VZCZCXYZ0015
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0915/01 0851608
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 251608Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6459
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000915 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2018 
TAGS: PREL PRGO IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI NSA RUBAI ON AHMEDI-NEJAD'S VISIT - 
CORRECTED COPY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
Corrected Copy of Baghdad 706 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (S) National Security Advisor (NSA) Muwaffaq al-Rubai 
shared his views on the purpose and meaning of the Iranian 
President Ahmedi-Nejad's recent visit with Embassy PolMil 
MinsCouns Amb. Marcie Ries and NSC's Brett McGurk in two 
hour-long conversations, one each on March 5 and March 7. 
(S/I Ambassador David Satterfield participated in the March 7 
meeting.) Rubai first indicated that the visit had focused on 
economic issues, but on March 7 he revealed further details 
of discussions on security and diplomatic issues.  Rubai also 
discussed his views on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
and Strategic Framework (SF), septel. End summary. 
 
¶2. (S) Rubai said that a significant amount of time during 
the PM's meetings was spent discussing economic issues, 
including the nine to eleven MOUs that the two countries had 
signed during the visit, renovation of the Najaf and Samarra 
shrines, oil and gas pipelines including a pipeline from 
Kazakhstan, the 1 billion dollar loan (Note: apparently for 
Iranian products/services.  End Note.), new power stations 
for Sadr City and Najaf, prospective rail links, and the 
movement of pilgrims across the border, etc.  Curiously, 
Rubai noted that throughout the visit, Ahmadi-Nejad never 
once mentioned the United States during his private meetings 
and indeed acted "as if there were no foreign troops in 
Iraq." 
 
¶3. (S) The topics of U.S. forces in Iraq and Iranian lethal 
aid to militants were not raised in the meetings with 
Ahmadinejad.  This was left to a lower rung of advisors. 
Ahmadi-Nejad had asked Prime Minister Maliki if the Iranian 
Chief of Intelligence could meet his counterpart, INIS 
Director Shahwani.  Maliki instead suggested that Rubai talk 
privately with the Iranian Chief, Mohammad Pur Amini.  Amini 
and two other Iranians met at Rubai's home; Amini's primary 
topic of interest was the impending U.S.)Iraq long term 
security negotiations.  Unlike Ahmadi-Nejad's meetings, in 
which the topic of the US and the long-term security 
agreement was never brought up, Amini repeatedly returned to 
the issue throughout their conversation, inquiring about the 
start date of negotiations, U.S. goals for permanent bases, 
and more generally what U.S. goals and desired end state were 
for Iraq. 
 
¶4. (S) According to Rubai, the Prime Minister did not discuss 
the issue of Iranian lethal aid with Ahmadi-Nejad.  The visit 
had "cemented" the Prime Minister's relationship with the 
Iranian President, according to Rubai, "which is good because 
it can stop the Iranians from meddling in Iraq."  Rubai also 
was interested in U.S. views on Iran's behavior in recent 
months, since he believed that Iran has played a more helpful 
role by reining in the Jaysh al-Mahdi and slowing the supply 
of lethal aid to Iraq.  Amb. Ries pointed out that it is 
unhelpful to give credit to Iran for a decrease in 
destructive behavior that Iranians themselves had initiated. 
This was particularly true, Amb. Satterfield noted, given the 
increase in EFP incidents in the past month, the increase in 
attacks on Basrah base, and the use of more powerful 240mm 
rockets. 
 
¶5. (S) Rubai noted the contradiction and made it clear that 
Iran could do more. He said he personally pressed the 
following three points with Amini during their meeting: 
(1) the Iranians must stop the provision of EFPs to militants 
- the Americans are in Iraq at the request of the Iraqi 
Government so the Iranians are killing our friends and this, 
in turn, weakens the GoI; 
(2) Iranians should tell the JAM special groups under their 
control to stand down, just as Sadr has done with those 
groups under his control, and 
(3) The Iranians should stem the flow of small arms across 
the southern border to militia groups - the Iraqis know 
through years of experience that if Iran wants to control 
their borders they are capable of doing it. 
Amb. Ries hoped that the Prime Minister was still planning on 
receiving a briefing on Iranian nefarious activities in Iraq 
from Gen. McCrystal, just as Rubai had received. 
 
¶6. (S) Rubai noted that Ahmedi-Nejad's visit was a public 
relations success for the Iranians: Iran was portrayed as a 
regional power and, while they had missed an opportunity with 
the Sunni, their reception was largely positive.  (Note: 
Sunni leaders largely boycotted the Ahmedi-Nejad visit; Vice 
President Hashimi made a short appearance at the meeting with 
the Presidency Council; but reportedly arrived late, and left 
 
early.  End note.)  Rubai was hopeful that the visit would 
send a strong message to Arab capitals and encourage them to 
send permanent diplomatic representatives to Baghdad, though 
he noted that it was likely that the visit would only 
heighten Arab fears of Iranian encroachment and influence in 
Iraq.  He confirmed that he will be traveling to Saudi 
Arabia, to prepare a readout on the trip, and to encourage 
the Saudis to finally send their ambassador.  He asked for 
U.S. assistance with meetings while in Saudi Arabia.  McGurk 
noted that while we favor strong neighborly relations between 
Iraq and Iran, there appeared to be no public statement from 
any Iraqi leader about Iran's negative influences in Iraq. 
He said this causes problems in the United States, as well as 
the region, where critics of our policy claim the Iraqi 
government is falling under Iran's sphere of influence and 
may not warrant sustained support. 
 
¶7. (S) Rubai said Ahmadi-Nejad appeared to be obsessed with 
occultation and the "Hidden Imam."  Rubai described one of 
the Iranian President's last meetings in Iraq, held at Abd 
al-Aziz al-Hakim's house.  In a room full of 30-40 people, 
Ahmadi-Nejad lectured for an hour about the return of the 
Mahdi, claiming that the wait united both Arab and Persian 
Shia.  Shia senior leaders, including the Prime Minister, 
Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi, Ahmad Chalabi, and Mohammed Bahr al-Ulum 
attended.  After about an hour, Kazemi-Qomi passed 
Ahmadi-Nejad a note after which he ended his talk.  Rubai 
noted that some Shia had been quietly bewildered by the 
display and that Bahr al-Ulum had joked about Ahmadi-Nejad's 
religious fervor, claiming that "he should go back to the 
hawza." 
 
¶8. (S) Comment: Rubai's characterization and description of 
the visit comports with others who provided first hand 
accounts, including Foreign Minister Zebari, Vice President 
Adil Abd al-Mahdi, Ammar al-Hakim, and President Talabani.  A 
common theme is that this visit should prod Arab states to 
send diplomatic representation to Baghdad.  We have noted 
that the visit on its face will not have this effect, and 
Iraqis need to take the initiative to support U.S. efforts 
with Iraq's Arab neighbors.  Rubai claims his visit to Saudi 
Arabia is designed for this purpose. 
CROCKER