VZCZCXRO2357
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #0411/01 0620725
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 020725Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8358
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000411 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG 
NSC FOR HUDSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EG SU
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY WILLIAMSON ASKS EGYPT TO PRESS SUDAN 
ON UNAMID 
 
REF: 2007 CAIRO 3101 
 
Classified by Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Meeting on February 24, Special Envoy to 
Sudan Richard Williamson asked Egyptian Foreign Minister 
Ahmed Aboul Gheit to press the GOS to drop its obstruction to 
UN/AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) deployment.  Aboul Gheit 
said that the GOE shares the USG's interest in stabilizing 
Darfur, but defended GOS objections to Swedish, Norwegian, 
and Thai troops deploying as part of UNAMID.  Stressing that 
the UN should seek troops from Muslim nations, Aboul Gheit 
said that Egypt is in renewed discussions with the UN on its 
offer of two more mechanized infantry battalions in addition 
to the one that the UN had accepted.  Aboul Gheit said Libya 
would need to be on board with any plans concerning Chad, and 
suggested creating a mechanism for the U.S., Egypt, France, 
and Libya to engage.  Williamson emphasized using the 2011 
referendum on Sudanese unity as a framework for North-South 
cooperation; Aboul Gheit focused on looking "beyond 2011." 
End summary. 
 
SE Williamson Asks GOE to Press GOS on UNAMID 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Special Envoy to Sudan Richard Williamson told Foreign 
Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit in their meeting February 24 that 
President Bush sought to alleviate the human tragedy in 
Darfur and to speed UNAMID deployment there in support of 
that humanitarian goal.  Williamson emphasized that neither 
the U.S. nor the international community is seeking regime 
change, and that stability on the ground through UNAMID, to 
which Khartoum previously agreed, helps rather than hurts the 
GOS.  In particular, dispersing the internally displaced 
persons (IDP) camps -  a hot-bed of rebel activity - cannot 
happen until UNAMID provides a safe environment for people to 
return home.  UNAMID, along with a European force on the Chad 
border, would also hinder rebel movements and action.  The 
U.S. has pledged USD 100 million to train and equip African 
countries to participate in UNAMID, however this will take 
time.  Meanwhile, the Swedes, Norwegians, and Thais are ready 
now, and the GOS is unreasonably blocking their deployment. 
Williamson thanked Egypt for its contribution to UNAMID, and 
asked Aboul Gheit to emphasize the message to the GOS that 
speedy UNAMID deployment is in the GOS' own interests.  "The 
U.S. can speak loudly, but when Egypt whispers Sudan 
listens."  Williamson also asked Aboul Gheit to press other 
Arab countries to send the same message to the GOS. 
 
¶3. (C) Aboul Gheit responded by noting that, while "we must 
be firm" with the GOS, the USG should "try to gain their 
confidence" rather than make threats.  The international 
community had erred with constant talk of sanctions and UN 
Security Council resolutions, he said.  As a result, he 
continued, the GOS is suspicious that the U.S. is focused on 
regime change, or on trying Sudanese officials before the 
International Criminal Court or new local courts.  However, 
"if you speak courteously you will engender a response," he 
said, suggesting that recently appointed chairman of the 
Assessment and Evaluation Commission UK Ambassador Derek 
Plumbly, formerly the UK's ambassador to Egypt, could be an 
effective interlocutor with Khartoum. 
 
GOE Defends GOS on UNAMID, More Egyptian Troops 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4. (C) Aboul Gheit defended GOS (and Libyan) objections to 
Swedish, Norwegian, and Thai troops for UNAMID, and 
criticized the UN for "picking and choosing" troops from 
among those offered.  The GOS had agreed that logistical and 
technical support for UNAMID could come from the 
international community, Aboul Gheit said, but had never 
understood from the 2006 agreement that created the hybrid 
force that non-African fighting troops would be part of 
UNAMID.  Instead of insisting on these forces the UN should 
accept more Muslim troops, which would be more acceptable to 
the GOS. 
 
¶5. (C) For instance, Aboul Gheit noted that the UN still has 
not accepted two of the three mobilized infantry battalions 
that Egypt had offered for UNAMID.  The GOE was now in 
renewed discussions with the UN DPKO on sending another 
battalion, but the Ministry of Defense, while it "did not say 
no," is "not showing as much eagerness" on sending further 
infantry.  Additionally, the UN had never responded to 
Egypt's offer to supply a unit from its elite traditional 
"Haganah" camel division - which in fact patrols the Egyptian 
side of the ancient "Darb al-Arba'in" ("Track of 40 Days") 
 
CAIRO 00000411  002 OF 002 
 
 
caravan route from Sudan.  Instead, the UN had recruited 300 
"English-speaking camel-riders from India." 
 
¶6. (C) Williamson noted USG displeasure with the UN DPKO's 
slow pace on UNAMID.  He suggested setting up a mechanism in 
New York of a small group of the most influential African and 
Arab countries to convene and compare notes on working with 
the UN Secretariat to help move the process along.  Aboul 
Gheit immediately accepted the proposal. 
 
Pressuring the Rebels, Talking With France and Libya 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶7. (C) The international community was still too focused on 
pressuring the GOS rather than the rebels, Aboul Gheit said. 
He said that the U.S. and France need to coordinate on 
pressing the rebels, given France's involvement in Chad, and 
given that France "allowed" Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim to move his forces to N'djamena. 
Aboul Gheit further complained that France continues to host 
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) leader Abdulwahid Nur in Paris 
despite his obstruction of the fall 2007 peace discussions. 
Williamson emphasized that the USG is raising the pressure on 
the rebels as well as the government.  In particular, the USG 
is talking to the Chadian government to get them to stop 
their support for the rebels. 
 
¶8. (C) Aboul Gheit advised creating a four-way mechanism 
between the U.S., France, Egypt, and Libya to address the 
situation, particularly given calls for a European force of 
the Chad/Sudan border.  He said that Libya is skeptical but 
highly influential, through its customary ability to pay 
local tribes to hinder - or alternatively to cooperate with - 
the force's mission.  "You must calm the Libyans" for this 
mission to succeed, he said. 
 
CPA 
--- 
 
¶9. (C) Williamson confirmed that the U.S. continues to 
support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) as the 
framework for keeping North and South Sudan together, saying 
that the 2011 referendum on unity vs. separation should be 
seen as a framework to improve working relations between the 
North and South.  Aboul Gheit also confirmed that stability 
in Sudan is high among Egypt's interests, and that in this 
regard Egypt continues to work to make unity attractive.  As 
examples, Aboul Gheit noted his and Egyptian General 
Intelligence Service Director Soliman's fall 2007 trip to 
Juba to encourage the southern government to return to the 
National Unity Government (reftel), as well as Egyptian 
development projects to increase prosperity in the South.  He 
warned, however, that the U.S. should understand that the 
Sudanese "are Africans - they take their time," and advised 
focusing not only on the short term but also "beyond 2011." 
 
Egyptian Darfur Special Envoy Suggests More Cooperation 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶10. (C) Earlier, SE Williamson met with Egyptian Special 
Envoy for Darfur Ambassador Ahmed Haggag on February 23.  On 
North-South issues, Haggag advised Egyptian-U.S. cooperation 
to train South Sudanese to increase governing capacity, 
diminish corruption, and build institutions, all sorely 
needed for the South to develop and view unity with the North 
as an attractive option.  Haggag also said that all 
international partners that signed the CPA, particularly the 
U.S., EU, UN, AU, China, Egypt, and Libya, should coordinate 
more closely on CPA implementation. 
 
¶11. (C) Williamson noted that if the CPA unravels, peace and 
stability in Darfur will be impossible to achieve. 
Williamson emphasized focusing on humanitarian assistance and 
stability in Darfur and hindering rebel movements, noting the 
need for the GOS to be more pro-active.  Haggag agreed, but 
also stressed that there is not enough pressure on the 
rebels.  Gulf countries could also provide more funding, 
Haggag said.  Nevertheless, Haggag noted that Darfur, while 
tragic, is merely a "side-show" to the "real issue" of 
North-South unity. 
 
¶12. (U) SE Williamson has cleared this message. 
RICCIARDONE