VZCZCXRO5316
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0173/01 0532215
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 222215Z FEB 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3794
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000173 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIKI YI
SUBJECT: P-3 PUSHES DPKO TO FIELD A MORE ROBUST UNMIK 
 
REF: USUN 163 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 b/d 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. P-3 deputy permanent representatives told 
U/SYG Guehenno on February 22 that UNMIK and KFOR need to 
robustly deter violence and Serbian efforts to establish de 
facto partition of Kosovo during the transition period.  DPKO 
agreed to bar Serbian minister Samardzic from entering 
Kosovo, but maintained that UNMIK's status neutrality and the 
practicalities of policing a very porous border required a 
careful balancing of coercion and restraint.  SYG Ban asked 
Ambassador Khalilzad to have the USG try to persuade Kosovo 
Prime Minister Thaci to respect UNMIK's role under resolution 
1244 during the transition.  See Action Request in paragraph 
¶6.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) In a February 22 meeting, U.S., UK, and French Deputy 
PermReps pushed UN Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
(DPKO) Jean-Marie Guehenno and DPKO Europe Division chief 
David Harland to encourage UNMIK to react more robustly to 
Serbian provocations.  Ambassador Wolff said UNMIK authority 
needs to be asserted and defended against Serbian challenges 
during the transition period, that UNMIK assertiveness is 
perfectly consistent with UNMIK neutrality, and that UNMIK 
firmness in anticipation of violence is essential to the 
avoidance of both soft and hard partition. 
 
¶3. (C) UKUN DPR Karen Pierce told Guehenno and Harland 
frankly that "UNMIK should have default instructions to err 
on the side of robustness," adding that "the danger of not 
acting robustly is far greater than the danger of wounding 
Serb sensitivities."  She urged DPKO to coordinate more 
closely with KFOR to make use of KFOR's more plenary powers 
of detention, as for example had often been done to prevent 
ethnic Albanian radicals from inciting violence by crossing 
into Kosovo from Macedonia.  French DPR Jean-Pierre Lacroix 
qualified his remarks as similar in kind if not degree to 
those of the U.S. and UK.  He said France "supports a robust 
response but is also sensitive to perceptions on the ground 
and a need to maintain UNMIK-Serbia communication." 
 
¶4. (C) U/SYG Guehenno replied that DPKO had advised UNMIK, in 
the aftermath of the February 21 violence in Belgrade, to 
stop people at the border who seemed at all suspicious.  The 
practical problem, he said, is that troublemakers coming 
south from Serbia can easily circumvent the border gates on 
foot or even in vehicles because there are many trails and 
unpaved roads criss-crossing the border/administrative 
boundary line.  Harland said UNMIK's 200 border police can't 
possibly close the border and even the dedication of all 
3,500 available KFOR troops in the area could not completely 
close it.  Recognizing that troublemakers were on hand, 
Guehenno said, UNMIK and KFOR quickly broke up today's 
demonstration in Mitrovica. 
 
¶5. (C) Guehenno appealed for P-3 understanding of the UN's 
delicate effort to remain status neutral, which he said 
required UNMIK/KFOR to maintain a border/administrative 
boundary line but to avoid being too coercive for fear of 
creating harder positions among all parties.  He said he was 
gratified that all Security Council members, during the 
February 18 public session, had rallied around resolution 
1244 as the enduring manifestation of Kosovo authorities.  He 
reported that SRSG Rucker was taken aback on February 21 when 
Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci announced to him that 
"1244 is now only for KFOR."  Coming on the heels of a public 
statement attributed to Kosovo Deputy Prime Minister Hajredin 
Kuci that the government of Kosovo will henceforth decide who 
visits Kosovo, Guehenno said the UN could use P-3 help in 
persuading the Thaci government "not to overplay its hand." 
He wants Thaci to appreciate that a measure of ambiguity 
regarding division of authority is in the best interest of 
all concerned. 
 
¶6. (C) UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon later called 
Ambassador Khalilzad to add a personal request that Thaci be 
reminded to respect the transition period during which UNMIK 
remains in charge in Kosovo.  Ambassador Khalilzad assured 
the SYG that the U.S. would convey this message to Thaci. 
Post requests that Department do so through USOP. 
 
¶7. (C) Pressing Guehenno on Kosovo-Serbia border operations, 
Ambassador Wolff suggested that UNMIK should quickly 
re-establish customs collections at gates 1 and 31 and should 
not allow Serbian ministerial-level visits for the time 
being.  Guehenno replied that customs operations would be 
returned to normal within a few days.  On the travel of 
ministers, he insisted UNMIK should also avoid overplaying 
its own hand by cracking down on travel.  He would prefer the 
partition drama play itself out in Belgrade, as radicals 
overreacted, rather than Mitrovica. 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000173  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Ambassador Wolff then focused on Minister for Kosovo 
Slobodan Samardzic by reading some of his recent press 
comments (the border attacks were "legitimate" and "in 
accordance" with Belgrade policy; Belgrade would not allow 
northern Kosovo customs points to form part of a state 
border) and asking whether Samardzic would be banned from 
Kosovo.  Guehenno replied that DPKO was consulting with the 
UN office in Belgrade.  (NOTE. Harland later told DepPolCouns 
that the consultation would result in a UN demarche to 
Samardzic in which he would be informed that he would not be 
considered for travel to Kosovo until he publicly retracted 
these incendiary comments.) 
KHALILZAD