VZCZCXRO0534
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0857/01 0801507
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201507Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6361
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000857 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREZ IZ
 
SUBJECT:  PRT TEAM LEADERS CONFERENCE - BRINGING TEAMWORK AND 
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS TO THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL 
 
¶1. Summary. On March 3 and 4, the embassy's Office of Provincial 
Affairs (OPA) hosted the second quarterly Provincial Reconstruction 
Team (PRT) Team Leaders Conference in Baghdad.  This gathering of 
nearly every PRT, ePRT, and RRT team leader provided an ideal venue 
for State, DoD, and interagency participants to share lessons 
learned, bring focus to U.S. and local national issues that can 
impact progress for Iraq, and look ahead at options for 
condition-driven changes and adjustments for PRTs in response to the 
evolving Iraqi economic and political landscape.  Themes that 
resounded throughout the conference included the incalculable value 
of strong State and military relations at the team level as well as 
the necessity for the teams to establish strong rapport and trust 
with their Iraqi counterparts at the provincial level.  Budget 
execution, provincial government capacity, and private sector 
development are key areas necessary for Iraq to progress from its 
current condition to one of political and economic sustainability. 
This sustainability would serve as a primary indicator to signal the 
start of the mission's transition to a more traditional bilateral 
relationship with the Government of Iraq.  End summary. 
 
¶2. This two-day conference included participation from nearly every 
PRT, ePRT, and RRT out of the 31 teams operating in Iraq, including 
the teams lead by the Italians and the Koreans.  Observers from 
MNF-I and other military components, embassy offices, and the 
interagency attended this event.  Presenters included senior 
military officials, embassy officials, UN representatives, and other 
representatives from both the governmental and non-governmental 
community.  Over 90 persons participated in part of all of the 
conference.  This cable provides a look into the overall results of 
the conference, and considers both the focus areas for the PRTs 
during 2008, and the transition of the program in the out-years.  A 
separate cable will address issues discussed in a special Team 
Leader session. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
AMBASSADOR AND OPA DIRECTOR SET THE TONE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. The Ambassador inaugurated the conference, pointing out that the 
teams are nearing the end of a one-year post-surge expansion.  He 
proffered the rhetorical question to the team leaders - how do you 
work yourselves out of a job - to illustrate the temporary nature of 
the PRT, and the need to find effective ways to achieve success with 
their Iraqi counterparts.  Success in the provinces will lead to a 
conditions-based and not calendar-based program transition.  Until 
we reach that point, he offered, each PRT should continue to reach 
out to all corners of their respective province to positively impact 
the lives of as many Iraqis as possible. 
 
¶4. The cornerstone to provincial government effectiveness, the 
Ambassador underscored, is the ability for budget execution on all 
levels of government, emphasizing that linkages within the provinces 
as well as back to Baghdad are absolutely vital.  With provincial 
elections a distinct possibility, the teams need to prepare to 
support and work with staff from UNAMI, US-based and 
international-based NGOs.  Finally, as US funding for Iraq continues 
to decrease, the teams must look for ways to use their limited 
resources to fill funding gaps in the Iraqi budget, while working 
with Iraqi counterparts to request and expend Iraqi funds in the 
provinces.  Again, solid linkages at the provincial and ministry 
level are paramount. 
 
¶5. Following the Ambassador, the OPA Director provided the overall 
perspective for the conference, challenging the team leaders to 
start thinking about and discussing the factors and conditions 
within a province that would signal the eventual transformation to a 
more traditional bilateral relationship with the Government of Iraq. 
 With that understanding in mind, the conference focus returned to 
present PRT activities, in particular budget execution and team 
effectiveness working in the provinces, both being top concerns of 
the Washington interagency.  While some PRTs have expanded their 
reach through the use of satellite offices, for example, the OPA 
Director suggested the team leaders not limit themselves in how they 
can improve interactions with their Iraqi counterparts at the 
provincial and local level. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
CONFERENCE RESULTS AND THE TRANSITION TO NORMALCY 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶6. The following are the highlights for more than 15 separate 
briefings and discussion sessions: 
 
-- Political Briefing (Provincial Powers Law): POL section 
representatives provided an in-depth analysis and assessment on the 
impact of law's veto by VP Adel Abdul Mehdi; follow-on discussions 
covered possible impacts of the recent veto, underscoring that the 
Elections Law still remains tied to this legislation. 
 
-- Political Briefing (Provincial Elections Overview and Panel 
Discussion): Representatives from the Political Section, USAID, 
 
BAGHDAD 00000857  002 OF 004 
 
 
UNAMI, and IFES explained that due to the complex timeline leading 
to elections, preparations continue despite the lack of an Elections 
Law or fixed date for provincial elections.  The Council of 
Representatives (COR) and the Independent High Electoral Commission 
(IHEC) will need to consider and decide on a number of vital issues 
including voter eligibility requirements, IDPs, open versus closed 
list, and candidate eligibility, to name a few.  All panel members 
emphasized that the elections will be an all-Iraqi event with 
limited US support.  At the same time, the PRTs will play a key role 
in this exercise, both to support election visitors needing access 
to the provinces, and also to provide atmospherics to the embassy 
before and during the elections season. 
 
-- CETI Briefing (Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq): 
Ambassador Ries provided an overview of the economic and business 
situation, with special emphasis on budget execution, state owned 
enterprises, and banking.  He highlighted the top five priorities in 
CETI: Ministry capacity, foreign and domestic investment, generation 
of energy, agriculture (represented by nearly one-quarter of the 
Iraqi population), and employment.  Ambassador Ries called for the 
PRTs to provide economic indicators from the grassroots level, even 
if only anecdotal accounts on activities within the respective 
province. 
 
-- MNC-I (Commanding General, 18th Airborne): LTG Austin, the newly 
arrived Corps commander, emphasized that success depends entirely on 
partnerships between the PRT and the military, noting that success 
is all about teamwork and not individual efforts.  He called on both 
State and military to promote cross education, to make the effort to 
understand one another's work culture, and to apply that knowledge 
towards problem solving in Iraq.  LTG Austin challenged the 
participants to work collectively on difficult tasks, using the 
CLC/Sons of Iraq as an example of a US initiative that is now worth 
our collective efforts to find a solution to transition these 
security elements into the Iraqi mainstream.  In follow-on 
discussions, senior members of LTG Austin's staff reinforced the 
need for State and DoD members to make proactive efforts to further 
strengthen the relationships and operational capacity of the PRTs. 
While they found that that coordination and relationships at the 
PRT/BCT and the Corps level were strong, they indicated that the 
same cannot be said at the Division level, a matter that needs some 
work. 
 
-- Embassy Medical: The embassy's mental health officer led a lively 
discussion to explore the characteristics of successful team 
members, and those team members deemed not quite successful in the 
PRT environment.  This discussion dovetailed into expectation 
management for perspective team members prior to ever arriving to 
Iraq.  He also focused on the impact the team leaders have on all 
team members, and the need for the leaders to promote a positive 
working atmosphere.  The team leaders were tasked to further reflect 
on this discussion once they returned back to the provinces, and to 
provide their top three team member observations, positive and 
negative, that might be useful for consideration by PRT recruiters. 
 
 
-- Office of Hostage Affairs (OHA) and RSO:  The OHA representative 
provided a background on hostage taking in Iraq, and punctuated her 
remarks by exhorting team leaders to maintain situational awareness 
at all times and avoid potential hostage taking situations.  OHA 
offered to schedule on-site hostage awareness, prevention and 
survival training to the team members at the convenience of the 
respective PRTs.  The Deputy RSO explained the RSO role with respect 
to PRT security, and clarified the difference between State-provided 
and military-provided movement security teams. 
 
-- USAID: Given the significant presence of USAID programs in Iraq, 
the Country Director for USAID provided a detailed program overview, 
and explained how these programs might impact the work of the PRTs. 
He also explained the negative impact that the current budget 
situation could have on the future of USAID programs, indicating the 
need to begin demobilization by the mid-year if funding is not made 
available soon.  The USAID piece was particularly valuable to the 
conference due to misconceptions and lack of understanding of how 
these programs work on the grassroots level, and how the lack of 
direct access by PRT team leaders contributes to this lack of 
clarity on programs in their respective provinces.  The Director 
explained that coordination is always a challenge in Iraq, and that 
implementing partners often try to avoid direct USG contact for 
their own personnel security reasons.  OPA recognizes this unique 
challenge, and the Director's presence at the conference was 
necessary to address these issues directly with the team leaders. 
 
-- MNF-I (GEN Petraeus): Following his formal presentation on the 
positive security impact of the surge, GEN Petraeus expounded on the 
larger issue of fundamental changes with respect to shaping the USG 
future roles and contributions in Iraq.  He viewed the interagency 
as key to ensuring that policy be synchronized and complemented with 
both pre-deployment and in-theater training.  This would be 
necessary to ensure that both State and military units, and the 
PRTs, will be able to implement the desired changes.  He challenged 
 
BAGHDAD 00000857  003 OF 004 
 
 
the PRT team leaders, as perhaps change agents, to develop ideas and 
actions that could contribute to the next significant phase shift in 
the USG activities in Iraq. 
 
-- PRT Assessment and Long-Term Strategy: The OPA Strategy and Plans 
Officer provided a brief history of the planning effort within OPA, 
and brought the team leaders up-to-date on the assessments and 
Maturity Model that are used for evaluating the progress of each 
province.  He explained how OPA uses a wide range of inputs from the 
USG community in Iraq to obtain the best possible and grounded 
assessment of each province, and to crystallize our sense of whether 
or not the province is making progress within the specific objective 
areas: Governance, Political Development, Political Reconciliation, 
Economic Development, and Rule of Law.  All these actions, in 
coordination with the interagency work group process in Baghdad, are 
essential to determine when conditions are met that can demonstrate 
a province has reached a level of sustainable maturity, or better. 
This process will serve as the basis for OPA to recommend 
fundamental changes to the PRT system, signaling the time to begin 
the transition to normalcy, with the goal to establishing a more 
traditional bilateral relationship with the government of Iraq. 
 
-- Transportation Issues: The Transportation Attache delivered a 
very clear and fundamental message: transportation is the key 
enabler in Iraq, with initial focus on the primary modal forms of 
transportation such as ports, roads and bridges, aviation, and 
railway.  The second focus area is ministry capacity and their 
ability for planning as well as budget execution.  Iraq is a natural 
land bridge, he stressed, and that railroads can play a crucial role 
as regional leader for intermodal transportation. 
 
-- Public Diplomacy and The Press: The PAS Counselor explained the 
role of the Provincial Support Unit within PAS that is specifically 
designed to provide cultural and press assistance to the teams. 
This unit, in coordination with the PD officer assigned to several 
PRTs, has access to a wide range of PD resources intended to carry 
messages from Iraq to the wider US and international audience.  He 
highlighted specific capabilities, such as the International 
Visitors program and the past US visit by a group of Anbari sheiks, 
which are widely accessible and should be used by all PRTs. 
 
-- UNOPS: Peter Sorensen, the Iraq Operations Center Director, 
described how UNOPS, a self-financed entity within the UN, managed 
over 26 projects worth USD 20 million during 2007.  He stated that 
the UNOPS presence in Iraq is entirely project driven, while 
operating under a broad UN mandate to work in both conflict and 
post-conflict environments.  To promote the positive impact that 
UNOPS could have on Iraq, Sorensen used a CERP-funded solid waste 
project in Kirkuk as an example of how a project can succeed when 
coordinated with the PRT and interwoven into the fabric of the 
structure of the municipality.  In this particular case, he noted, 
cost savings due to quality project management has allowed the 
project to extend beyond its planned duration. 
 
-- Additional valuable briefings were provided by Management 
(dedicated support to the PRTs), the Counterinsurgency Center in 
Taji (now available for joint US/Iraqi training, and also includes 
Iraqi sheikh and military/police active participation in the 
course), MNF-I Strategic Effects (current priority information tasks 
include Levels of National Employment, and a Literacy Campaign). 
 
------------------------------- 
CLOSING REMARKS BY OPA DIRECTOR 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7. At the end of the second day, the OPA Director closed the 
conference by underscoring the importance of team leader and 
military interactions, and the direct impact these interactions will 
have on the success of the PRTs.  She emphasized that 2008 is a 
crucial period for the PRTs now that the entire system is fully 
operational.  As we are nearing the end of the first quarter of this 
calendar year, the Director explained to the team leaders that the 
immediate PRT planning efforts must focus on objectives and 
activities for the next 6 to 9 month window.  Through these combined 
efforts, OPA should be in a solid position at the next Team Leader 
Conference to address mid-year adjustments for the PRTs, and to 
present the vision and framework for the rest of 2008 and beyond. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8. Two specific themes resounded throughout the conference: the 
importance of interpersonal interactions and interagency 
coordination (not only between State and military, but also among 
participating agencies as well), and the eventual transformation of 
the PRT system from its current form to one that will lead towards 
the more traditional bilateral relationship of diplomacy and 
technical support.  This transformation will probably be gradual 
albeit deliberate, and OPA recognizes the need to visualize how this 
transformation could be implemented in order to be prepared for that 
 
BAGHDAD 00000857  004 OF 004 
 
 
eventuality.  Given this reality, OPA also recognizes that the PRT 
program can successfully arrive to that inevitable transition point 
only through vigorous implementation of strategies and work plans in 
concert with a transparent and thorough assessment process.  Working 
together, those actions should provide OPA and the interagency with 
the sense of when the provinces have reached a sustainable level 
where we can start the dialogue of pulling back.  Returning to 
present day activities, OPA does not wish to lose sight that we have 
a challenging task at hand, and our success will depend upon support 
from the interagency as well as the will of the Government of Iraq. 
 
CROCKER