VZCZCXRO5231
PP RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHUJA #0503/01 0741349
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141349Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2352
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 8930
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/NDU WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DET STUTTGART FOBE VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEAHQA/AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000503 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOE FOR GEORGE PERSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2018 
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL PGOV ECOWAS XY NI
SUBJECT: ECOWAS STANDBY FORCE: ITS PRESENT STATUS 
 
REF: ABUJA 447 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b 
& d). 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) is 
frequently mentioned by those in the African security 
community as the best developed of the African rapid-reaction 
brigades called for by the African Union (AU) in July 2004. 
Indeed, ECOWAS has come a long way from the days of the 
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) interventions, with pledged 
units from all member states identified, training exercises 
taking place, some staff slots filled, and some conflict 
prevention/resolution doctrine worked out.  It has also begun 
to put in place both the peace support operations (PSO) 
doctrine and the organizational infrastructure necessary to 
move beyond a mere military response and into the area of a 
civilian peacebuilding capability.  However, many of these 
advances are on paper only, or are mitigated by other 
factors.  Serious challenges and shortcomings remain to be 
overcome if ECOWAS is to intervene effectively in the next 
West African crisis and avoid the mistakes of the past.  This 
cable provides a short analysis of the basic structure of the 
ESF and an analysis of ECOWAS' achievements and shortfalls in 
the arena of conflict prevention and response.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------- 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND THE ESF 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U)  The ECOWAS Standby Force is being created to address 
persistent subregional strife and the shortcomings of 
previous efforts under its previous incarnation called 
ECOMOG.  It was developed in conjunction with the AU's 
doctrine on creating an indigenous African 
peacekeeping/enforcing capability.  The original 
configuration was 6500 soldiers from pre-selected units of 
member states -- a 1500-man rapid reaction Task Force (TF) 
prepared to deploy within 30 days (ECOWAS leadership has 
since increased the TF size to 2773 soldiers), and a Main 
Brigade (MB) of around 5000 soldiers.  The MB is to be 
deployable within 90 days.  Both the TF and the MB are to be 
self-sustainable for 90 day deployments, with one of the 
following actions subsequently to occur: 1) TF elements will 
return to their home states; 2) the TF will remain in place 
as part of the deploying MB contingent; 3) the TF will become 
an element of an AU or UN mission; or 4) the TF will hand 
over operations to a UN or AU force.  ECOWAS is relying on a 
series of donor-financed and -led training exercises to take 
place in various member states, culminating in a large-scale 
Force Training Exercise sometime in 2009 for the TF to reach 
mission-capable status by 2010.  Strategic planning will be 
done by the Mission Planning and Management Cell, and 
operational planning is led by current ECOWAS ESF Chief of 
Staff Brigadier General Hassan Lai, a Nigerian.  Furthermore, 
future military action is to be taken concurrently with 
civilian peacebuilding activities to ensure a holistic, 
long-term approach to conflict management, societal 
rebuilding, and the protection of human rights. 
 
¶3. (U) ECOWAS has also made progress on other key aspects of 
creating effective conflict prevention and response 
mechanisms.  These include ECOWARN, a directorate with 
offices throughout West Africa, whose specific tasks are to 
monitor destabilizing threats of all kinds, analyze them, and 
disseminate information about these threats to member states; 
 the Emergency Response Team, composed of civilians who are 
sent out to perform such tasks as evaluation of refugee needs 
and election monitoring; and the Council of the Wise, 
comprised of West African elder statesmen and -women who can 
be dispatched on dispute mediation and resolution missions. 
ECOWAS claims to have successfully used these organs to help 
create desirable outcomes, such as the sending of monitors 
for Togo's 2007 elections which were subsequently judged 
largely free and fair, and the dispatching of a mediation 
team to Liberia to help peacefully resolve the 2005 election 
 
ABUJA 00000503  002 OF 003 
 
 
dispute between Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and George Weah. 
 
-------------------- 
SHORTFALLS AND NEEDS 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) On paper, ECOWAS appears far advanced in its ability 
to manage conflict, however, serious problems and challenges 
still remain, some of them barely addressed since ECOMOG days: 
 
-- Funding issues still remain unresolved.  Donor nations 
(primarily the U.S., UK, and France) pay for all aspects of 
the ESF's staff, training, and operational costs.  Foreign 
assistance risks being uncoordinated and redundant, as 
traditional partners are joined by new, deep-pocketed ones 
such as the European Union, who do not always act in concert 
with established donors.  Also, a few member states tend to 
bear nearly all the mission costs, leading to 
disproportionate influence over tactics, strategy, and 
political developments. 
 
-- While all member nations have pledged pre-identified units 
to the TF, and General Lai reports having visited nearly all 
of those units in their home bases, there is concern that 
these units will be either not mission-ready or not the units 
actually deployed in a crisis.  Nigeria's armed forces, for 
example, are already stretched to capacity with domestic and 
international obligations, and under current conditions it is 
hard to conceive a scenario in which they could produce their 
multiple pledged units within the prescribed 30-day 
timeframe.  Moreover, no firm mechanism is in place to ensure 
that the Main Brigade can field all 5000 troops if necessary; 
there are no specific nation-by-nation numerical requirements 
to fill out such a large quota within 90 days. 
 
-- While ECOWAS has made much progress toward forging 
well-reasoned, broadly supported PSO policies, history has 
shown that internal politics, historical ties, personal 
loyalties to specific warlords, and language have all been 
factors mitigating members' reactions to the call of duty. 
 
-- Little progress has been made toward assembling the 
civilian components necessary to meet the needs of ECOWAS' 
PSO doctrine.  West Africa lacks the expertise to engage in 
peace building activities effectively, and ECOWAS for the 
short- to medium-term will need to rely on UN support for 
these functions. 
 
-- ECOWAS' approach to crisis prevention and management 
remains narrow and haphazard.  To date the Commission has 
made laudable progress toward intervening in and ending armed 
conflict, but it has done little to guard against, prepare 
for, or counter equally destabilizing events and situations 
such as natural disasters, pervasive narcotrafficking, or 
pandemic disease.  It has also shown itself to be 
distressingly selective when it comes to enforcing Commission 
Protocols and addressing specific member states' 
transgressions.  Despite a "zero tolerance" policy toward 
national leaders who gain office through undemocratic means, 
and despite the potential for regional destabilization caused 
by unrest in West Africa's largest country, not a word was 
said about Nigeria's seriously flawed 2007 presidential 
election.  Nor has ECOWAS expressed any interest in resolving 
Nigeria's intractable Niger Delta conflict, which has 
economic, military, human rights, environmental, and minority 
rights aspects -- all topics of alleged vital interest to 
ECOWAS. 
 
-- Lastly, the ESF has made little progress toward developing 
its own realistic logistical capabilities.  In theory, TF 
logistical support is supposed to come from Mali, Nigeria, 
Ghana, and Senegal, along with helicopter support from 
as-yet-undetermined countries.  Nigeria's ability to lend 
such support relies on C-130s, most of which cannot fly and 
transport ships badly in need of a refit.  Considering that 
Mali's military is focused on its own internal low-level 
 
ABUJA 00000503  003 OF 003 
 
 
rebellion in the remote north, and is absorbed in meeting its 
own logistical requirements, the most likely scenario is that 
donor nations will be called upon to meet the need.  The 
ESF's planning capabilities are further compromised by its 
inexplicable failure to staff General Lai's team fully -- 
after two years of full funding by ECOWAS' partners, he has 
only five of eleven positions filled.  Inquiries into the 
reasons are met with temporization and promises of future 
action.  The result is what is described in reftel -- an 
unrealistic request that fails to draw upon facilities the 
donors have already put at ECOWAS' disposal, such as the 
Murraytown, Sierra Leone Logistics Depot, which already 
contains $60 million in USG-supplied ready-to-use equipment. 
 
-------------- 
MOVING FORWARD 
-------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) That an economic community could achieve so much in 
the arena of conflict resolution and prevention is 
remarkable.  ECOWAS has eclipsed regional organizations 
better resourced and with fewer development challenges, 
showing itself to be forward looking and pro-active in 
addressing the subregion's history of violence and 
instability.  Further progress depends on several factors: 
strong, focused leadership, both at the Commission and 
national levels; greater buy-in and ownership on the part of 
a number of members; the willingness to reform a bloated, 
inefficient bureaucracy; and continued donor support.  For 
the U.S. the way forward in helping stand up the ESF 
specifically, and advancing conflict prevention in general, 
is to demand value for dollar and to decline supporting 
events such as the inefficient Logistics Exercise (Logex) 
described in reftel.  The USG's refusal to support the Logex 
as presented sent a strong message about accountability to 
partner nations, and the lack of ESF ownership of and effort 
in the planning process.  Perhaps hearing "no" more often 
from its partner nations, and being held to a higher standard 
of oversight and transparency, will force ECOWAS to resolve 
some of its long-term weaknesses.  The USG could also expand 
its influence by offering technical support for the civilian 
side of the PKO/PSO strategy, currently still in its infancy, 
perhaps in the areas of rebuilding civilian police capability 
or a functioning judiciary. 
SANDERS