VZCZCXYZ3878
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0299/01 0620952
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 020952Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0074
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 000299 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN 
ADDIS ABAB ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY VISITS DARFUR, PRESSES FOR 
FASTER UNAMID DEPLOYMENT AND OFFERS ASSURANCES TO HELP 
 
Classified By: CDA ALberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) U.S. Presidential Special Envoy Richard Williamson met 
with UNAMID political and military leadership in El Fasher to 
emphasize the importance that President Bush places on 
resolving the crisis in Darfur and the administration's 
willingness to commit significant additional financial and 
political resources to expedite the deployment of 
peacekeepers.  UNAMID officials described the logistical, 
administrative and political challenges currently facing the 
UN operation and identified several areas where immediate 
U.S. assistance is welcomed.  UNAMID Joint Special 
Representative Adada highlighted Sudan's intent to imminently 
expel the peacekeeping force's British chief of staff.  The 
Special Envoy also paid a courtesy call on the Wali of North 
Darfur.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
JSR DIPLOMATICALLY DESCRIBES UNAMID CHALLENGES 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (C) U.S. Presidential Special Envoy Richard S. Williamson, 
accompanied by U.S. Charge d'Affaires Alberto Fernandez, led 
an eleven-person delegation to El Fasher, North Darfur on 
February 27 to meet with senior AU-UN Hybrid Operation in 
Darfur (UNAMID) political and military officials, including 
Joint Special Representative (JSR) Rudolphe Adada, Deputy 
Force Commander Brigadier General Karenzi and Chief of Staff 
Brigadier General Patrick Davidson-Houston.  The Special 
Envoy also paid a courtesy call on Wali of North Darfur 
Othman Mohammed Yousif Kibir and visited Al Salam Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDP) camp on the outskirts of El Fasher. 
 
¶3. (C) Adada summarized the principal challenges facing 
UNAMID as the slow pace of incoming units, the lack of 
sufficient infrastructure and logistical support to 
accommodate the force and the recent up-tick in violence in 
West Darfur, which will have "obvious negative consequences 
for the political process."  Adada explained his vision of 
enhancing security through accelerated deployment of UN 
peacekeepers but pointed out that the Government of Sudan 
(GoS) continues to reject non-African units, including from 
Thailand and Nepal.  Adada described Presidential Advisor 
(and executor of the Darfur file) Nafie al Nafie's recent 
statement that "all African troops must deploy before 
non-Africans" as a serious setback. 
 
¶4. (C) Commenting on recent deployment developments, the JSR 
noted that the Ethiopian and Egyptian battalions are expected 
to arrive within the next two-three months and that, of the 
Heavy Support Package (HSP), only half of the Chinese 
engineering company and one Formed Police Unit (FPU) from 
Bangladesh has arrived.  Adada also remarked that operational 
decisions such as re-directing the incoming Egyptian 
battalion to North Darfur, rather than South Darfur where it 
originally planned to deploy, might cause additional delays. 
(Note: UNAMID Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai pushed to 
position the Egyptian battalion in North Darfur, where local 
sentiment is more favorably inclined toward Egyptians and its 
capabilities are better suited for the operating environment. 
 UN Assistant Secretary General and Head of the Department of 
Field Support Jane Hall-Lute, as well as UNAMID Integrated 
Support Services (ISS) officers opposed the move because of 
the logistical implications; in late February, DPKO Chief 
Jean-Marie Guehenno ultimately decided to support Agwai, who 
will travel in the first week of March to Cairo to meet with 
Egyptian defense officials.  End Note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
S/E EXHORTS URGENCY, PLEDGES HELP IN UNAMID DEPLOYMENT 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶5. (C) Special Envoy Williamson acknowledged the unique 
challenges and difficult operating environment--both 
politically and militarily--facing UNAMID.  He emphasized, 
however, that expediting the peacekeepers' deployment is an 
urgent priority of the U.S. President, and the U.S. 
Government is prepared to expend significant financial and 
political resources to ensure that UNAMID expands rapidly and 
with the training and equipment it requires to function 
effectively.  As a first step, Williamson held that UNAMID 
should aim to absorb up to 3,600 African troops by June. 
This accomplished, he said, it was his belief ) based on 
 
recent conversations with al Nafie ) that the GoS would 
accept the Thai and Nepalese units shortly thereafter. 
(Note: The 3,600 additional troops derive from one each 
800-soldier Ethiopian and Egyptian battalions, fresh rotation 
of existing battalions that will be brought up from 650 to 
800 personnel, and the injection of Egyptian transport and 
communications companies.  End Note.) 
 
¶6. (C) Underscoring the need for urgency in "getting boots on 
the ground" and the U.S. desire to help proactively in 
accomplishing this objective, the Special Envoy solicited 
specific input from UNAMID officials on areas in need of 
immediate assistance.  Beyond material, training, equipping 
and financial contributions, including the 100 million 
dollars pledged by President Bush during his recent tour in 
Africa, Williamson stressed that he would seek to leverage 
U.S. political clout to aid UNAMID, including--if 
necessary--helping to resolve the issue of the re-positioned 
Egyptian battalion. 
 
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AREAS FOR POTENTIAL USG ASSISTANCE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Responding to the Special Envoy's queries throughout 
several meetings, the JSR, Deputy JSR for Operations and 
Administration Hossein Medilly, the Deputy Force Commander 
and the Chief of Staff variously highlighted key areas where 
the U.S. might lend assistance, including: 
 
-- Provision of water treatment and acquisition equipment at 
numerous UNAMID camps. 
-- Assistance in ensuring that incoming battalions are not 
only fully equipped but are also trained technically and 
tactically on their equipment and have the means to maintain 
and sustain it in the field throughout their rotation. 
-- Expedited camp expansion to accommodate 800-soldier 
battalions and a potential increased force flow. 
-- Creation of self-sufficient "reception capacity" at 
several sites in Darfur to receive incoming units and serve 
as transition space. 
-- Assistance in encouraging the Canadian helicopter 
contractor, Skylink, to move its personnel and equipment out 
of theater so that UNAMID can bring in some of their own 
helicopters currently based in Khartoum. 
-- Infusion of "proper" military vehicles that are more 
consistent with the stronger mandate of UNAMID (vice AMIS) 
and the more complex security environment on the ground. 
-- Encouragement of Western militaries to send additional 
advisors to UNAMID to focus specifically on developing staff 
capacity 
 
¶8. (C) The Special Envoy observed that many of the areas 
where UNAMID requires support could have been addressed 
earlier with better communication between the UN and USG. 
Williamson related that his guidance from the President is 
"to be exceedingly proactive in supporting UNAMID...and the 
UN should test us."  On Skylink's helicopters, the Special 
Envoy committed to expediting resolution of the issue with 
the Canadians "by next Wednesday."  He reiterated that the 
U.S. wants to commit its resources wisely, which is why 
transparent dialogue with UNAMID and DPKO regarding critical 
shortfalls is paramount.  (Comment: There is general 
consensus among the military and civilian components of 
UNAMID that logistical support remains the "make or break" 
factor for effective UNAMID deployment and sustainability. 
There are differences between the components, however, in how 
to tackle the problem, which could diminish the UN's ability 
to clearly communicate its needs to the U.S. and other 
donors.  Skylink is illustrative: Despite a contract funded 
by the Canadian government through March 31, UNAMID civilian 
leadership elected, based on apparent past disputes with the 
company, no longer to task Skylink aircraft, over the 
objections of the Force Commander, who sought the additional 
air assets to bolster military operations.  End Comment.) 
 
-------------------------------- 
NEW UNAMID CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Providing an overview of the force's revised concept 
of operations, a senior UNAMID planning officer described the 
new plan to project peacekeeping patrols from approximately 
35 base camps, including three &supercamps8 in Nyala, El 
Fasher and El Geneina.  UNAMID planners scrapped the previous 
concept of operations, which envisioned up to 55 battalion 
and company sites scattered throughout Darfur, as they 
 
realized that it would be logistically infeasible to 
re-supply so many camps by air (essential in Darfur, given 
the vast distances) and leave the more numerous, smaller 
camps vulnerable to enemy attack.  With fewer bases, Chief of 
Staff Davidson-Houston observed, less soldiers would be 
required for camp protection and more could be patrolling, 
usually going out for seven to 14 days at a time. 
Davidson-Houston acknowledged that the new concept of 
operations, already approved by DPKO, inherently suggests 
different training and equipment requirements, such as skills 
in long-range patrolling, rationed meals, reliable mobile 
communications gear and appropriate tentage.  He highlighted 
that UNAMID would be better off if it receives fewer pieces 
of military equipment that included the "full package" 
(pre-deployment training, spare parts, maintenance support, 
tactical training, etc.) rather than piecemeal gear that is 
difficult to sustain and incompatible across the force. 
 
--------------------------- 
FATE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Broaching the topic of the Sudan's repeated demands 
to expel military Chief of Staff Patrick Davidson-Houston, 
JSR Adada lamented that Sudanese officials showed little 
willingness to soften their stance, insisting that the CoS 
leave by the end of February.  (Comment: Davidson-Houston 
remained in El Fasher as of February 29.  He has been a 
critical factor in driving UNAMID deployment forward, 
possibly one of the reasons--beside his British 
nationality--that Sudan seeks to eject him.  Khartoum 
canceled February 28 meetings on the topic with the JSR, who 
went to AU headquarters in Addis to seek further guidance. 
End Comment.) 
 
------------------------------------- 
REAL CONCERN WITH LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S)  At the end of the lunch, the civilian 
representatives departed, and the UNAMID Military 
representatives stayed to discuss specific operational 
concerns with US DOD personnel.  The discussion soon turned 
frank on the lack of internal operational control the UNAMID 
Force Commander has over the support structure for his 
troops.  Chief of Staff Davidson-Houston stated that General 
Agwai only commands the peace-keeping troops.  All logistics, 
transportation, and communication assets are controlled by 
independent UNAMID civilian section heads.  Davidson-Houston 
stated that "no U.S. Commander would ever agree to this kind 
of task organization."  General Agwai is responsible for 
overall military operations, but he has very little influence 
over the actual support of his own troops.  The implication 
was that if the military staff had full authority over the 
logistics infrastructure, operations could be conducted more 
efficiently and effectively. 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
COURTESY CALL WITH NORTH DARFUR WALI 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶12. (C) Interspersed with UNAMID meetings, the Special Envoy 
made a courtesy call on Wali of North Darfur Othman Mohammed 
Yousif Kibir.  The Wali pledged to expedite UNAMID's 
deployment, in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA), and pressed the U.S. Government to exert more 
pressure on rebels to join a peace process, give more focus 
to early recovery and rural development programs in Darfur 
(as a means of encouraging voluntary IDP returns), and 
facilitate stabilized relations between Chad and Sudan. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Special Envoy Williamson conveyed the importance 
that the U.S. administration places on the Darfur issue and 
its willingness to help resolve the conflict.  He elaborated 
that the U.S. intends to continue providing significant 
humanitarian assistance in Darfur and urged the Wali to 
assure access for all relief workers.  Williamson further 
noted U.S. appreciation for Sudan's acceptance of UNAMID and 
the expectation that the Wali would continue to facilitate 
the deployment of the peacekeeping force throughout North 
Darfur. 
 
¶14. (U) This cable was cleared by Special Envoy Williamson. 
FERNANDEZ