VZCZCXRO8705
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0350/01 0671414
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071414Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1237
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 1107
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2030
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2293
RHEHNSC/NS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AB FL PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000350 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PRM/FO, INL/FO, IO/FO, L/FO, AND 
PM/FO 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO 
TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY, DEPUTY SECRETARY KIMMITT 
JUSTICE FOR OIA DIRECTOR WARLOW 
DEPT PASS TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM PINR PREF MASS SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  UNIIIC COMMISSIONER VOWS TO LEAVE NO 
STONE UNTURNED -- BUT NEEDS U.S. ASSISTANCE 
 
REF: BEIRUT 166 
 
BEIRUT 00000350  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for Reasons: Sec 
tion 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) This is an action request.  See paragraphs 13-14. 
 
¶2. (C) UNIIIC Commissioner and Prosecutor-Designate Daniel 
Bellemare is as determined as ever to succeed in his mission, 
but warns that it will take more time and resources before he 
will be able to issue indictments.  Bellemare, who is 
scheduled to present his next report to the UN Security 
Council on April 8, would like to travel to Washington April 
9 to meet with senior-level USG officials to discuss USG 
assistance.  End summary. 
 
FOCUS, STAMINA, AND HELP FROM THE U.S. 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The Charge, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, paid an 
introductory call on UN International Independent 
Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) Commissioner and 
Prosecutor-Designate Daniel Bellemare and UNIIIC investigator 
Stacy de la Torre at UNIIIC headquarters on March 6. 
Bellemare reiterated his previous message that "failure was 
not an option," since it would send a bad message to 
terrorists in the region.  To achieve success UNIIIC, 
however, needed to keep at it with focus, stamina, and the 
best possible resources, including help from the U.S. 
 
¶4. (C)  UNIIIC's workload of 21 cases (the 2005 Hariri 
assassination plus 20 others) was a "massive" investigation, 
he stressed.  UNIIIC is looking at similar investigations, 
such as the FBI investigation into the attack on Khobar 
towers, to understand better how to conduct its business and 
enlist the cooperation of local authorities and in the 
international community. 
 
PRIMARY NEED IS INVESTIGATIVE LEADS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) Stressing that time is of the essence, Bellemare 
reiterated his appeal for member states' assistance, both in 
terms of providing intelligence leads and TDY experts on the 
ground.  As Commissioner, he needs investigative leads 
provided through what UNIIIC would consider "anonymous" tips 
that would allow him to develop admissible evidence that, 
once he dons his prosecutor hat, can be used to make 
indictments. 
 
¶6. (S) The intelligence community can provide hints on where 
to look, or where not to look, he said, citing an ICTY 
example where, following a source's tip that a certain video 
existed, the ICTY eventually was able to find this important 
piece of evidence.  For example, Bellemare said, UNIIIC has 
sketches of potential witnesses whom it will need to 
identify, but security reasons prevent it from mass 
distributing them.  The U.S. could help by using its network 
of informants to help identify these people. 
 
¶7. (C) I will "leave no stone unturned," Bellemare vowed, 
"but I need U.S. assistance.  Casting the net to see what you 
catch is fine, but at some point you need to know what you 
are fishing for."  Bellemare reiterated that the general 
"menu" of types of assistance needed was an attempt to make 
it easy for member states to say yes.  In terms of personnel, 
Bellemare said the U.S. could help most by providing 
experienced investigators to conduct "normal police-style" 
interviews on the ground in Lebanon.  He offered to travel to 
Washington on April 9 to meet with USG officials, adding that 
meetings with "high level contacts who can open doors" would 
be greatly appreciated. 
 
FORTRESS UNIIIC 
--------------- 
 
¶8. (C) UNIIIC operates out of the Monteverde Hotel in the 
hills outside of Beirut, which is now used exclusively for 
UNIIIC offices and accommodation for UNIIIC personnel.  The 
"fortress" is protected by 500 military personnel in three 
perimeters of defense:  UN security, Internal Security Forces 
(ISF), and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).  Bellemare himself 
leaves the compound only when necessary and surrounded with a 
50-vehicle motorcade.  Even his international travel is kept 
under tight wraps and involves the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (when in Canada) and other security details. 
 
MANAGING EXPECTATIONS ON INDICTMENTS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) Stating that he was confident UNIIIC "will resolve 
this, but it won't be overnight," Bellemare stressed the need 
to manage expectations on when the Tribunal would be able to 
issue formal indictments.  Repeating what he told us on 
January 31 (reftel), Bellemare said names of suspects will 
not be in his next report but will only appear in the 
indictments.  UNIIIC needed to be pragmatic given the 
challenging security environment.  However the report, his 
first, which he will present to the UN Security Council on 
April 8, will differ in style and approach and be more 
direct, he said, sending "clear signals in terms of 
expectations." 
 
¶10. (C) The Charge asked about recent leaks that Hizballah 
was involved in at least some of the assassinations. 
Bellemare, who also had heard the rumors, said the 
information did not come from UNIIIC.  (Note:  UNIIIC sent us 
a January 26, 2008 Stratfor article claiming Hizballah 
carried out the January 25 bombing that killed ISF Captain 
Wissam Eid, as well as the January 15 attack against a U.S. 
Embassy vehicle.  End note. 
 
¶11. (C) Bellemare stressed that UNIIIC's investigation would 
not be finished on June 15 (when its mandate expires), but he 
did not know yet how and when UNIIIC would evolve into the 
Tribunal.  The Secretary General must consider three things 
when deciding when to begin the Tribunal's operations: 
finances (i.e., has the UN received funding for the first 
three years?), the political circumstances, and the progress 
of the investigation.  It was best to avoid a long period 
between the operational start-up and the first indictment, 
Bellemare said, to avoid having judges sitting there idly 
waiting. 
 
¶12. (C) Bellemare further recalled that indictments in the 
ICTY and ICC took two years, and the Oklahoma bombing 
indictments did not happen overnight either, not to speak of 
the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks.  "We are not miracle 
workers," Bellemare, so there should be "no illusions of 
immediacy."  However, the fact that the Tribunal had been 
created despite the fact that the investigations were not 
complete sent a political message that there would be an end 
to impunity and that the process was irreversible.  The 
question now was not if but when the Tribunal would get to 
the end results.  "I don't believe in the perfect crime," he 
said, "It's just a matter of time." 
 
ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Bellemare would like to visit Washington on April 9, 
the day after he presents his report to the UN Security 
Council.  Post requests Department schedule (at a minimum) 
meetings with NEA A/S Welch and IO A/S Silverberg.  We also 
strongly recommend a meeting with the Secretary and/or Deputy 
Secretary, if available.  Post requests Department also 
 
SIPDIS 
schedule meetings with the NSC, FBI, and DEA (investigators)  
at the highest levels appropriate/possible.  It would also be 
useful for a member of Director Mueller's delegation to stop 
in Beirut to meet with UNIIIC on the margins of Director 
Mueller's upcoming visit to Amman. 
 
¶14. (S) On assistance, we urge Washington agencies to be 
forward-leaning in meeting UNIIIC's requests, especially in 
terms of providing investigators to conduct interviews and 
intelligence-sharing.  End action request. 
SISON