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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000351 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, WHA AND PM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018 
TAGS: PREL MASC OVIP BR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE 
NELSON JOBIM TO WASHINGTON 
 
BRASILIA 00000351  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel 
 
¶1. (C) Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim will travel to 
Norfolk and Washington from March 18-22, 2008 on a 
counterpart visit.  He will meet with Secretary Gates in an 
office call on March 20 June.  Minister Jobim,s objectives 
for the visit are to enhance prospects for bilateral 
cooperation and explore possibilities for access to U.S. 
defense technology. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary:  Minister Jobim is the first strong Minister 
of Defense in Brazil.  He is working to centralize civilian 
oversight of the Brazilian military and hopes to learn from 
the U.S. military in this regard.  He has also clearly 
indicated a desire to pursue military cooperation agreements 
despite objections from the Ministry for External Affairs, 
such as in the case of concluding a SOFA with France.  He has 
also expressed his desire to pursue a Defense Cooperation 
Agreement with the U.S. and to have it approved directly by 
the President.  Jobim has also been helpful in making 
progress on a General Security of Information Agreement, 
which requires approval by Brazil,s Ministry of Interior and 
Office for Institutional Security.  Although the U.S. and 
Brazil share the basic goals of fostering hemispheric 
stability, preventing terrorist activity and strengthening 
international non-proliferation regimes, U.S.-Brazil 
cooperation is hindered by difficulties in completing a 
bilateral defense cooperation agreement, providing 
protections for U.S. personnel involved in training and joint 
exercises and taking proactive steps to address countries of 
proliferation concern such as Iran.  Brazil has maintained 
its leadership role in the Haiti peacekeeping force MINUSTAH 
under the active advocacy of the Foreign Ministry.  Jobim,s 
visit comes at an important time as Brazil is formulating a 
new National Defense Strategy and beginning to make decisions 
about acquisition of new military systems and technology. 
Other military issues of interest include service relations 
with the fledgling civilian defense ministry and the 
necessity of negotiating further agreements with the U.S. in 
order to enhance our already strong military-to-military 
relationship.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
Politico-Economic Overview 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was elected in 
2002 in large part on promises of promoting an ambitious 
social agenda, including generous handouts to the poor.  On 
the strength of the popularity of these measures, he was 
re-elected in 2006, although with diminished support from the 
middle class.  The public's top concerns - crime and public 
security - have not improved under this administration. The 
Lula Administration has been beset by a grave political 
crisis as interlocking influence peddling/vote-buying 
scandals plagued elements of Lula's PT party, but the 
President,s personal popularity has not suffered, even after 
many of his closest associates have been caught in corrupt 
practices.  MOD Jobim is perhaps among the most trusted 
leaders in Brazil.  A former Supreme Court Justice, he 
maintains a strong reputation for integrity that is rare 
among Brazil,s leadership. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Friendly Cooperation, But Not Strong Friendship 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4.  (C) Brazil's democratic institutions are strong and 
stable after more than 20 years of civilian rule.  A return 
to military dictatorship is today unthinkable as Brazil's 
armed forces pursue a professional non-political identity. 
With steady export-led economic growth having become the norm 
in the recent past, Brazil has been a supporter of reasoned 
foreign policy goals and has been steadfast in its support of 
democracy in the hemisphere.  It has a strong interest in 
hemispheric security issues that largely mirrors our own, and 
actively cooperates with us on the operational level in the 
fight against terrorism. 
 
BRASILIA 00000351  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) While relations between the U.S. and Brazil are 
generally friendly, often the USG encounters major 
difficulties in gaining the cooperation of senior 
policymakers on issues of significant interest to the United 
States.  The difficulty is most apparent in the Ministry for 
External Affairs (MRE) which maintains an anti-American slant 
and has tried to block improved DoD-MOD relations.  In 
planning for Jobim,s visit, the MRE actively campaigned to 
limit Jobim,s time in Washington to one largely ceremonial 
day with little substance. 
 
¶6.  (C) The current left-of-center administration has 
studiously avoided close cooperation on pol-mil issues 
important to us and has kept us at arms length on most 
security-related issues.  Specifically, the MRE has dragged 
its feet on completing a Defense Cooperation Agreement, 
General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), 
Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) or Article 
98 agreement.  The GOB traditionally maintained that such 
agreements, particularly the SOFA, were against Brazilian 
law, but reversed itself (over MRE objections) and signed a 
SOFA with France earlier this year.  We are exploring the 
possibility of using the French SOFA as a starting place for 
a U.S.-Brazil agreement. 
 
¶7.  (C) Brazil has stayed the course as leader of MINUSTAH in 
Haiti despite a lack of domestic support for the PKO.  The 
MRE has remained committed to the initiative because it 
believes that the operation serves FM Amorim's obsessive 
international goal of qualifying Brazil for a seat on the UN 
Security Council.  The Brazilian military remains committed 
as well, because the mission enhances its international 
prestige and provides training and operational opportunities. 
 So far, President Lula has backed the Foreign Ministry's 
position, and Brazil will likely continue to provide 
leadership and troops to MINUSTAH for the conceivable future. 
Despite the success of the MINUSTAH deployment, Brazil has 
not shown any interest in undertaking further peacekeeping 
operations, although Brazilian contributions to UN operations 
in such places as Darfur have been requested. 
 
------------------------ 
CT and Non-Proliferation 
------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) The desire not to be identified with the U.S. is 
borne out as well in the GOB's approach to counterterrorism. 
Cooperation remains excellent at the operational level, 
especially between law enforcement agencies.  However, the 
GOB political leadership has refused to endorse U.S. 
counterterrorism initiatives publicly and has insisted that 
official communiques of the 3 1 mechanism note that there is 
no evidence of terrorist operations in the Tri-Border area, 
where Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina meet.  Wary of its 
large, prosperous and influential Arab population, the GOB 
makes every effort to downplay in public even the possibility 
of terrorist fund-raising going on inside Brazil. 
 
¶9.  (C) The GOB has a good record in non-proliferation 
efforts, but has been slow to join international consensus in 
favor of sanctions on Iran.  Brazil has also not yet signed 
the NPT Additional Protocol, although it has not ruled out 
signing it in the near future. 
 
--------------- 
Military Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Brazil established a Ministry of Defense (MoD) for 
the first time in June 1999, uniting the three services 
(Army, Navy, and Air Force) under a single minister.  Jobim 
became Minister last year when the disastrous crash of a 
Brazilian airliner highlighted weaknesses in the civil 
aviation system, which comes under MOD purview. 
Organizationally, the MOD still faces challenges managing the 
individual services. Each service is still fairly autonomous 
and controls its own budget and acquisition programs.  In 
addition, the Lula administration,s focus on social reforms 
 
BRASILIA 00000351  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
and programs has meant decreases for military budgets, 
leading to fewer training opportunities and equipment 
purchases.  This situation is changing as there is now near 
consensus among Brazil,s leadership that the military is 
under-resourced and under equipped to accomplish its missions. 
 
¶11.  (C)  To address this situation, the Lula government has 
tasked a new National Defense strategy to be completed by 
this fall.  This paper will set the framework for military 
modernization and theoretically drive decisions on 
acquisition of new equipment.  In reality, such decisions 
will be made largely for political and economic reasons. 
Brazil,s defense industrial base has atrophied since the end 
of the Cold War, and it is a major objective of the 
government to reinvigorate it.  Decisions on major systems 
will be influenced much more by access to foreign technology 
and opportunities for Brazilian industry than by the 
capabilities such systems will add to Brazil,s military. 
 
---------------------- 
General Points to Make 
---------------------- 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Our core message for Jobim's visit should be: 
 
--  Reinforcing and underscoring the importance of these 
agreements in support of Brazil,s interest to reequip and 
modernize its military with technology transfer is critically 
important.  It would also help to define how we, the anchor 
of the North America, and Brazil the anchor of South America, 
may be able to work more closely in the future to enhance 
hemispheric defense cooperation. 
 
 We recommend SecDef also emphasize the following points in 
conversations with Minister Jobim: 
 
-- We want to continue improving our defense relationship. 
This is an imperative, given the difficult global security 
situation in which we live today, and the importance of 
Brazil,s role in the Americas. 
 
-- We are serious about our partnership in Brazil.  We see 
strong possibilities for joint research and production, 
exchanges of military personnel and training. 
 
-- As you make important decisions about the modernization of 
Brazil,s forces later this year, keep in mind that 
partnership with the U.S. can help both our countries realize 
our common goal of preserving stability in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
 
--  As we continue to develop our partnership, we need to 
have in place several standard documents to assure smooth 
cooperation.  The Defense Cooperation Agreement is the first 
of these.  We understand your Ministry has approved the 
current draft and hope the rest of your government will also. 
 Next, we hope to complete an agreement on information 
security and a Status of Forces Agreement to protect the 
forces of both countries during joint exercises. 
 
-- The United States would like to congratulate Brazil for 
its efforts in Haiti.  The improving situation there is in no 
small measure due to the professionalism and dedication of 
Brazilian troops and leadership.  We hope Brazil is resolved 
to continue to contribute to the success of MINUSTAH. 
 
 
 
SOBEL