VZCZCXRO2792
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHJO #0040/01 0630837
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030837Z MAR 08
FM AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6116
INFO RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUCNSAD/SADC COLLECTIVE
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 2875

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JOHANNESBURG 000040 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOL FOR ILAB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB PREL SF
SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICA: WITS UNIVERSITY SOCIOLOGIST COMMENTS ON 
POLOKWANE 
 
JOHANNESBU 00000040  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Summary 
------------- 
 
¶1.  Professor Eddie Webster, head of the Sociology of Work Unit 
at Wits University in Johannesburg and colleague/wife Luli 
Cullinicos, presented a sociological assessment of the Polokwane 
conference at a February 29 breakfast seminar.   Webster said 
the 1996 introduction of GEAR without Parliamentary or NEDLAC 
oversight was the "original sin" that created a split between 
within the tripartite alliance of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP, 
but that the selection of Jacob Zuma as the standard-bearer did 
not come until later.   Webster presented data that indicated 62 
pQent of ANC members were either members of COSATU, the SACP 
or the ANC Youth League, and the 42 percent of ANC delegates in 
wealthy Gauteng Province were unemployed.   He described COSATU 
and the SACP as the "elephants in the room" at Polokwane, but 
urged that the labor movement remain a separate force outside of 
government.  End Summary. 
 
Demographics of ANC Delegates at Polokwane 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶2.  Webster, who had attended Polokwane as an SABC observer, 
provided an overview of the demographics of the ANC in the 
run-up to Polokwane.   His statistics showed that membership in 
the ANC increased from 416,869 paid up members in 2002 to the 
621,231 members in 2007, with one in four of all members in 2007 
coming from the Eastern Cape, where ANC membership doubled 
during this period.   Webster noted that membership fees were 
R12 a year (or less than $2) and it took just 100 members to 
form a new ANC branch.  He thought that much of the growth of 
branches was due to an "amoeba" theory, in which those who felt 
excluded in one branch simply split off and started their own 
branch.   Many of the leaders of ANC branches were deployed in 
the public service, legislature or private business, essentially 
leaving a vacuum, which was then filled by grassroots activists. 
  Webster said that these activists capitalized on resentment of 
how ANC insiders had used party membership to promote their 
careers and fortunes, capturing "the resentment engendered by a 
simultaneous growth of opportunity and inequality." 
 
¶3.  Webster also had statistics about poverty within the ANC 
membership.   A 2006 study commissioned by the ANC in Gauteng 
province showed that 42 percent of  its delegates were 
unemployed; that 30 percent lived in informal settlements; 44 
percent lived without access to water in their homes; 47 percent 
had not completed matric (Note: roughly equivalent to a high 
school diploma. End Note) and 25 percent had less than R1000 a 
month in disposable incomes.  (Comment:  Since Gauteng province 
is the third largest economy in Africa, and, together with 
Western Cape, has the lowest unemployment in South Africa, these 
rates may underestimate the overall poverty of ANC delegates on 
a national basis.  As Webster pointed out, the rates of 
unemployment for ANC members appear to be higher than the 
national unemployment rate. End Comment.) 
 
¶4.  Webster added that the differentiation between those in 
power and the common run of delegates in Polokwane was 
pronounced.  Those in power arrived in 4x4s, and dined in 
air-conditioned "network" rooms, while regular delegates came by 
bus and ate in tents or cafeterias.  Dense informal networks 
were built up, such as among rural women present.  Polokwane 
became a national theater that allowed a "coalition of the 
aggrieved" to "frame their resentments in a sense of moral 
indignation that enabled Jacob Zuma to seize the mantle of 
Tambo." 
 
Original Sin and Macroeconomic Policy 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶5.  The adoption of the Mbeki government's neo-liberal GEAR 
(Growth Employment And Redistribution) macroeconomic strategy in 
1996, without consultation with COSATU and the SACP and 
bypassing NEDLAC, the National Education Development and Labor 
Advisory Council, which has a statutory mandate to disQ 
economic and labor policies among tripartite constituencies and 
civil society, was the turning point in the Alliance.  Webster 
characterized this "bypassing of democratic structures" as 
post-apartheid government's "original sin."   Neither COSATU nor 
the SACP, though both alliance members, were able to influence 
this policy, developing a set of common grievances against the 
"hegemony" of the Mbeki government.   COSATU then-President 
Willie Madisha told Webster in 2003 that the labor federation 
resolved in 1998 to "recapture" the ANC and "ensure that the 
bourgeoisie does not run away with the revolution." 
 
¶6.  Webster noted although there were divergences, Zuma's 
selection as a standard-bearer for the "coalition of the 
aggrieved" was not made until sometime in 2000, when it first 
 
JOHANNESBU 00000040  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
became known that Zuma was under investigation by the Scorpions 
for alleged corruption.  COSATU was outraged at the perceived 
use of state resources to eliminate a rival, according to 
Webster.  Although neither COSATU nor the SACP were officially 
voting at Polokwane, the organizations were the "elephant in the 
room".  Webster said that 62 percent of paid-up ANC members were 
either members of COSATU, the SACP or the ANC Youth League. 
 
Polokwane as Warning and Opportunity 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶7.  The typology of leadership styles in post-colonial Africa 
varied along a grid of "authoritarian populism" and "popular 
democracy" either of which could be characterized as using state 
resources for private accumulation/corruption or for a 
commitment to public service.   Webster questioned where along 
that grid Polokwane would take South Africa.   He noted that too 
close an alignment of labor with the policy process would not be 
healthy, and warned that having labor be captive to state power 
could be dangerous.   However, Webster believed that COSATU was 
aware of this danger, as its February 28 press conference 
showed.  (Note: COSATU Central Executive Committee took issue 
with public statements made by ANC President Zuma on labor 
market flexibility.   End Note.) 
 
Implications for Policy 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  Despite the "recapturing" of the ANC by COSATU and the SACP, 
Webster doubted that national policies will change 
significantly.   Jacob Zuma is a politically ambiguous leader 
who represents multiple constituencies, including rural 
traditionalists, Webster said.  In addition, a shift in economic 
policy has already taken place in the form of increased social 
spending and the adoption of industrial policy.  This shift took 
place two or three years ago and will simply be continued by 
Zuma, Webster said. 
 
Comment 
-------------- 
 
¶9.   The demographic data presented by Professor Webster 
indicate the deep economic divisions still present in South 
African society, creating a fertile field for nuturing populist 
economic policies.  Webster was encouraging COSATU's membership, 
many of whom were in the audience, to Qtinue on the labor 
federation's path of policy independence from government.   In a 
follow-on conversation, he noted potentials parallels for COSATU 
with the experiences of other African state, where trade unions 
had become "clearly subservient clients of governments until the 
inevitable fallout".  COSATU's General Secretary Vavi, who 
recently implicitly criticized Zuma in a radio interview, at any 
rate seems unwilling to cut even his political allies any slack. 
 If politics is the art of compromise, then his personal 
unwillingness to do so, as much as any views on labor's policy 
independence, may result in COSATU remaining an independent  -- 
and critical --  force in Alliance politics. 
End Comment. 
COFFMAN