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id: 145758
date: 3/13/2008 22:20
refid: 08BOGOTA996
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: SECRET
destination: 08BOGOTA996
header:
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RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHBO #0996/01 0732220
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 132220Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1923
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 1437
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0159
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1256
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 000996 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL PTER OAS VZ SP FR SZ EC
CO 
SUBJECT: MARCH 13 UPDATE: COLOMBIA DISPUTE WITH ECUADOR 
VENEZUELA--AND NICARAGUA 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer 
Reasons 1.4 (b) and d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) The GOC used a March 10-12 visit to Colombia by OAS 
SYG Insulza and the OAS Commission examining the March 1 GOC 
attack against the FARC in Ecuador to provide a "frank and 
detailed" briefing on the attack.  Presidential advisor Jorge 
Eastman told us Insulza seemed impressed by the GOC's 
briefings, and voiced understanding of the GOC position.  FM 
Araujo told the Ambassador the OAS team had not been 
"political or polemical."  Still, Eastman expects Ecuador to 
maintain a hard line against Colombia due to the positive 
response President Correa's tough stance has generated in 
Ecuador.  The GOC wants to obtain Interpol verification of 
the information on the Reyes computers before releasing any 
new information on GOV/GOE connections to the FARC.  (See 
Septel for the GOC's plans for the March 17 OAS ministerial.) 
 END SUMMARY. 
 
 
OAS SYG LOOKS FORWARD IN VISIT TO COLOMBIA 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (U) OAS SYG Jose Miguel Insulza and a special OAS 
Commission visited Colombia on March 10-12 to review details 
of the March 1 GOC attack against FARC Secretariat member 
Raul Reyes in Ecuador.  Insulza told the media that the 
Commission had a productive visit to Colombia, and intends to 
use the March 17 ministerial meeting to propose solutions to 
resolve the Ecuador-Colombia dispute. 
 
 
OAS IMPRESSED BY FRANK GOC BRIEFING 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Presidential Communication Director Jorge Mario 
Eastman accompanied Insulza and the OAS Commission to the 
Colombia-Ecuador border on March 11 to review details of the 
March 1 attack against the FARC.  Eastman told us that strike 
mission commander General Tito Pinilla provided the OAS team 
a detailed briefing, including maps and a review of two 
"Tucano" attack aircraft.  Pinilla briefed GOC intelligence 
reports indicating  Reyes would enter Colombia; the GOC 
originally planned to attack him in Colombian territory. 
When the GOC later learned Reyes would remain in Ecuador, 
President Uribe decided to attack him there.  Pinilla 
reviewed the range of the Tucano aircraft, showing how the 
planes fired from Colombian airspace.  He also explained that 
Colombian military and police entered Ecuador to verify the 
operation's results. 
 
¶4. (S) Eastman said the OAS group--previously briefed by the 
Ecuadorians--probed hard on whether there was USG involvement 
in the attack.  Some of the OAS members appeared influenced 
by some Ecuadorians' claims that USG aircraft operating out 
of the U.S. Cooperative Security Location (CSL) in Manta 
carried out the operation.   Eastman noted that after the OAS 
group raised Ecuadorian claims that the GOC used 
precision-guided bombs in the attack, the GOC conceded that 
it had used GPS-guided bombs and A-37s in addition to the 
Tucanos. 
 
¶5. (C) Foreign Minister Fernando Araujo confirmed to the 
Ambassador that the OAS mission was neither political nor 
polemical. (Note: See Septel for details on the GOC approach 
to the March 17 OAS ministerial.)  Eastman said the OAS group 
left Colombia impressed by the frank and open way in which 
the GOC briefed them on the Reyes operation, and Insulza left 
the impression that he personally understood and sympathized 
with the GOC position.  The GOC is confident Insulza will 
look for a balanced formula. 
 
 
IMPRESSIONS OF COMMISSION POSITIONS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Eastman said the Brazilian ambassador voiced 
understanding for Colombia's stance, but stressed that 
respect for sovereignty and national borders are essential. 
Peru's ambassador was not a strong voice, but the GOC expects 
 
BOGOTA 00000996  002 OF 002 
 
 
Peru to back the GOC.  The Bahamas ambassador was impressed 
by the physical distances and difficult terrain on the 
border, but made only cautious comments.  He speculated that 
the Argentine ambassador would be the most critical of 
Colombia's position. 
 
 
ECUADOR MAINTAINS HARD-LINE 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Eastman conceded that Uribe's initial description of 
events to President Rafael Correa was misleading, since Uribe 
suggested that the operation started in Colombia and spilled 
over into Ecuador.  Still, the GOC thinks Correa subsequently 
hardened his stance due to pressure from Venezuelan President 
Chavez.  The GOC fears Correa will continue his hard-line 
stance, since Ecuadorian public opinion and media appears to 
support his tough line.  In contrast, Eastman said the GOC 
paid for a poll in Venezuela in mid-January that showed 
Venezuelans do not support Chavez' aggressive posture against 
Colombia; this finding has not changed as a result of the 
latest crisis. 
 
 
GOC STRATEGY ON RELEASE OF REYES COMPUTER INFO 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶8. (C) After the Rio Group meeting, Eastman said the GOC 
decided not to publicly release further information from the 
Reyes computers showing Ecuadorian and Venezuelan links to 
the FARC.  The GOC wants to get Interpol verification of the 
computers before releasing any new information to the public. 
 
 
Brownfield 

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