VZCZCXRO7569
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVI #0165 0321742
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011742Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9439
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0090
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0195
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0791
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0199

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 000165 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2023 
TAGS: PREL MEPP SY AU
SUBJECT: EMBASSY REQUESTS FM PLASSNIK CANCEL SYRIA VISIT 
 
REF: TRICK-KILNER E-MAIL 2/1/08 
 
Classified By: CDA Scott Kilner.  Reason: 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) In response to REF request, Econ/Pol Counselor and 
PolChief called 2/1 on Austrian MFA Deputy Director for ME 
Affairs, Christoph Meran, to raise USG concerns about FM 
Plassnik,s planned Feb. 7-9 visit to Damascus.  The visit is 
prt of a larger ME tour, including Lebanon, Israel,and 
Palestine.  ME Director Scheide, who will acompany Plassnik, 
was returning form official travel and unavailable for a 
meeting.  However, Meranpromise to convey our concerns to 
Scheide and t the Minister immediately upon Scheide,s 
return o the office later that afternoon.  Meran also 
idicated that USG concerns would probably be reviewe by the 
cabinet. 
 
¶2. (C) Counselor informd Meran that the USG was concerned by 
Plassnik,s plan to visit Damascus, noting that engagement by 
some EU diplomats had not produced a positive Syrian 
response.  The U.S. would welcome a decision to drop the 
Damascus stop.  The USG was also concerned at the lack of 
advance consultation (in contrast to the advance notice 
provided before President Fischer's December trip to 
Damascus), especially given Vienna,s stated interest in 
playing a greater role in ME diplomacy and, specifically, in 
possible follow-up to the Annapolis Conference.  Meran 
initially suggested that the Damascus trip was not yet 
confirmed, but after consulting with other ME Department 
staff, reported that two meetings were confirmed: with the 
Foreign Minister and with the Vice-President.  A meeting with 
President Assad had been requested but not confirmed. 
 
¶3. (C) Upon his return to the office, ME Director Scheide 
called Charge to confirm the U.S. message.  Charge reiterated 
USG concerns, drawing from ref e-mail points, and noting that 
the U.S. regarded any senior-level travel by western, not 
just Austrian, officials to Damascus as inappropriate now. 
Charge reminded Scheide that engagement with the German and 
Dutch FonMins had been followed by the arrest of Riad Seif. 
In light of these problems, the Charge urged the Austrians to 
reconsider going to Damascus. 
 
¶4. (C) Scheide said bluntly that this was "out of the 
question," arguing that an Austrian visit to Damascus was 
consistent with the U.S. invitation to Syria to attend the 
Annapolis Conference.  Charge noted the unique character of 
the Annapolis event and that Syria's actions since then have 
not been constructive.  Scheide stressed Syria's importance 
to the peace process and that Plassnik would stick to the 
EU's agreed message, urging constructive Syrian engagement. 
He also noted that Austria had rejected Iranian FM Mottaki's 
request to visit Vienna, which not all EU capitals had done. 
In a clear allusion to Austria's desire to play a more 
visible role in the post-Annapolis peace process, Scheide 
said that he would not want U.S.-Austrian differences over 
this visit to become a burden on "related matters."  The 
Charge reiterated that the visit was not a good idea. 
 
¶3. (C) Charge will meet MFA Political Director Mayr-Harting 
and Chancellery Diplomatic Advisor Wrable on February 4 and 
will again raise U.S. concerns regarding the visit.  Scheide 
also promised a readout after the trip. 
Kilner