VZCZCXRO7008
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMO #0848/01 0880813
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 280813Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7321
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000848 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS IR IQ MEP
SUBJECT: DFM SALTANOV ON MOSCOW CONFERENCE, SYRIA, IRAN, 
HAMAS, IRAQ 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: In a March 20 meeting with visiting Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee Senior Staff Member Talwar, DFM 
Saltanov reviewed Russia's position on a range of critical 
issues in the Middle East, underscoring strong U.S.-Russian 
cooperation in the lead up to and following the Annapolis 
Conference.  Saltanov commented on the challenges of 
organizing the Moscow conference, citing the "divided rule" 
of the Palestinian territories and the reluctance of many key 
players, including Israel, to hold the conference as the most 
formidable hurdles.  He supported focusing the Moscow 
Conference on the multilateral track, but strongly advocated 
adding to the agenda the Israeli-Syrian track, and in general 
greater international engagement with Syria, Iran, and Hamas. 
 Saltanov also stressed Russia's interest in ratcheting up 
its involvement in Iraq, but would be conditioned on U.S. 
willingness to focus more on national reconciliation and the 
establishment of a realistic timetable for troop withdrawal. 
End summary. 
 
Annapolis Conference Instrumental 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In a one and one-half hour meeting with visiting 
Senior Foreign Relations Committee Staff Member Puneet 
Talwar, DFM Anatoliy Saltanov highlighted the overlapping 
interests and sustained cooperation between the U.S. and 
Russia in the Middle East.  Saltanov pointed out that the 
cooperation intensified "leading up to, during, and following 
the useful Annapolis Conference," and assured Talwar that 
Russia was ready to continue such engagement with the U.S. 
with the outgoing and future U.S. administrations. 
 
¶3.  (C) Saltanov noted that the main obstacle to reaching a 
comprehensive peace agreement was the lack of trust between 
the Israelis and Arab countries, but stressed that Annapolis 
made an important contribution in the settlement of the 
conflicts in the region, and in particular, the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  He confirmed that FM Lavrov 
traveled to Syria on March 19 and was en route to Israel on 
March 20 to follow up on Annapolis and encourage all parties 
to reach "concrete agreements."  Saltanov observed that PM 
Olmert and PNA President Abbas suffered from "narrow 
political space in which to maneuver," but was encouraged 
that both leaders seemed committed to "do their part" to 
reach a settlement. 
 
Moscow Conference: An Organizational Nightmare 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶4.  (C) When asked about GOR plans for a possible 
post-Annapolis conference in Moscow, Saltanov admitted that 
the organization of the conference "was becoming very 
complicated" and was reluctant to speculate on timing.  He 
cited as the most formidable hurdles the "divided rule" of 
the Palestinian territories (between the PNA and Hamas) and 
the reluctance of many key players, including Israel, to hold 
the conference in the next few months. 
 
¶5.  (C) On the substance of the conference, Saltanov argued 
that the Moscow conference should focus on the multilateral 
track, noting that discussions with the Arab countries on 
"critical issues" like economic development, water, and 
energy resources could boost the Arab world's "respect" for 
Israeli concerns.  Following his trip to region, Lavrov would 
consult with the Secretary and Quartet on timing and content, 
and the Quartet would make a final decision. 
 
But We Need to Engage Syria... 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Saltanov echoed Lavrov's views that the 
Israeli-Syrian track should also be incorporated into the 
agenda of the Moscow Conference.  Saltanov underscored the 
importance of pushing Israel and Syria to at least start a 
dialogue, which could later lead to substantive negotiations. 
 Saltanov argued that the international community would 
observe a shift in its relationship with Iran and a dramatic 
change in Syria's activities in Lebanon and Iraq, if Israel 
agreed to engage on Golan Heights.  He stressed that a 
"policy of pressure and isolation" toward Syria is not only 
"useless, but destructive." 
 
¶7.  (C) Talwar inquired about Russia's views on the upcoming 
tribunal examining the assassination of former Lebanese 
President Hariri.  Saltanov stressed that Putin has 
consistently stated publicly and privately that the tribunal 
should get to the bottom of the assassination, even it means 
implicating Syria, as long as the process is not politicized. 
 
MOSCOW 00000848  002 OF 003 
 
 
 Saltanov positively assessed the work of the previous and 
current tribunal commissioner. 
 
...And Iran 
----------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Saltanov strongly advocated for the international 
community's engagement with Iran, stressing that Russia finds 
Iran a "complicated but necessary" partner.  Saltanov 
asserted that Iran was also interested in a stable and 
unified Lebanon, Palestinian state, and Iraq, but only by way 
of peaceful and comprehensive negotiations.  On Iraq, 
Saltanov commented that, "obviously," Iran was guided by its 
own strategic interests and those interests "needed to be 
tempered," but argued that Iran was careful not to exacerbate 
tensions with Sunni-majority Arab countries by meddling too 
much in Iraq.  Saltanov added that Iran has also exercised 
restraint in its relations with Shiite enclaves in Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, but acknowledged that 
Iran's continued restraint hinged on further developments in 
the region and in Iran itself. 
 
¶9.  (C) Commenting on Iranian domestic politics, Saltanov 
argued that the outcome of the March 14 Majles elections 
demonstrated the negative effects of strong international 
pressure on Iran.  He posited that the conservatives won the 
lion's share of parliamentary seats mainly because the 
Iranian people, perceiving that the international community 
"was bent on regime change and isolating Iran," rallied 
around the conservatives.  "More international pressure 
equates to less popular support the reformists," he argued. 
Thus, dialogue with Iran was a fundamental element of Russian 
foreign policy, and Saltanov called on the U.S. to adopt a 
similar position. 
 
¶10.  (C) When asked to what extent Russia was prepared to 
block Iran's nuclear ambitions, Saltanov said that the 
international community should wait to see how Iran responds 
to the positive elements in the P5 1 Ministerial Statement 
that accompanied the latest UNSC resolution on Iran. 
Categorically rejecting a "military solution" to the Iranian 
nuclear problem, Saltanov said Russia favored more clearly 
laying out for the Iranians the concrete benefits of 
cooperation with the international community in exchange for 
suspension of uranium enrichment. 
 
...And Hamas 
------------ 
 
¶11.  (C) Saltanov observed that there were many "skeptics in 
Israel, Arab world, and other places" who doubt that PNA 
President Abbas lacks the authority to negotiate an enduring 
political settlement, underscoring that Hamas' control over 
Gaza has significantly weakened his mandate.  Saltanov agreed 
with Talwar that Abbas was particularly concerned that 
engagement by the international community with Hamas would 
mean the further weakening of Abbas' authority, but argued 
that Hamas represented a significant part of the Palestinian 
"political spectrum" and thus had to be engaged. 
 
¶12.  (C) Recognizing the radical elements in Hamas, Saltanov 
claimed that Russia's sustained contacts with Hamas revealed 
that some elements of the Hamas leadership were "secular, 
pragmatic, and generally not hopeless."  He cited as an 
example Hamas' willingness to agree to a cease-fire with 
Israel in exchange for GOI assurances of no future military 
operations in the Palestinian territories.  However, Saltanov 
argued that Israel, not Hamas, "undid" the agreement, which 
was mediated by the Egyptians, when it recently launched 
another surgical strike in Gaza.  Saltanov commented that 
continued pressure on and isolation of the Hamas leadership 
only strengthened the hand of the radical elements. 
 
Russia Willing To Play a Greater Role in Iraq 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) In the event the next administration took a 
"fundamentally different" approach to Iraq, Saltanov stressed 
Russia would be willing to play a more active role in Iraq. 
He noted that a stable Iraq was in Russia's national 
interests -- Russia did not want terrorist activities in Iraq 
to infiltrate Russian territory and Russia had significant 
economic interests in the country. 
 
¶14.  (C) However, Saltanov stated Russia would 
"unquestionably and enthusiastically" step up its involvement 
in Iraq if two conditions were met.  First, greater emphasis 
must be placed on efforts to achieve national reconciliation. 
 Saltanov noted Russia's sustained efforts to encourage the 
opposition forces in Iraq to reach a compromise with the 
 
MOSCOW 00000848  003 OF 003 
 
 
Maliki government.  Second, a timetable for the withdrawal of 
foreign troops must be established.  He argued that 
opposition forces insist on such a timetable as the basis for 
serious negotiations with the Iraqi government.  Saltanov 
reiterated the GOR position that the timetable should be 
"realistic," which meant that troop withdrawal should not be 
immediate. 
 
¶15.  (U) This cable was cleared by Puneet Talwar. 
BURNS