VZCZCJII899
PP RUEHC RUEHRH RUEHYN RHEHAAA RUEAIIA
DE RUEHJI #0148/01 0831153
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231153Z MAR 08
FM AMCONSUL JEDDAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0640
INFO RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 7823
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0141
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JEDDAH 000148 
 
RIYADH PLEASE PASS TO DHAHRAN, DEPT PASS TO NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2018 
TAGS: PARM PGOV PINR PREL PTER SNAR KCRM SA YE
SUBJECT: SMUGGLING ACROSS YEMENI BORDER DIFFICULT TO CURB 
 
Classified By: Consul General Tatiana C. Gfoeller for Reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The SAG continues to face difficulties in its 
efforts to curb the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and people 
across the Yemeni border, according to a Ministry of Interior 
(MoI) colonel stationed in Jizan.  The colonel cited terrain, 
profit motive, and smugglers' organization and tactics as the 
prime challenges facing the Kingdom's counter-smuggling 
operations, but noted modest progress in Saudi-Yemeni 
cooperation.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) At the conclusion of a March 1 - March 3 visit to the 
city of Jizan and the Farasan Islands, Econoffs had the 
opportunity to speak with COL Mohammed Abdullah Assiri 
(strictly protect) about Yemeni border security issues (NOTE: 
COL Assiri's official association was with the Jizan 
governorate's public relations department, but he confided to 
Econoffs that he was a colonel with the MoI and was in charge 
of security during our trip.  END NOTE.).  Based on his 
extensive and continuing involvement in border security 
operations, COL Assiri offered a candid account of the status 
of efforts to counter the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and 
people from Yemen into the Kingdom, stating that it was 
unlikely that the SAG would be able to curb illicit flows in 
the foreseeable future. 
 
Weapons, Drugs, and People 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) COL Assiri referred to Yemen as "a land of 60 million 
weapons, three per person" (NOTE: open source estimates range 
from 20 million to 60 million weapons and a population of 
about 22 million.  END NOTE.).  He said it was virtually 
impossible to keep this vast supply from spilling across the 
border, even though the MoI's Border Guard routinely 
interdicts large shipments of rifles, handguns, and 
ammunition.  The colonel was deeply concerned about the 
effect that this constant influx will have on the Kingdom's 
internal security. 
 
¶4. (C) The Border Guard is failing to curb the smuggling of 
the stimulant leaf qat, according to the colonel.  He cited 
the compelling economic motive for a Yemeni farmer to grow 
the crop, and said that Saudi consumer demand is a 
significant factor in maintaining the high price of the 
plant.  In addition to qat, he said that smugglers also bring 
marijuana across the border, and that both drugs are 
distributed to Saudi consumers by a loose network of gangs. 
 
¶5. (C) COL Assiri said that smuggled children make up a large 
portion of illicit human cross-border traffic, and are 
typically placed in child beggar rings.  Parents are often 
complicit, since the income from one child beggar can support 
an entire family back in Yemen.  The colonel said that the 
SAG repatriates all illegal immigrants, children and adults 
alike.  He noted that illegal Yemeni immigrants are usually 
much easier to apprehend than those from the Horn of Africa, 
as their expectation of easily sneaking into the Kingdom 
again makes them less resistant to capture. 
 
Difficulties Defending the Border 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The loosely distributed organization of the smuggling 
networks presents a growing challenge, according to the 
colonel.  Family and tribal connections, often spanning the 
border, play a crucial role in the networks.  Outside of 
these trusted associations, participants will have contact 
only with their immediate buyers and sellers, with limited or 
no information about the non-adjacent links in the 
distribution chain.  Even in the smuggling of weapons, 
smugglers will typically be motivated by profit rather than 
by ideology, unaware of the ultimate destination of the 
shipments they transmit. 
 
¶7. (C) Smugglers' tactics also make them hard to interdict, 
particularly in the mountainous western region.  COL Assiri 
described techniques such as walking in columns with 
individuals spaced far apart so that if the lead smuggler is 
shot or captured the others can escape.  He also noted their 
use of tricks such as wearing shoes that leave 
backwards-facing footprints.  The colonel said that the Saudi 
Border Guard was having some success via the increased use of 
booby traps.  However, the border remains so easy to cross 
that the MoI sees little reason to devote resources to 
guarding alternative channels such as coastal routes. 
Indeed, Econoffs saw only one coast guard observation post 
during their trip, and it was unmanned. 
 
¶8. (C) The colonel pointed to improved Saudi-Yemeni 
cooperation as one positive trend in the effort to curb 
smuggling.  This includes extradition treaties and joint 
training exercises.  He also noted that smuggling has dropped 
significantly during periods when the Yemeni government has 
attempted to prevent cross-border movement by Shia tribes 
aligned with the al-Houthi rebellion, most recently during a 
flare-up in January.  However, he repeatedly expressed his 
concern that the continuing high volume of illicit traffic 
will have a significant negative effect on internal stability 
and security. 
GFOELLER