presentation.  "We see no evidence," Nazarov 
concluded, that Iran is ready to forego enrichment in favor 
of the services of international fuel centers.  Nazarov 
attributed former National Security Adviser Larijani's 
departure to his unhappiness over this decision. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Reiterating the need for a positive agenda with 
Iran, Nazarov argued that Ahmedinejad had mastered how to use 
international sticks to rally internal support.  The more the 
international community wielded sanctions, he maintained, the 
greater the likelihood of Ahmedinejad's reelection.  While 
threats and drastic actions sounded better to the average 
voter, Nazarov commented, "all responsible politicians" 
understood that inducements would be required to change 
Iranian behavior.  Nazarov maintained that the U.S. should 
seek to engage Iran more broadly on regional security, since 
"chasing Iran into the corner" had exacerbated its bad 
behavior.  In Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Iraq, more 
responsible Iranian behavior could be induced, particularly 
if Iran's disquiet over its own security was assuaged.  In an 
aside, Nazarov noted that Iran's anti-narcotics policy was 
more effective than that of the EU, Pakistan, or U.S./NATO 
when it came to Afghanistan. 
 
MOSCOW 00000859  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C)  Up to now, Nazarov insisted, Iran remained 
suspicious of U.S. efforts to engineer regime change, with 
nonproliferation concerns interpreted as a euphemism for a 
broader political agenda.  Iran needed to believe that its 
security interests were being taken into account, which -- 
over time -- would lead to changes in the calculus of its 
regional policy.  Just as Iran had to earn the trust of the 
U.S. (and international community, writ large), the U.S. 
needed to gain the confidence of the Iranians.  Only then, 
Nazarov maintained, would a roadmap defining the parameters 
of Iranian nuclear activity, transparency, and regional 
behavior be possible.  Conceding that the difficulty of 
working with Iran made bilateral relations a low priority for 
the GOR, Nazarov again attributed some of Iran's 
unpredictability to an exaggerated sense of insecurity fueled 
by U.S. threats of military action. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Nazarov agreed that Russia gave a lower priority to 
Iran than the U.S., due to substantially different threat 
perceptions.  Tapping the table sharply for emphasis, Nazarov 
twice repeated that "no one knows that Iran has made a 
political decision to acquire nuclear weapons," adding that 
it was "unlikely" that such a decision had been taken. 
Citing Russian and other international experts, Nazarov 
maintained that Iran faced broad technological challenges, 
not limited to its enrichment activities.  In a best case 
scenario, he said, Iran could develop a nuclear device in 
five years, but realistically that accomplishment was "much 
further down the road."  In any event, he stressed, Iran's 
nuclear advance would not come as a "bolt from the blue," but 
would be presaged by increasing evidence of nuclear activity, 
a withdrawal from the NPT, and abrogation of its IAEA 
commitments.  Strict sanctions would only embolden Iranian 
radicals, who argue for a preemptive withdrawal from both 
international regimes. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Pushed on whether Russia would support additional 
sanctions at the same time that inducements were proffered, 
Nazarov insisted that there already was an "imbalance" in the 
P5 1 strategy.  Rather than the EU3 and Russia playing good 
cop to America's bad, Nazarov argued, the U.S. should adopt a 
more constructive tone, redress Iranian concerns over 
security, and align its strategy to reflect more of its 
approach to North Korea.  Reiterating that sanctions were 
ineffective, if popular electorally, Nazarov said that U.S. 
unilateral steps (and the possibility of additional EU 
measures) could jeopardize the unity of the P5 1 and weaken 
international resolve towards Iran. 
 
Congress and "123" 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C)  Nazarov expressed concern over draft U.S. 
legislation that, among other things, called for rejection of 
a "123" agreement with Russia, in the event of its continued 
cooperation with Iran on Bushehr.  Noting that the 
Administration had praised Russia's approach to the delivery 
of Bushehr fuel, which the Kremlin had consulted on in 
advance, Nazarov questioned congressional motivations. 
 
Keeping Bilateral Relations on Even Keel 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  Nazarov began and concluded his comments by 
emphasizing the importance that Russia attached to its 
relations with the U.S. and characterizing the recently 
concluded 2 2 dialogue as an important mechanism for ensuring 
stability and continuity during a time of political 
transitions.  He urged that the accomplishments of the last 
eight years be preserved and emphasized that Russia viewed 
its relations with the U.S. as a key tool in maintaining 
international stability. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  Under former Secretary Igor Ivanov, the Security 
Council played an important role in managing Iran policy, due 
to Ivanov's personal relations with many in the Iranian 
leadership.  With Ivanov's departure, the Security Council's 
role on Iran has diminished; nevertheless, Nazarov's personal 
comments that achieving a complete suspension is unrealistic 
probably reflect the consensus of Russian senior officials, 
even as Russia adheres to the P5 1 goal of full suspension. 
 
¶12. (U) This cable was cleared by Puneet Talwar. 
BURNS