VZCZCXRO6246
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0388/01 0761507
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161507Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0218
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000388 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR AF/SPG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2023 
TAGS: PREL PINS MARR MPOS SU
SUBJECT: VIEWS ON MARCH 1 BORDER SKIRMISHES FROM SOUTH OF 
THE BORDER 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 308 
 
     ¶B. HOTR IIR 6 890 0155 08 
     ¶C. KHARTOUM 328 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto M. Fernandez. Reasons 1.4 (b,d 
) 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Discussions with senior UN and UNMIS 
officials in Juba and Aweil, in addition to follow-on 
discussions with various elements of the SPLA, place March 1 
skirmishes not in the disputed region of Abyei but south of 
the Kiir River near Rumaker, Northern Bahr el Ghazal state. 
UNMIS officials in Aweil point to growing SPLA tensions with 
SAF or SAF-aligned forces as the cause of not only 
December-January skirmishes, but also "SAF border probes" 
dating to October 2007 that occurred amidst senior-level 
discussions on redeployment at both the Khartoum and Juba 
level.  This leads Post to conclude that a series of 
incidents have occurred (and are likely to continue) along 
the South Darfur/Southern Kordofan/Northern Bahr el Ghazal 
borders.  Movement by both armies appears to show that both 
sides are attempting to carve out resource-rich territory on 
either side of the 1956 border.  Both the SPLA and SAF are 
using military pressure to affect resolution of the Abyei 
impasse. END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
UN ASSERTS MARCH 1 VIOLENCE OCCURRED IN SOUTH 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Aweil's UN Resident Coordinator (RC) Mohammed Khan 
told ConGen PolOff on March 6 that "he was absolutely 
certain" that the March 1 skirmishes (REFTEL) between SPLA 
and SAF-supported popular defense forces occurred in Northern 
Bahr el Ghazal state near the village of Rumaker, about 50 
kilometers south of the River Kiir in Northern Bahr el Ghazal 
state (NBEG). (NOTE: The Kiir River is also known as the Bahr 
el Arab. END NOTE.) Military observers from the UNMIS Aweil 
Team Site showed ConGen PolOff their maps on which they have 
plotted incidents within NBEG and the region. The March 1 
incident dips well below what is the currently-accepted as 
the 1956 border.  UNMIS RC and Milobs detailed to PolOff 
accounts relayed to them - by Rumaker residents and by 
transiting traders - of repeated attacks by heavily-armed 
"muhajadeen" against SPLA positions around Rumaker. UNMIS 
Civil Affairs Chief Samantha Barnes told PolOff on March 4 
that UN DSS believes that at least 70 PDF members had been 
killed, and a "well-equipped force of at least 1,000" took 
part in the attacks.  UN DSS personnel traveled with Poloff 
to Aweil and then onwards to Rumaker for a site assessment 
that day.  Briefing Poloff on the return flight to Juba, UN 
DSS personnel commented "a gun-mounted truck is a fairly 
remarkable acquisition for a Misseriya herdsman."  Pressed as 
to whether he believed Misseriya tribesmen were behind the 
March 1 attacks, he expressed his view that ethnic Misseriya 
allegedly accepting monetary inducement to enlist hardly 
warranted "the herdsman moniker."  "These were not provoked 
shepherds," he stressed, "this was PDF."  SPLA sources told 
ConGen staff that they had seized 5 SAF prisoners during the 
March 1 NBEG raids, and intended to raise this issue at the 
next Joint Defense Board meeting. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
SPLA ACTIONS BELIE WORDS -- TO A DEGREE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Post notes that SPLA Chief of Staff Oyai Deng Ajak 
told ConGen staff March 1 that the SPLA had been attacked by 
SAF-supported PDF forces at three positions along the River 
Kiir (Ref A).  Juba-based sources told ConGen Defense Liaison 
Officer that the SPLA had positioned at least one "screening 
element" north of the river in what is Southern Kordofan. 
Similar reports also place a second SPLA unit near Grinti 
south of the Kiir, but straddling the NBEG border. (Ref B). 
It is entirely possible that SPLA/Misseriya skirmishes 
attributed to "undisciplined" SPLA could have been initiated 
by this northern-most unit in response to infiltration by 
SAF-supported PDF forces southward into NBEG.  UNMIS RCs in 
Aweil and Juba have no reports from UNMIS RC Abyei that 
corroborate March 3 media accounts about offensive operations 
by the SPLA, nor does UN DSS/Juba. 
 
¶4. (C) SPLA U.S. Liaison Officer Colonel Dut Paul Garang told 
ConGen PolOff March 5 that Major General Piang had "traveled 
to the front" on March 3 to meet with SPLA units "around" the 
Kiir River.  ConGen PolOff confirmed in discussions with NBEG 
Security Director and NBEG Deputy Governor on March 7 that 
Piang had presided over state-level security meetings in 
Aweil, had met with the SPLA's 15th Brigade in Winjik (NBEG), 
and had traveled to the towns of Majok Yienthiu (NBEG), and 
 
KHARTOUM 00000388  002 OF 003 
 
 
Abyei. USG-contract military advisors told PolOff March 5 
that Piang's travel was linked to March 1 concerns voiced by 
SPLA Chief of Staff Oyai Deng Ajak about what Ajak termed "a 
marked decline in intelligence gathering" by SPLA forces 
along the 1956 border.  (COMMENT: Piang's duties within the 
SPLA include operations and training -- making assertions of 
a discipline problem (Ref C) or possibly the need for updated 
marching orders to SPLA units (related to observation and 
reporting) equally plausible. END NOTE.) 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
NBEG PERSPECTIVE ON CLASHES PAST AND PRESENT 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) RC Khan reviewed October-February PDF and SPLA 
movements in the NBEG border region, noting that there was 
direct SAF-SPLA conflict on October 10, 2007 following 
provocation by SAF military assigned to a garrison outside of 
Majok Yienthiu.  One hundred SAF had moved out of the 
garrison and, according to Khan, attacked an SPLA unit moving 
westward across Majok Yienthiu toward Rumaker. That incident 
and the ensuing violence led to road closures from Malualkon 
to Warawar and Rumaker northwards to the border by the SPLA. 
(COMMENT: This meant the Aweil-Meriem highway was blocked 
from the South by the SPLA and from the North by SAF-back 
PDF, isolating Abyei and NBEG from goods and services. END 
COMMENT). Khan maintains that the road closures were meant 
not to put restive tensions into check but rather to shroud 
SPLA activities along the border region. 
 
¶6. (C) According to Khan, UNMIS/Juba chief David Gressly 
raised access issues on behalf of WFP and other UN 
humanitarian agencies with the NBEG Governor in mid-January. 
The Governor flatly refused to permit UN access to the 
northeast corner of NBEG state, claiming "the SPLA is open 
and transparent with you, and then suffers the consequences 
of attacks by well-informed SAF.  Yet when SAF restricts your 
movement around Abyei, there are no complaints, and Khartoum 
suffers no consequences.  We are tired of being punished for 
being the only group that adheres to the rules." Queried as 
to whether recent redeployment by SAF out of NBEG has 
improved the SPLA's outlook, Khan laughed. "Those barracks 
over there -- they are full of SAF, and their numbers grow 
each evening.  That means the SPLA (present only as part of 
the JIU) is outnumbered two-to-one in their own state 
capital!" (COMMENT: This is similar to descriptions of SAF 
presence in Bentiu (Unity State), Renk and Malakal (Upper 
Nile state) where GOSS and SPLA officials have alleged that 
SAF have merely retreated-in-place into civilian life by 
shedding their uniforms (and keeping their weapons) rather 
than affecting full redeployment northward. These SAF are 
supposedly ready to take up their arms when necessary. END 
COMMENT). 
 
------------------------------------------ 
NBEG PERSPECTIVES ON ABYEI REGION VIOLENCE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Aweil Peace Commissioner Lino Adub, recently returned 
from Muglad, similarly reviewed for ConGen PolOff SAF and 
SAF-aligned PDF movements within Southern Kordofan state 
following the SPLM's December 2007 appointment of Edward Lino 
as the party's interim administrator for Abyei.  According to 
Adub, Misseriya clashed with Southern Sudan Police Services 
(SSPS) in Ariik, south of Abyei town. (NOTE: Demobilized SPLA 
and SPLA aligned militias were placed into the SSPS in the 
Spring of 2006. SSPS presence in the Abyei environs 
technically violates the CPA, as the South's police force 
does not have jurisdiction in Southern Kordofan state. END 
NOTE.) Regional tensions simmered through February 7, when 
the SPLA-escorted convoy of the Commissioner of Abiemnon came 
under fire from a passing convoy of SAF.  The ensuing gun 
battle, which resulted in forces taking offensive positions 
on opposite sides of the roadway and saw a dozen dead and 
twenty-plus wounded.  Adub claims that following the fire 
fight SAF bribed Misseriya to close the roadways.  Blockades 
of road North of Abyei town leading into Muglad were in place 
by February 8.  On February 9, despite the presence of a 
joint investigating committee on the same road, Misseriya 
militia attacked a commercial bus traveling past the site of 
the February 7 skirmish, resulting in the death of seven 
passengers. Dinka residents fearing repercussions moved 
temporarily from Abyei to (formerly SPLA-controlled) Agok, 
and on February 12 the largely Misseriya security committee 
met in Diffa and invited SPLA General Valentino (engaged in 
Ngo Dinka-Misseriya shuttle diplomacy since late January) to 
participate in the meeting. Simultaneously, Ngok Dinka and 
Misseriya leaders met in Abyei town and held discussions 
which resulted in the subsequent shaky peace pact that still 
holds to this day.  Adub noted that the peace pact calls for 
 
KHARTOUM 00000388  003 OF 003 
 
 
an agreement to stop road blockades impacting the Abyei 
region, commits the parties to a joint investigation of the 
February 7 incident, and establishes a joint dispute 
resolution mechanism to limit the outbreak of future conflict 
at the tribal level.  As NBEG Peace Commissioner, Adub and 
his Unity State counterpart will have observer status at 
subsequent Misseriya/Ngok Dinka discussions. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) While at least one chapter of the March 1 attacks has 
been verified as occurring in the South, therefore making it 
unlikely that the SPLA were the aggressors, the nuances are 
important. Post has reported that the SPLA took company-sized 
units from other locations throughout the South and deployed 
them (to division-sized strength) at points along the 1956 
border. SPLA observers assert this is chiefly to hide SPLA 
redeployment, and we are inclined to believe them.  Both 
sides are maneuvering and cheating but the SAF has been much 
more brazen, with overt SAF incursions into Upper Nile in the 
winter of 2007, gun-mounted truck supported "Misseriya" 
incursions into the South in December/January, and 
SAF-instigated violence in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in both 
October 2007 and March 2008.  More recent reliance by the SAF 
on predominantly-Misseriya PDF suggests a return by Khartoum 
to its well-worn strategy of divide and conquer through the 
spread of fear and distrust among the inhabitants of the 
Abyei region and the North/South border area more broadly. 
We note, however, that while the SPLA claims to have 
recovered SAF insignia and ID cards from the dead, there is 
no external mechanism through which to verify "Misseriya 
herdsmen" versus PDF militiamen who happen to be Misseriya. 
 
¶9. (C) COMMENT CON'T: Motivation for recent SAF-assisted 
attacks remains a question.  Two theories circulate within 
diplomatic circles: probing of SPLA strength along the 
North/South border or a (perhaps mutual) attempt to establish 
the 1956 border through military might. The Bahr el Ghazal 
region and western areas of Southern Kordofan are rich in 
mineral deposits. Continued lack of clarity regarding border 
demarcation for troops on either side of the North/South 
border has given both parties ample leeway to argue that they 
are justified in maintaining their present positions.  This 
argues for the urgent deployment of formed and functional 
JIUs to the area, enhanced UNMIS oversight and unfettered 
access for border demarcation -- both of which are long 
overdue. 
FERNANDEZ