VZCZCXRO2390
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0613/01 0621140
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021140Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6000
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000613 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IR IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MARCH 1 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT 
TALABANI 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) In a March 1 meeting with the Ambassador, President 
Talabani said the Turkish withdrawal from the north opens the 
door for a political solution; said he hopes to visit Turkey 
March 10-12 to talk frankly with them about the PKK as well 
as come away with an agreement to restart the trilateral 
(Iraq-Turkey-U.S.) talks.  Talabani does not expect much from 
Iranian President Ahmadinejad's March 2-3 visit to Baghdad, 
describing it as a "protocol" visit during which they would 
sign some unimportant agreements in areas such as trade. 
Talabani believes Ahmadinejad will not be visiting Najaf and 
Karbala because Grand Ayatollah Sistani did not agree to the 
visit, and characterized the lack of the visit as a real 
deficiency in Ahmadinejad's schedule.  Talabani confirmed 
that PM Maliki and the full Executive Council will be 
involved in the the Long-Term Strategic Relationship (LTSR) 
negotiations, said the PCNS will meet on Monday to discuss 
forming a new Cabinet, and claimed that there is general 
agreement that provincial elections should still be held no 
later than October 1.  End Summary. 
 
Turkey and PKK 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (C) President Talabani, accompanied by Deputy Prime 
Minister Barham Saleh, met with the Ambassador on March 1. 
Talabani said the Turkish withdrawal from the north now opens 
the door for a political solution.  He thanked the Ambassador 
for his interventions; the Ambassador noted that the 
situation was stopped before it got out of hand, and now it 
is time to take political advantage of the situation, 
including scheduling Talabani,s promised visit to Turkey. 
Talabani said he hoped to visit March 10-12, and will take 
the Ministers of Oil, Water, and Interior with him because 
the Turks want to discuss a range of issues.  Talabani said 
he wants to meet first with President Gul, then with Prime 
Minister Erdogan, and then have a private meeting with both 
together in order to have an off-the-record discussion about 
Iraq, relations with Iran, Kirkuk, the PKK, and the Kurdish 
situation overall.  He mentioned that he will also need to 
discuss with them privately something that Ahmadinejad agreed 
to.  Talabani would like to use the visit to restart the 
trilateral (Iraq-Turkey-U.S.) talks again; the Ambassador 
noted that the visit should result in agreement on mechanisms 
and agenda for the future, and that the trilateral meetings 
are one mechanism, but there also needs to be agreement on 
bilateral channels:  some involving Turkey and Iraq, but some 
involving Turkey and the the Kurds speaking directly. 
 
¶3. (C) Turkey is important to Iraq for three reasons, 
Talabani explained.  It is very important in terms of 
regional balance; it is Iraq,s "door to Europe;" and Turkey 
has a democratic Islamic government.  Both Turkey and Iraq 
are friends of the U.S., and should work together.  "We must 
talk frankly about the PKK," Talabani declaimed.  If the PKK 
continues to fight, we need to take effective measures 
against it, he said, and Barzani agrees with the need to send 
a strong message to the PKK to lay down its arms and end the 
fight, or leave Iraq.  Talabani noted that the Turks are now 
speaking to the Iraqis in fairly conciliatory terms; 
confirmed that the Turks had invited KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani 
to visit Turkey; and said that from his point of view that 
visit could take place either before or after his own visit 
to Turkey. 
 
Visit of Iranian President Ahmadinejad 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Talabani outlined Iranian President Ahmadinejad,s 
visit to Baghdad March 2-3, noting that he would have a 
separate meeting with Ahmadinejad.  The Ambassador urged 
Talabani to use his influence to persuade Ahmadinejad not to 
use the visit to attack the U.S., and to talk frankly to 
Ahmadinejad about Iran,s future and the need to deal with 
Iraq as a sovereign state.  Talabani agreed, and assured the 
Ambassador that if Ahmadinejad attacks the U.S., publicly or 
privately, he will respond and not let it pass.  Talabani 
said frankly that he does not expect much from the visit; it 
will not solve any problems between Iraq and Iran; but it may 
calm things down for a while.  The visit should be seen as 
one of protocol, meant to demonstrate brotherhood and 
friendship, but nothing more, Talabani said.  The GOI will 
sign some unimportant agreements with Ahmadinejad, he said 
(Barham elaborated that these would be on trade, customs, 
transit, and the like), but "reaching a good strategic 
relationship is impossible," which Talabani noted as one 
reason Iraq needs a good relationship with Turkey. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00000613  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶5. (C) Talabani said it was his impression that Ahmadinejad 
will not be visiting Najaf and Karbala because Grand 
Ayatollah Sistani did not agree to the visit, and reiterated 
a number of times that the fact that Ahmadinejad is not being 
received in Karbala and Najaf is a real deficiency in his 
schedule. 
 
Long-Term Strategic Relationship; PCNS; Elections 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶6. (C) PM Maliki will direct the Long-Term Strategic 
Relationship (LTSR) negotiations with the full cooperation of 
the Executive Council, Talabani said.  He noted that the 
Presidency Council is consitutionally responsible for 
approving something like the LTSR, but said that in this case 
Maliki,s approval would be necessary as well.  Talabani 
agreed that everyone wants to avoid the problems encountered 
at the end of last year in negotiating the Declaration of 
Principles and the UNSCR renewal.  Finally, Talabani said 
that the Principals Committee on National Security (PCNS) 
would meet on Monday (March 3) and the main topic would be 
the government (i.e., forming a new Cabinet), and said that 
everyone agrees that despite the veto of the provincial 
powers law, elections should still be held no later than 
October 1. 
CROCKER