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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
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RHMFISS/USAREUR POLAD HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 6329

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000553 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PSEC MOPS PTER TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: THE UPS AND DOWNS OF GOVERNMENT-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 
 
REF: A. A. ANKARA 430 
     ¶B. B. ANKARA 475 
     ¶C. C. ANKARA 171 
     ¶D. D. ANKARA 222 
     ¶E. E. ANKARA 513 
     ¶F. F. ANKARA 502 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Kim J. DeBlauw for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Turkish military operations against PKK 
terrorists in northern Iraq over the past three months have 
lent a facade of unity to the contentious relationship 
between the military leadership and Prime Minister Erdogan's 
governing Justice and Development Party (AKP).  The Turkish 
General Staff (TGS), deeply frustrated by the AKP's 2007 
election victory and its political clout, remains fiercely 
opposed to what it considers to be the ruling party's 
Islamist agenda, symbolized by the recent passage of the 
so-called headscarf amendment to the constitution.  Future 
flashpoints include broader constitutional reform, programs 
aimed at addressing the demands of ethnic Kurdish citizens, 
and any measures perceived to cut into authorities or 
privileges of the secular elite.  The March 14 closure case 
has put AKP on the defensive, taking attention away from the 
military's spat with the political opposition over whether 
the February ground operation into northern Iraq was 
terminated early under US pressure.  Most expect TGS to act 
coolly in the days ahead, distancing itself from legal debate 
surrounding the closure case against the AKP.  The political 
distractions expected as the closure case proceeds may weaken 
the government's hand as it considers non-military 
initiatives to weaken support for the PKK among Turkey's 
ethnic Kurds.  End summary. 
 
Iraq Operation Makes for Strange Bedfellows 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Turkish armed forces' air and ground campaign 
against PKK terrorists in northern Iraq since November 2007 
created the appearance of unity between erstwhile ideological 
foes TGS and the governing AKP.  Both the military and the 
government contributed to and capitalized on an outpouring of 
Turkish nationalism following high Turkish casualties during 
PKK attacks in October 2007.  Cross-border counter-strikes 
which followed beginning in December enjoyed overwhelming 
public support and both the GOT and TGS sought to take 
credit. 
 
¶3. (C) The charge leveled by the main political opposition 
Republican Peoples Party (CHP) and Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP) against the military and the government (refs A and B), 
that the army withdrew from northern Iraq under U.S. pressure 
and without finishing the mission, has further driven TGS and 
AKP together.  Chief of Turkish General Staff GEN Buyukanit 
characterized the opposition's charges as "treasonous."  The 
opposition charges have touched a raw nerve, opening a rift 
between the military and its traditional ideological allies 
that will not heal anytime soon.  Meanwhile, Prime Minister 
Erdogan added to the appearance of solidarity with the 
military by heaping lavish praise on military's performance 
in northern Iraq. 
 
Military Frustration High 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Serious tensions remain between the military and 
civilian leadership, barely under the surface.  While still 
regarded as the country's most revered and respected national 
institution, the Turkish military suffered a major political 
setback with the resounding re-election of the AKP in July 
2007 and Gul's subsequent elevation to the presidency.  Its 
infamous web posting of April 27, 2007, the Constitutional 
Court's controversial ruling a few days later, and the series 
of large public demonstrations in favor of secularism which 
TGS was widely believed to have supported behind-the-scenes 
hastened elections and, most believe, led to broader support 
for the AKP.  With no prospect of popular support for more 
overt action against the government, TGS had no recourse but 
to wait and watch the government's actions as Gul moved to 
Cankaya with a headscarved first lady.  Renewed PKK attacks 
in the fall of 2007, culminating in the Daglica ambush in 
 
ANKARA 00000553  002 OF 002 
 
 
October, offered TGS an opportunity to regain some prestige 
in the public's eye through military action. 
 
¶5. (C) For TGS, among the most symbolic and provocative 
elements of the AKP's agenda was the government's pledge to 
pass a constitutional amendment designed to lift the ban on 
women wearing headscarves at universities.  When it was clear 
that the AKP had the votes it needed with support from the 
MHP, Parliament pressed forward speedily with the 
constitutional amendment package.  GEN Buyukanit declined to 
address the question publicly and, when pressed, commented 
only that the public was well aware of the military's 
feelings on the matter (ref C).  The amendment gained 
parliamentary approval easily (ref D); however, President Gul 
chose to wait until February 21, the day on which TGS 
launched its ground attack against PKK terrorist positions in 
northern Iraq, to sign the amendments into law.  The package 
is currently under review by the Constitutional Court and 
implementation, which had been hotly disputed by the 
universities, has been suspended. 
 
Flashpoints Ahead 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The so-called headscarf amendment was a blow to the 
military.  Future broader constitutional reform under 
consideration by the AKP will also be opposed by the 
military, which oversaw the drafting of the current 
constitution following the 1980 coup, to the extent that 
those proposals are perceived as anti-secular or as chipping 
away at the authorities of the state establishment.  Another 
contentious issue ahead is the plan to address economic and 
social ills of the southeast.  The military acknowledges that 
economic measures are needed in the southeast.  However, it 
remains opposed to any broad amnesty for PKK terrorists, seen 
by some as necessary to bring PKK cadres down from the hills 
and into a peaceful political process.  TGS also opposes any 
cultural measures, such as Kurdish language education, that 
would appear to give Turkey's Kurds -- who are not regarded 
as a minority in any legal sense -- a special status. 
 
Implications of "Judicial Coup" 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) The March 14 closure case against the AKP (ref E) adds 
a new dimension to the military's struggle against the ruling 
party.  If TGS feels vindicated by the case against the AKP, 
the military leadership has offered no public comment.  Most 
expect TGS to act coolly and with restraint in the days 
ahead, distancing itself from court debate, and allowing 
another wing of Turkey's secular establishment to take its 
run at the AKP.  The inevitable political distractions 
expected as the closure case drags on will likely weaken the 
government's hand as it considers non-military initiatives 
towards Turkey's Kurdish population, making consensus on 
those proposals more difficult. 
 
¶8.  (C) Currently at odds with all parties in parliament and 
unable to effectively influence public sentiment through 
press statements or dire Internet warnings, TGS is forced to 
rely on like-minded allies in the judiciary and bureaucracy 
who similarly feel that the Republic - and their stake in it 
- is under threat.  The closure case currently before the 
Constitutional Court bears no overt military fingerprints but 
serves the military purpose of keeping AKP in a tight box. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
WILSON