VZCZCXYZ0998
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0602/01 0610822
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 010822Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5986
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000602 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2018 
TAGS: ECON IZ PGOV
SUBJECT: IRAQ EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE - FEB 22 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Prime Minister Maliki and Deputy Prime 
Minister Salih co-chaired the Iraqi Executive Steering 
Committee (I-ESC) in support of the Baghdad Security Plan 
(FaQ).  The meeting featured PM Maliki calling for the 
reestablishment of defunct neighborhood councils in Sunni 
areas; the decision to pay-off and forcibly evict 120 
squatter families from 2 Ministry of Defense buildings in 
central Baghdad; and complaints over the Governor's refusal 
to share information about Baghdad's network of security 
cameras.  END SUMMARY 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Defunct Neighborhood Councils in Sunni Areas 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶2. (C) In response to a Project Clean Delivery briefing about 
difficulties in delivering kerosene to Sunni areas of Baghdad 
that have defunct local government councils due to previous 
assassinations and threats from AQI, PM Maliki urged that the 
Provincial Council and Baghdad Governor work with Interim 
Follow-up Committee on National Reconciliation. (Comment.  At 
the follow-up Deputy Meeting, the I-ESC Secretariat stated 
that new council was to be temporary until Iraq elections are 
held NLT 1 October, 2008.  End Comment). 
 
¶3. (C) Comment. PM Maliki also mentioned utilizing the 
involvement of the Popular Mobilization Committees.  Since 
Chalabi had assumed his position as Head of the Essential 
Services Committee, the Embassy had assumed that his Popular 
Mobilization Committee was no longer active.  Over the course 
of the last year, the Embassy has sought to limit interaction 
with Chalabi's Popular Mobilization Committee, viewing it as 
 
an illegitimate competitor to Neighborhood Councils.  End 
Comment. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Squatter Gangs in MoD Housing Complexes 
--------------------------------------- 
¶4. (C)  The Minister of Defense and the Baghdad Operations 
Commander both identified gangs of squatters living amongst 
60 families in each of the MoD owned Bab Al-Mouzan Housing 
Complex in Southern Adamiyah and the Air Force Club in 
Karrada as extremely destabilizing for security in central 
Baghdad.  Dr. Chalabi noted that these gangs are menacing 
local universities.  DPM Salih stated that the families 
should both be forced to leave and given financial payments 
as compensation.  Several IESC members voiced concerns that 
this would be seen as rewarding law breakers.  The issue was 
to be followed-up on at the MCNS. 
 
------------------------------ 
Future of Green Zone Proposals 
------------------------------ 
¶5. (C) As part of a discussion updating the progress of 
refurbish GoI owned buildings in Baghdad, the Secretary of 
the Council of Ministers (CoM) noted that CoM would soon be 
reviewing proposals to either eventually turn the Green Zone 
(IZ) into a diplomatic area or a centralized area for GoI 
entities.  The Secretary noted that he was in regular contact 
with Multi-National Forces real estate division on the issue. 
 
 
------------------------------------- 
Governor Refuses to Share Information 
------------------------------------- 
¶6. (C) DPM Salih and National Security Advisor Dr. Rubaie 
voiced frustration to the Baghdad Governor over his refusal 
to provide any details about the number or locations of 
Baghdad's network of security cameras.  The Governor defended 
his refusal by noting that such info was highly sensitive and 
that some of the cameras are decoys.  The Deputy Prime 
Minister instructed the Governor to prepare a detailed report 
to be delivered to Dr. Rubaie and the Council of Ministers. 
(Comment.  The Governor often feels unfairly usurped 
regarding control of security forces in Baghdad.  The Baghdad 
Operations Command was created under an emergency executive 
order and reports directly to the Prime Minister.  The 
Embassy was previously informed that there are approximately 
1000 security cameras in Baghdad, including decoys.  End 
Comment.) 
 
¶7. (C)  The Baghdad Governor agreed to proceed with the 
establishment of video viewing screens for the cameras at the 
Prime Minister's National Operation Center.  The Governor 
also complained that he is short of skilled computer 
technicians to run the camera network and asked for 
assistance in hiring 17 such specialists. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
PDS Quality Poor, Distribution System Corrupt 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶8. (C) The Minister of Trade acknowledged extensive 
corruption and poor food quality in the monthly distribution 
of basic food stuffs to Iraq's citizens.  Specifically, the 
 
Minister noted that significant quantities of spoiled food 
and been imported and that gangs regularly switch out quality 
food for poor quality food at warehouses.  The Minister said 
that he was taking steps to improve import quality, but that 
he needed assistance from the BOC to curb theft and 
corruption.  Noting the need to improve government services 
in previously insecure areas, DPM Salih instructed the 
Minister to prepare a map that indicates the degree of 
successful distribution in each of Baghdad's neighborhoods. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Lack of Progress on ID Smart Cards 
---------------------------------- 
¶9. (C) Dr. Chalabi and others lamented the fact the Ministry 
of Trade has yet to develop and implement an ID Smart Card 
that could help reduce rampant corruption.  The Minister of 
Trade said that development of such cards had stalled due to 
a decision by MNF-I to withdraw $10 million in funding.  DCG 
Rollo stated that this funding for a Baghdad only card was 
withdrawn by CG Petraeus several months previously because 
the Ministry of Interior was attempting to establish a 
similar, but incompatible system nation wide.  DPM Salih 
noted that ID Smart Cards are essential for security and 
instructed the NSA Office to follow up on the issue. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment.  The current PDS ID sheets are frequently 
and easily counterfeited.  Establishment of a biometric based 
national ID card would have significant security benefits, 
but Embassy and MNF-I efforts to engage the GoI to develop 
such a system have bogged down due to lack of cooperation 
from the MoI General in charge of the program.  MNF-I has 
developed its own data base of biometric info on tens of 
thousands of Iraqis through raids, detentions and Awakening 
engagement, but this data has not been shared with the GoI. 
End Comment. 
CROCKER