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INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 000361 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PLS PASS TO USAID LAC 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN GREENE AND NYMAN 
DEPT FOR DRL G. MAGGIO 
DEPT FOR USOAS 
NSC FOR V ALVARADO 
SOUTHCOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON KDEM NU
SUBJECT: WHA/CEN DIRECTOR FEELEY VISITS NICARAGUA 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 153 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 209 
     ¶C. MANAGUA 297 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A Trivelli for reasons 1.4(b,d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  During his March 4-5 visit to Nicaragua, 
Office Director for Central American Affairs John Feeley 
delivered a consistent message that the USG desires a 
constructive and positive relationship with the Ortega 
administration and that the U.S. will stay engaged for the 
benefit of the Nicaraguan people.  Feeley also led the 
technical delegation that will study Nicaragua's medical 
infrastructure with a view to formulating a USG offer to 
provide medical equipment in exchange for obsolete Nicaraguan 
anti-air missles (MANPADs).  Former Nicaraguan Liberal 
Alliance president and Managuan mayoral candidate Eduardo 
Montealegre acknowledged the risks of his alliance with the 
Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC), but insisted that 
"getting rid of the Pacto means getting rid of Ortega." 
USAID's democracy partners warned that a divided and weakened 
civil society is incapable of mounting organized opposition 
to Ortega's increasingly autocratic administration.  Managua 
mayor Nicho Marenco characterized the Liberal mayoral ticket 
for Managua as "strong" and admitted that the FSLN's mayoral 
candidate "has no chance."  Former Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN) vice president Sergio Ramirez 
supported the USG's general engagement policy in Nicaragua, 
while making the point that international cooperation should 
be separated from political relations.  In an extended 
interview with a leading daily, Feeley recapped both his 
MANPADs mission and offered a general overview of 
U.S.-Nicaraguan relations as productive and satisfactory, 
despite some differences with the FSLN government, 
particularly on property claim resolutions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
MANPADs, Regional Issues, and Colombia with Ortega 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C) Feeley and the Ambassador, along with two 
representatives from the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence 
Center (AFMIC) visiting Nicaragua to conduct a comprehensive 
analysis of Nicaragua's public health system, met with 
President Ortega on the evening of March 4.  Although the 
meeting was delayed until after 10pm, the encounter quickly 
became an informal and wide ranging conversation, despite the 
presence of several Nicaraguan ministers, military officials, 
and a large press contingent.  Feeley stressed to Ortega that 
the MANPADs belong to another era and the USG and Ortega,s 
government have a rare opportunity to put much of that past 
behind them by reaching an agreement to turnover these 
missiles.  Feeley linked the destruction of these missiles to 
the administration,s Merida Initiative, underscoring that 
the transnational threats the isthmus and the United States 
confront cannot be effectively neutralized with MANPADs, but 
rather with increased interoperability among regional police 
forces, better intelligence and information sharing, and 
improved investigative and prosecutorial capabilities.  The 
AFMIC team leader provided an overview of the team,s mission 
and described initial impressions from the first day of field 
work. 
 
¶3. (C) Ortega segued from health care to migration and free 
trade, repeating his belief that CAFTA should be renegotiated 
due to the inherent asymmetries between the U.S. and regional 
economies and in order to "avoid driving more migration to 
the U.S." due to the closing of businesses.  Feeley countered 
that initial statistics from the region indicate that CAFTA 
has actually generated new jobs among small and medium 
businesses.  He highlighted the development linkages of CAFTA 
and export-driven growth with the MCC project in Nicaragua. 
Ortega concurred that the MCC has been a success and 
expressed his appreciation for MCC CEO Danilovich,s interest 
in the project, as well as his hope for more assistance of 
this nature.  He provided a detailed analysis of the state of 
Nicaraguan agriculture and the possibility that it could 
become Central America,s milk, dairy and beef provider. 
 
¶4. (C) Finally, Ortega touched on Nicaragua's dispute with 
Colombia over the 82nd parallel and the International Court 
of Justice's (ICJ) recent decision.  He also decried Colombia 
recent incursion into Ecuadorian territory and the strike on 
the FARC encampment which killed FARC spokesperson Raul 
Reyes.  Feeley responded that Colombia had a right to self 
defense from terrorist groups using the sovereign territory 
of neighboring states as a refuge.  He also stated that, in 
his personal opinion, neither Reyes nor the FARC genuinely 
sought a negotiated peace or incorporation into Colombian 
civil society.  The FARC seeks a power sharing arrangement 
and will continue to terrorize the Colombian people as long 
as its drug-fueled profits allow.  Ortega disagreed and 
stated his belief that the FARC seeks a more just Colombian 
society, but that Uribe is a bellicose and arrogant leader, 
as evidenced by the GOC,s provocations against Nicaragua in 
the Caribbean.  Feeley repeated the recent injunction of the 
Deputy Secretary to both FM Santos and Colombian FM Araujo 
that both sides desist from provocative actions and let the 
maritime boundary dispute be resolved by the ICJ.  Ortega 
responded Nicaragua would not seek confrontation, but he was 
unsure Colombia would exercise such self-restraint.  (NOTE: 
The following day the GON broke relations with Colombia over 
the Ecuador attack, only to restore them several days later 
following a Rio Summit meeting in Santo Domingo. END NOTE) 
 
Lesser of Two Evils 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C) Speaking of his decision to align his supporters with 
the PLC and run on the PLC ticket in November's municipal 
elections, Eduardo Montealegre readily acknowledged that this 
new alliance carries inherent risks.  Stating that the 
alliance "gives oxygen to (former President and convicted 
felon) Arnoldo Aleman," Montealegre insisted that "getting 
rid of the Pacto means getting rid of Ortega" and that 
winning the majority of the municipalities in November's 
election is essential to forestall Ortega's efforts to stay 
in power after 2011.  Despite his commitment to the alliance 
with the PLC, Montealegre wryly admitted that the Supreme 
Electoral Council (CSE) could rule the alliance illegal 
because "the law doesn't work and the CSE does what it 
wants."  Montealegre also spoke in favor of an amnesty law to 
provide some measure of protection against blackmail for 
those politicians seeking real change.  Without such a law, 
he reasoned, Ortega and Aleman will continue to manipulate 
the levers of state against any and all who threaten their 
power. 
 
Civil Society - The Deafening Silence 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) USAID's democracy partners -- International 
Republican Institute (IRI), National Democratic Institute 
(NDI), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems 
(IFES) -- decried civil society's slow self-destruction.  Due 
to power struggles and lack of cooperation, civil society 
groups have failed to mount a unified campaign against 
Ortega's steady concentration of power in the executive 
branch.  The three partners highlighted that civil society 
has been virtually silent on key issues such as firings 
within the CSE (ref A), the attempt to suspend elections in 
the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) (ref B), and the 
CSE's stripping control of the ALN from Montealegre (ref C) 
among other issues.  In addition, instead of supporting and 
strengthening political opposition parties, remarked the 
partners, civil society organizations are acting as 
quasi-political parties, fighting among themselves both for 
U.S. attention and organizational preeminence.  This behavior 
has frequently put them at odds with opposition parties and 
confused the population. 
 
Former Sandinista Vice President Criticizes Ortega 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (C) According to Sergio Ramirez, Vice President during 
Ortega's first administration, one of the more disturbing 
elements of Ortega,s first year as president was his ability 
to manipulate the IMF into allowing the GON to receive 
funding and Venezuela oil from President Chavez without any 
accounting for this income.  He also criticized Ortega,s 
"double discourse" -- his penchant for fiery anti-American 
rhetoric that is not matched by commensurately anti-U.S. or 
anti-market actions -- as a tactic to divert attention from 
his main goal of perpetuating himself in power.  Ramirez said 
if the FSLN were to succeed and Ortega to remain in power, 
Nicaragua would no longer be a "viable" country.   When asked 
his opinion of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, Ramirez agreed 
the U.S. was right to not respond publicly to Ortega,s 
egregious rhetoric and to remain engaged in helping alleviate 
Nicaragua,s crushing poverty.  Ramirez believed that 
international cooperation needed to be separated from 
political relations.  In his view, one country helping 
another, despite political disagreements, was "the right 
thing to do."  He also recognized that the Nicaraguan people 
were sophisticated enough to recognize these dichotomy, but 
would prefer that the U.S. and Nicaragua maintain good 
relations despite their President,s often confusing public 
attitude with regard to the United States. 
 
Marenco - "FSLN Has no Chance to Win in Managua" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (C) In a lunch meeting with Feeley, Dionisio "Nicho" 
Marenco, the FSLN mayor of Managua, directly stated that his 
former vice mayor -- former championship boxer and the FSLN's 
mayoral candidate for Managua in November, Alexis Arguello -- 
"doesn't have a chance to win (in November's election).  No 
way."  According to Marenco, the FSLN bases don't like 
Arguello -- who continues to struggle with drug and alcohol 
addictions -- but he remains completely loyal to Ortega and 
First Lady Rosario Murillo.  Marenco characterized the 
Liberal coalition ticket of Eduardo Montealegre and PLC 
deputy Enrique Quinonez as "strong" and admitted that he is 
"comfortable" with the coalition.  In reference to the state 
of the economy, Marenco commented that the Ortega 
administration faces some very tough challenges in light of 
the glaring contrast between promised jobs and improved 
services and the reality of sharp prices increases for water, 
electricity, fuel, and food. 
 
Central Bank - Nicaragua Remains on Track 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9. (SBU) According to Antenor Rosales, President of 
Nicaragua's Central Bank, the IMF visit went well, with 
Nicaragua meeting most of its targets.  Rosales pointed out 
that both sides agreed on the importance of accounting for 
Venezuelan assistance, particularly the money from the oil 
import scheme.  In Rosales, view, as long as the funds were 
used in productive sectors such as agriculture and 
infrastructure, the possible inflationary effects should be 
tolerable. (NOTE: Rosales indicated that income from the oil 
scheme totaled USD 128 million in 2007. END NOTE)  Looking at 
2008 and beyond, for the FSLN to fulfill its campaign 
promises, Rosales believes the GON needs to solve the 
electricity shortage problem, improve the investment climate 
to attract investors (and generate the promised jobs and 
economic growth), and keep macroeconomic stability to keep 
the blessing and approval of the IMF and donors. 
 
Agreeing to Disagree 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10.  (C) Aside from agreeing to check the status of a draft 
Standard of Forces Agreement (SOFA) stalled in the Ministry 
for two months, Foreign Minister Samuel Santos was either 
evasive or prickly on a range of topics including pending 
American citizen property disputes, Nicaragua's liberal 
interpretation of their rights based on the Hague's recent 
decision on the 82nd parallel, the potential suspension of 
elections in the RAAN, and the "independence" of the CSE. 
Santos referred to Montealegre and the Liberals as "political 
infants" whose inability to resolve their internal problems 
was not the fault of the FSLN.  He emphasized that the CSE's 
decision to move up the electoral calendar did not favor the 
FSLN.  Santos admitted that the Liberal coalition, if it 
stands, "will be difficult" in the Managua mayoral race. 
 
¶11.  (U) In a comprehensive interview with the daily 
newspaper "El Nuevo Diario," Feeley emphasized our positive 
engagement in Nicaragua as exemplified by our MCC program and 
Hurricane Felix reconstruction efforts.  He noted the USG's 
satisfaction with Ortega's willingness to negotiate a 
settlement on the MANPADs issue.  He remarked that while the 
USG has not yet reached the point where precise numbers can 
be discussed, both sides have shown a strong willingness to 
work towards a solution that benefits the Nicaraguan people. 
Feeley also made it clear that, despite the generally 
positive direction of the USG-GON relationship, the USG 
expects the GON to take the measures necessary to resolve the 
over 600 outstanding property cases in accordance with 
Congressional mandates.  Mentioning the Merida Initiative, 
Feeley then described the USG's commitment to work with 
Mexico and the Central American governments to fight 
narco-trafficking and terrorism, further extending the USG's 
overall committment to Nicaragua. 
TRIVELLI