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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000348 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN - GREENE AND NYMAN 
DEPT FOR PM/SNA - DETEMPLE 
DEPT FOR L/PM - HEROLD 
SOUTHCOM FOR ADM STAVRIDIS AND FPA 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR JAG 
OSD FOR OSD(POLICY) - WALTER EARLE 
NSC FOR ALVARADO AND FISK 
DHS FOR USCG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2018 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS KTIA NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA SOFA LETTER: POTENTIALLY DIFFICULT ROAD 
AHEAD 
 
REF: SECSTATE 2677 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli for reasons 1.4 b & d. 
 
¶1.  (C/NF) SUMMARY.  After nine weeks of delays on the part 
of the Foreign Ministry (MINREX), on March 14 we were finally 
able to meet with Ministry and Nicaraguan Army officials to 
formally deliver the draft text of the letter regarding the 
bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and talking 
points per reftel instructions.  We had initially believed 
that the government's prior reluctance to engage with us on 
SOFA was due to its misunderstanding about the process of 
concluding the agreement.  However, during the meeting, it 
became clear that the Nicaraguan side may have serious 
reservations about the content proposed in our draft 
agreement.  The meeting with MINREX Director for Immunities 
Maria Esther Chamorro was cordial, but without tipping her 
hand Chamorro indicated there were concerns about at least 
three items:  the language regarding carrying weapons, the 
granting of tax exemptions that pertain to the proposed 
administrative and technical staff (A&T)-equivalent immunity, 
and the entry/exit protocols.  We were able to assure our 
counterparts that our draft proposal was open for discussion 
and not a fait accompli, as they had initially feared.  We 
also clarified that the proposal was not blanket permission 
for any U.S. Armed Forces personnel to enter Nicaragua. 
Chamorro said her government would not be prepared to discuss 
the proposal further before the March 24.  We reiterated our 
desire to conclude an agreement quickly and avoid further 
cancellations of training and humanitarian activities.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C/NF) On March 14, nine weeks after receipt of reftel, we 
were able to formally meet with Foreign Ministry (MINREX) 
officials to deliver the SOFA dipnote draft text and talking 
points per reftel.  NOTE: In January, we did pass the draft 
text informally via email after a week of having our initial 
meeting requests to MINREX repeatedly postponed.  END NOTE. 
We explained that our goal in requesting a meeting had been 
to determine whether there was agreement or near-agreement on 
the dipnote text before sending a formal, signed version.  We 
noted that our proposed text was virtually the same as the 
2007 exchange of notes -- the only significant change being 
the 2008 list of operational activities.  We added that we 
were open to any concerns and emphasized our desire to 
conclude an agreement quickly, given that two months had 
already passed and some operations had already been canceled. 
 We had initially believed that the government's reluctance 
to engage with us on SOFA was due to their misunderstanding 
about the process of concluding the agreement.  However, 
during the meeting, it became clear that some there may be 
serious reservations about the content proposed in our draft 
agreement. 
 
¶3.  (C/NF) Our meeting had originally been scheduled with 
three senior officials -- Maria Ester Chamorro, Director of 
the Immunities Division; Mario Rodriguez, Director of the 
International Agreements Division; and Lorena Martinez, 
Director of the South America Division (and former Director 
of International Cooperation) -- however, when we arrived 
Chamorro was the only Director present.  We were somewhat 
surprised to see Gregorio Torres, our normal counterpart from 
the North America Division, who had been scrupulously 
avoiding us on this issue for the previous two months.  Also 
present, in uniform, was a LTC Estrada, from the Nicaraguan 
Army.  Rodriguez and Martinez never appeared for the meeting. 
 Chamorro was clearly in the lead for MINREX.  She had 
clearly been through the draft text, as it was highlighted in 
several places and, as the discussion progressed, it became 
clear she had identified several points of serious concern 
about the dipnote text. 
 
¶4.  (C/NF) Chamorro was cordial, but without tipping her hand 
she indicated concerns about at least three items, namely, 
the language regarding carrying weapons, the granting of tax 
exemptions that pertain to the proposed A&T-equivalent 
immunity, and the entry/exit protocols.  Chamorro indicated 
that her government needed additional time for internal 
consultations and said the Ministry would contact us once 
they were prepared to discuss the proposal further.  She 
cautioned that nothing would be possible before the March 24 
end of Holy Week.  LTC Estrada noted that the 2008 list of 
planned operational activities had already been approved by 
the National Assembly and published in "La Gaceta," 
Nicaragua's "Federal Register."  He added that the Army had 
been disappointed that some activities had already been 
canceled due to the absence of an agreement.  He added that 
the Army supported a quick resolution that would avoid 
further cancellations, though he deferred to MINREX on the 
legal and procedural requirements that were necessary to do 
so. 
 
¶5.  (C/NF) We assured Chamorro that our draft proposal was 
open for discussion and not a fait accompli, as she had, 
apparently and incorrectly, initially feared.  We also 
clarified that the proposal would apply to those individuals 
and units deployed to Nicaragua as part of one of the agreed 
operational activities, and was not blanket permission for 
any U.S. military personnel to enter Nicaragua without cause. 
 We closed noting our disappointment that the two-month delay 
had caused some operational activities to be canceled, and 
reiterated our desire to conclude an agreement quickly to 
avoid further cancellations of training and humanitarian 
activities. 
 
¶6.  (C/NF) Over the weekend, the Ambassador raised the SOFA 
with Vice President Jaime Morales, who responded that he was 
shocked by the slow pace of progress and said he would raise 
the issue directly with President Ortega.  Also, on March 24, 
the Ambassador telephoned FM Santos to convey our concern at 
the lack of progress on the SOFA and to urge quick action. 
Santos replied that the SOFA had come up on the margins of 
his participation in the OAS Ministerial during the week of 
March 17.  He said that his staff was concerned with one 
minor point in the text, which he couldn't recall, but asked 
that he be sent a clean copy of the draft text.  He promised 
to press his staff to resolve this issue quickly. 
 
¶7.  (C/NF) COMMENT.  When we arrived at MINREX for our March 
17 meeting there seemed to be some confusion about whether we 
actually had an appointment.  We have noted before that it 
has become increasingly difficult to engage with the Foreign 
Ministry, on even the most basic of issues.  Our 
working-level contacts seem increasingly unable to assist 
with the most routine of requests, which requires us to 
"bundle" issues for the Ambassador to raise directly with the 
Foreign Minister episodically. 
TRIVELLI