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INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5109
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0009
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0992
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 2925
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 4357
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 1164
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 1596
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 2013
RUEHTH/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI PRIORITY 1842
RHMFISS/NAVSUPPACT SOUDA BAY GR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
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RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0358
RUEHTH/ODC ATHENS GR PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 000469 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2018 
TAGS: GR NATO ODC PARM PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: ADMIRAL FITZGERALD VISITS ATHENS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Welcome to Athens.  We look forward to hosting your 
visit which comes at an important time, during the Bucharest 
Summit, in the U.S.-Greece bilateral relationship.  As you 
know, Greece is an important NATO ally and strategic partner 
of the U.S., as well as a member of the European Union. 
Athens was transformed for the better by the 2004 Olympic 
Games.  Greece is less idiosyncratic politically than in the 
past and more internationally involved.  Relations with 
Ankara, while not trouble-free, are better than in the 
1990's, and Greece is one of the most steadfast advocates of 
eventual full EU membership for Turkey. 
 
----------------- 
POLITICAL CLIMATE 
----------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) National elections were held in September 2007 and 
Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis of New Democracy, Greece's 
center-right party, won another 4 years in government. 
However, New Democracy won by a narrow margin and maintains a 
razor thin majority of only one seat after losing 13 seats in 
Parliament.  Strong gains by the far right and left parties 
as protest votes and hard line views on Macedonia have had an 
impact on U.S. dialogue with the GoG on Macedonia's NATO 
accession, and it has been even more difficult to persuade 
Athens to increase its contribution to ISAF and other NATO 
missions.  The economy is performing well, aided by good 
growth in the Balkan region and Greece's adoption of the Euro 
in 2002. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) While the probability of any major military 
confrontation is remote, much time and energy is spent in the 
military stand-off with Turkey.  Both sides are unable to 
resist the frequent temptation to poke the other in the eye. 
The Greeks parse very carefully any U.S. statements over 
Cyprus or the Aegean, with an eye towards scoring points 
against the other side.  We encourage all senior visitors to 
carefully word any reference to those two problems. The GoG 
dearly wants recognition of the Greek role and contributions 
to stability in the Balkans.  In particular, the US military 
to military relationship with Greece is the strongest 
bilateral relationship we have and the Greek military is very 
eager to maintain that strong relationship.  Your visit will 
reinforce the US commitment to that relationship. 
 
-------- 
MEETINGS 
-------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) You are scheduled to meet with three primary 
military interlocutors; Deputy Defense Minister Tousoulos, 
CHOD General Demitries Grapsas and the new Chief, Hellenic 
Naval General Staff, Vice Admiral George Karamalikis. 
Although military issues are important and will be the likely 
focus of your meetings, five very important political issues 
dominate Greek thinking and will also be addressed during 
your meetings with General Grapsas and Deputy Minister 
Tousollous.  Each is addressed below. 
 
--------- 
MACEDONIA 
--------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Greece 
objected to the Republic of Macedonia's name.  Greeks 
consider the unmodified use of "Macedonia" a usurpation of 
their heritage and warn that it could encourage irredentism 
towards Greece's northern province of the same name.  In 
1995, the U.S. helped broker an "Interim Accord" between 
 
ATHENS 00000469  002 OF 004 
 
 
Greece and Macedonia positing that Greece would not object to 
the use of the name, "the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia" (FYROM) until the two countries could decide on a 
mutually acceptable solution through UN-led negotiations. 
The U.S. decision in November 2004 to recognize the Republic 
of Macedonia by its constitutional name in bilateral 
relations touched off a storm of controversy in Greece.  We 
have repeatedly urged both sides to lower the rhetoric and 
engage in negotiations led by Matthew Nimetz under the 
auspices of the United Nations.  Positions have hardened as 
the April 2008 NATO Summit approaches with the possibility of 
a NATO invitation to Macedonia.  Greece has made clear it 
will veto the invitation absent a settlement of the name 
issue, notwithstanding its commitment in the "Interim 
Accord".  We continue to urge both countries to work for a 
mutually agreeable solution through the UN/Nimetz process. 
If your Greek interlocutors raise this contentious issue, 
they will make the point that future members must strengthen 
security for all allies.  For Greece, this cannot happen in 
the case of Macedonia until it recognizes the need for good 
neighborly relations and a recognition 
in the name issue. 
 
 
------ 
KOSOVO 
------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Greece has not recognized Kosovo's independence, 
although we continue to encourage the Greeks to do so.  In 
the lead-up to Kosovo's independence, the Greeks consistently 
expressed concerns about the prospect of Kosovo's 
independence over Serbia's objections.  Greek antipathy 
largely stemmed from a knee-jerk affinity for the Serbian 
position (based, among other things, on Orthodox solidarity), 
but also from concerns of a possible negative precedent for 
Cyprus and a possible reactionary response in Serbia that 
could destabilize the region.  However, the Greeks have not 
resisted or further complicated Kosovo's independence.  They 
did not object to EU decision making on a Rule of Law 
Mission, they have pledged substantial personnel to the EU 
Rule of Law Mission, they have pledged to maintain their 
force levels in KFOR, and they have provided staff for the 
International Civilian Office (ICO).  We continue to make the 
point that Kosovo requires friends in the region who are 
committed to its success, political stability, and economic 
growth.  The Greeks accept this point, but also assert that 
it is important to maintain Serbia's European orientation; 
Greece has been among the most active players in the EU in 
engaging with Serbia post-Kosovo independence and in 
encouraging Serbia's European and Euro-Atlantic perspective. 
The Greeks maintain two mechanized infantry battalions in 
Kosovo. These are subordinate to the 2nd Mechanized Infantry 
Division in Edessa, one of their few 'high readiness units'. 
 
 
------------- 
ENERGY ISSUES 
------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Greece is seeking to play a prominent new role as 
an energy pipeline hub to western Europe.  We see the most 
significant development as the Turkey-Greece-Italy 
Interconnecter (TGI), which could be the first pipeline to 
carry Caspian gas to Europe without going through Russia or 
through Russian-controlled pipelines.  It is an important 
step in realizing our Southern Corridor strategy of 
increasing energy diversity and security for Europe, and we 
have actively encouraged Greece to contract for gas from 
Azerbaijan.  Greece has found itself in the cross hairs of an 
intense effort by Russian Gazprom to block TGI through any of 
a number of means, including proposing a competing pipeline 
 
ATHENS 00000469  003 OF 004 
 
 
called the Southstream. The Russian aim is to block the 
provision of Azeri gas to Europe through Greece.  Although 
Greece relies on natural gas for less than 5 percent of its 
energy needs (but plans to expand this amount significantly 
under EU greenhouse gas guidelines), 80 percent comes from 
Gazprom, making Greece reliant on continued Russian goodwill 
in the short-medium term. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Meanwhile, Greece, Bulgaria, and Russia have agreed 
to construct the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Bosporus Oil Bypass 
Pipeline (BAP) and have their national oil companies share 
ownership.  We support this initiative insofar as it is 
commercially feasible.  The Embassy and Washington agencies 
have been actively promoting with Greece the need for 
increased European energy security and diversification.  It 
will be useful for you to reinforce U.S. appreciation for 
Greece's courage in standing up to Russian pressure on gas 
issues and to build contacts with Central Asian suppliers. 
 
-------------------- 
GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS 
-------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Against the sway of public opinion, the GOG 
remains supportive of Turkey's EU accession hopes and 
understands that a Turkey in the EU is in Greece's long-term 
strategic interest.  The Cyprus issue, however, is the 
sticking point.  The issue has been stymied since the Greek 
Cypriots rejected the Annan plan to reunify the island in a 
2004 referendum (Turkish-Cypriots accepted the Plan).  While 
Athens quietly backed the Annan Plan, the Greek Government 
also believed it should stand by the Government of Cyprus and 
the vote of theGreek Cypriots.  The Greeks are cautiously 
optimistic with the new opportunities aising from the 
election of Cypriot Christofias and his stated intent of 
working with the Turkish Cypriots to resolve the issue.  They 
remain suspicious that Turkey may not be as committed to 
achieving a permanent settlement to the issue, and 
particularly worry that the Turkish General Staff (TGS) may 
stymie Turkish Cypriot efforts to make progress. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Although Greece and Turkey still differ on issues 
such as Aegean air/seaspace demarcation and Greece often 
complains of alleged Turkish air incursions in the Aegean, 
rapprochement remains a leitmotif of their bilateral 
relations.  During 2004, there were 500 mock dog fights 
attributed to the demarcation disputes between the two 
countries.  In 2006, the number was reduced to 150 but 
tensions again arose in May 2006 when a Turkish F-16 collided 
in international airspace with a Greek F-16.  Both 
governments quickly brought the situation under control 
successfully averting a potentially explosive situation. 
Both sides adhere to the provisions of an informal CBM where 
both suspend close aerial activity from June to September to 
avoid potentially destabilizing incidents during peak tourist 
season.  Additionally, there is a great deal of reoccurring 
dissension related to the issue of over-flights of 
demilitarized Aegean islands during NATO exercises.  This 
controversial issue repeatedly emerges often forcing the 
withdrawal of Greek support for NATO exercises in the region. 
 
 
¶11.  (S/NF)  We understand the Greeks are preparing to submit 
plans to NATO to request NATO support for an exercise over 
the controversial island of Agios Efstratios.  Should they 
raise this issue during your visit, we recommend you simply 
note our expectation that the Greeks follow the policy 
guidance they have received from CC-AIR Izmir Commander Lt 
Gen McFann exactly,  that any deviation from these letters 
would automatically result in the withdrawal of NATO support, 
and that the question of whether NATO can support this 
request will be evaluated once the plans are submitted.  As 
 
ATHENS 00000469  004 OF 004 
 
 
you are aware, the Izmir policy letters specify that the 
mission must be on the 3 month forecast; it must provide 
Izmir specific flight details no later than 14 days prior to 
the flight and the Air Tasking Order (ATO) must be shared 
with the adjacent CAOC no later than 1 day prior to the flight 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
GREEK MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO GWOT AND ELSEWHERE 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶12.  (C) At every opportunity, and at every level, we 
encourage the Greeks to contribute more to the war efforts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Recently, the Ambassador met with 
Minister of Defense Meimarakis and pressed him hard for a 
Provincial Reconstruction Team in Dai Kundi, heavy lift 
helicopters, more personnel in the OMLT in Jalalabad, and 
removal of the caveats.  He did not reject any of the 
requests outright but has yet to respond.  We encourage you 
to repeat those same requests during your meetings with the 
Deputy Minister and the CHOD.  We recommend that you lead off 
by acknowledging and expressing appreciation for ongoing 
Greek support at Souda and for the MOD's commitment to 
provide personnel to the U.S. embedded training team in 
Kabul.  Greece offered an OMLT with the provision that the 
Kabul-only caveat could be met.  NATO came back with two 
options: a Greek-led OMLT in Jalalabad (which is outside the 
60 kilometer caveat but within NATO's RC-Capital region) or 
to provide staff to a U.S. embedded training team in Kabul. 
Greece has opted for the latter, thus far. 
 
¶13.  (C) Although Greek contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan 
are limited, Greek contributions to other important GWOT 
initiatives are substantial and should not be overlooked. 
When Turkey refused to allow the U.S. coalition to operate 
from bases in their country during the last war, the USAF 
moved 6 KC-135 tankers from Incirlik to Souda Bay Airfield 
where the Greeks helped fuel them.  For U.S. ground forces, 
the Souda Bay port complex and the airfield allowed the 4th 
Mechanized Infantry Division to quickly shift from the north 
to the south in time for the start of the war. Greece allows 
over 24,000 over-flights a year and participates in OAE/OEF, 
KFOR, and UNIFIL.  Although it is fine to thank them 
privately during meetings, Greek public sentiment is strongly 
anti-war, so the help Greece gives us at Souda Bay and with 
frequent transshipments of ammunition are subjects they would 
like to keep private avoiding any public acknowledgments. 
 
¶14.  (C) A very important part of our engagement with Greece 
is our robust ship visit plan.  The Hellenic National Defense 
General Staff (HNDGS), the Hellenic Coast Guard and the 
Hellenic National Police have been very supportive opening 12 
additional ports for ship visits from 6th Fleet vessels. The 
security surveys for these ports are finished and new ports 
are under consideration.  Last year, 73 US ships visited 10 
different Greek ports outside Souda Bay and this year, 14 
ships have visited 5 different ports.  The ongoing Lebanon 
crisis has necessitated several recent cancellations but once 
that situation changes, we hope to see an increase in visits. 
 Additionally, we look forward to hosting a carrier visit 
this year. 
SPECKHARD