VZCZCXYZ0770
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0193/01 0602042
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 292042Z FEB 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3830
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000193 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: USUN: STRATEGY FOR MORE EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS 
 
¶1. Sensitive but unclassified - entire text.  This is an 
Action Cable; please see paragraphs 9 and 11. 
 
¶2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT:  UN peacekeeping effectiveness has 
diminished in the wake of proliferating deployments into 
increasingly challenging geographic, security and political 
environments.  UN troop numbers and peacekeeping costs 
continue to expand, and as the UN nears the 100,000-troop 
mark, qualitative and quantitative shortfalls are emerging. 
We believe one reason for this is that the Security Council 
is not exercising sufficient oversight over the PKOs it 
creates. Too often, missions are launched without defined 
goals or benchmarks, and continue into perpetuity without 
advancing the situation on the ground.  Since effective PKOs 
can promote U.S. national interests, the U.S. needs to take 
the lead in asserting Security Council oversight over PKOs 
with the intent of instilling a "goal-oriented" approach. 
This approach would put various missions on timelines for 
success and/or termination.  The best argument for shutting 
down obsolete PKOs is that focus, forces and funds may be 
better utilized elsewhere.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----- 
Proliferating Peacekeeping Operations: Numbers and Costs are 
Higher Than Ever Before, Straining the System 
----- 
 
¶3. With an unprecedented 90,883 peacekeepers deployed across 
seventeen peacekeeping operations (as of January 2008), the 
UN has become the second biggest projector of force in the 
world.  Moreover, this is nowhere near the ceiling:  Security 
Council-mandated deployments in support of the African 
Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) 
alone should push the UN's numbers over the 100,000-person 
mark.  In neighboring Chad and Central African Republic, the 
UN anticipates additional deployments in support of the UN 
Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), 
and the Security Council has instructed DPKO to begin 
planning for a possible UN operation in Somalia (UNSCR 1772) 
which would involve the deployment of as many as 
twenty-thousand more blue-hatted peacekeepers to replace the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). 
 
¶4. These growing deployments are reflected in the bulging 
peacekeeping budget.  At over $7 billion for 2008, the 
peacekeeping budget is the highest ever.  The U.S. bill for 
peacekeeping comes out to approximately $2.2 billion for 
FY08, more than any other Member State, nearly four times our 
assessed contributions for the regular budget. 
 
----- 
The Need for Greater Security Council Oversight of PKOs 
----- 
 
¶5. As a substantial and strategically significant investment, 
we have a strong interest in ensuring that UN peacekeeping is 
as effective as possible. Historically, PKOs have often been 
launched swiftly in response to perceived crises, and then 
have continued without substantial review or oversight by the 
Security Council.  The result is an insufficient focus on how 
to develop and advance the political and humanitarian Lines 
of Operation (LOO) in a given country so that as the security 
LOO improves, real progress can be made towards ending the 
conflict.  Missions thus continue in perpetuity without 
benchmarks to help assess progress, and without a clear 
strategy towards advancing the situation on the ground. 
Mandate renewals are largely pro forma, without substantive 
and objective analysis and discussion.  The sum of these 
problems is a missed opportunity for more effective 
peacekeeping that genuinely improves the lives of people 
caught in conflict. 
 
¶6. Therefore, it is our view that a shift in thinking is 
required.  Instead of rubber-stamping existing PKOs, the 
Security Council needs a mandate renewal process that takes 
account of an objective assessment of the viability and 
efficacy of a given PKO, emphasizes accountability within a 
strategic framework, and, where appropriate, seriously 
considers termination of PKOs. Furthermore, as new PKOs are 
considered, mandates should have clear mission statements 
built around goals, timelines and clear cost assessments. 
 
¶7. The result should be a framework in which the Security 
Council can evaluate proposed PKOs for viability before 
authorization, and assess the progress of existing PKOs 
against actual benchmarks as they continue on. 
 
----- 
 
 
The U.S. Must Lead the Security Council Towards A 
Goal-Oriented Approach to Peacekeeping 
----- 
 
¶8. The U.S. will have to lead this approach, primarily by 
pressing through the Council to insist that the Secretariat 
approach planning and execution with a goal-oriented approach 
before a new operation is created, and also by emphasizing 
that mandate renewals will be the tool to ensure that 
existing operations are on track. 
 
¶9. In order to be prepared to do so effectively, we must have 
our own internal assessment process in place. Our concept is 
the formation of a compact interagency team that can analyze 
both existing and proposed PKOs and offer strategic 
assessments along political, military, and budgetary lines. 
The team would analyze both existing and proposed 
peacekeeping operations.  For existing PKOs, the team would 
evaluate the mission, objective, force structure, political 
component, cost and lifespan, and make recommendations as to 
whether the PKO is effective and warranted on its merits, and 
what adjustments could be made to ensure its efficacy.  For 
those that termination is recommended for, a second-order 
analysis could then be conducted to analyze whether the PKO 
is in fact necessary for other (political and/or diplomatic) 
reasons.  As part of this approach, our various Posts need to 
be proactively and systematically tasked to respond with 
field assessments as to how a given operation is proceeding, 
and this input should be incorporated into the analysis. 
Then, specific questions to pose for the Council and the UN 
Secretariat would be developed by this team as each mandate 
 
SIPDIS 
is coming up for renewal, to encourage a rigorous and 
thoughtful renewal and/or termination of mandates. For new 
PKOs, the team would help craft mandates with clear mission 
statements built around goals, timelines and clear cost 
assessments.  (ACTION REQUEST #1: USUN requests that the 
Department respond to this proposal.) 
 
¶10. A perfect opportunity to implement this approach is with 
the current planning for a UN follow-on PKO to AMISOM in 
Somalia.  We intend to ask the tough questions of DPKO early 
on in the planning process in order to know what we are 
walking into before the Security Council stands up another 
PKO. For example, we expect DPKO to include three courses of 
action and associated costs for each, and an assessment of 
whether or not DPKO expects that the TCCs can be found to 
provide the equipment and troops.  Additionally, we expect 
DPKO to offer a likelihood of and a timeline for success. 
This will ensure that to the extent we consider authorization 
of a PKO there, it has a clear mission-oriented mandate and a 
reasonable chance of success. 
 
¶11. Going forward, the same analysis should be applied to 
existing PKOs as their mandate renewals come up.  For 
example, in the case of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) or the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western 
Sahara (MINURSO), good arguments have been made already that 
the presence of peacekeepers in each country actually 
precludes progress towards political settlement of these 
conflicts.  Clearly, any decision for closure must take 
careful consideration of the potential for renewed violence 
if UN troops are removed, and the full spectrum of 
geopolitical interests the US must balance.  Nevertheless, it 
is incumbent on both the U.S. Government and Security Council 
to give due diligence to an assessment of efficacy and 
strategy in renewing all PKOs, including these two 
long-standing ones. (ACTION REQUEST #2: USUN requests an 
update on Department thinking as to a strategy towards the 
closure of UNFICYP and MINURSO, and for specific points that 
could be made at the respective mandate renewals to ensure a 
serious discussion within the Council.  MINURSO mandate 
renewal is 30 April.  UNFICYP mandate renewal is 15 June.) 
 
¶12. Finally, the Security Council has a critical oversight 
role to play with respect to the behavior of the host country 
of a peacekeeping operation.  As exemplified by the current 
treatment by the Eritrean government of UNMEE, host countries 
currently can act with impunity to render a given PKO 
impotent.  The Council's inability to muster a substantial 
response to Eritrea's obstructionism calls into question the 
credibility of the entire mission and emboldens others to 
challenge similar missions in other operational theaters. 
The U.S. needs to be prepared to lead the Council towards an 
oversight process of PKOs that includes responding with 
political and/or other measures against the host country, and 
even withdrawal. 
 
----- 
 
 
Conclusion 
----- 
 
¶13. Given the substantial investment and interest the U.S. 
has in peacekeeping, we should take the lead in the Security 
Council and elsewhere to ensure that UN peacekeeping remains 
viable and consistent with U.S. national interests.  This 
would entail a rigorous up-front assessment of nascent PKOs 
as well as an equally thorough in-progress assessment of 
existing PKOs as they come up for mandate renewal in the 
Security Council.  We should begin to press through the 
Council to insist that goals and timelines for a PKO are 
articulated before a new operation is created, and then 
emphasize that mandate renewals will be the tool to ensure 
that existing operations are on track.  If, after a 
prescribed time period, the parties involved are not able or 
willing to move forward, we should be prepared to take a hard 
look at reducing or closing the PKO. 
 
KHALILZAD