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S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000098 
 
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NOT BY CIB: "DO NOT/NOT PROCESS, GIVE TO EAO FOR GUIDANCE." 
 
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DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018 
TAGS: PARM KNPP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: LIKE-MINDED READY TO DRAFT A BOARD 
RESOLUTION 
 
REF: REF A) UNVIE 64 B) UNVIE 74 C) UNVIE 94 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 
1.4 b, d and h 
 
 ¶1. (S) Summary:  At a Canadian-hosted meeting February 14 
like-minded COMs (P3 1, Canada, Australia, Japan) agreed to 
work discretely on a Board resolution on Iran, with experts 
scheduled to meet February 20.  Canadian Ambassador 
Gervais-Vidricaire made a strong case for the Board to 
reassert its authority two years since its last resolution on 
Iran and argued that the window of opportunity for Board 
action would close after the March Board.  Australia, Germany 
and the UK seconded Canada's initiative, and only the 
Japanese had some reservations.  Canada and Australia 
preferred a resolution that was non-critical of the 
Secretariat and put the onus on Iran, but UK Ambassador Smith 
 
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warned that an unhelpful DG report could prompt a more 
critical resolution.  Canada also insisted on absolute 
confidentiality to avoid any perception the like-minded were 
 
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prejudging the report.  The like-minded expect that the DG 
report will remove all  issues from this of outstanding 
questions except for the key issue of weaponization, and are 
also concerned about how much emphasis the DG would give 
suspension and the AP.  Ambassador Schulte warned that the DG 
would be inclined to report progress at any cost and agreed 
that the Board needed to reassert its authority.  None of the 
like-minded Ambassadors raised previous concerns about Board 
action interfering with the UNSC process. 
 
¶2. (S) In a separate meeting the same day, Chinese Ambassador 
Tang told Ambassador Schulte that he expects a report showing 
substantial progress and that the Board should welcome the 
progress.  Tang, who had met with Iranian Ambassador Soltineh 
earlier the same day, repeatedly asked if the IAEA had been 
provided the evidence it needed.  Tang also suggested that 
Iran and the IAEA be brought into P5 1 negotiations. 
Ambassador Schulte advised that the IAEA had a verification, 
not a negotiation, role.  End Summary 
 
Expectations for the DG Report 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (S) At a Canadian-hosted meeting February 14, like-minded 
COMs (P3 1, Canada, Australia, Japan) discussed expectations 
for the DG's report on Iran and the need for Board action. 
The like-minded agreed to work quietly at the expert level on 
Board resolution elements pending the release of the DG 
report, now expected on February 25.  Canadian Ambassador 
Gervais-Vidricaire opened by noting that neither the date nor 
the content of the report were firm.  She expected that the 
work plan would not be "finished" but that the DG would 
report progress on issues adjudged no longer be outstanding, 
with the sole exception of the "alleged studies."  She noted 
press reports of disagreement in the Secretariat over closing 
issues as well the sharp denial on the part of an unnamed 
Secretariat official, dismissing such reports as "hype."  She 
 
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added there will certainly be no progress on confidence 
building measures, including suspension and the AP, to the 
contrary, Iran is moving ahead with advanced centrifuges. 
 
¶4. (S) Canadian Msnoff assessed the basic outlines of the DG 
report, which he expected would be "all things to all people" 
or "nothing to no one."  All that is missing, he said, are 
the crucial adverbs and adjectives.  He noted that the 
Secretariat was not fully satisfied with Iran's responses on 
 
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a number of issues, including the improbable story on 
contamination.  AEOI's role in Gachin mine from 1993-2000 
also did not preclude military involvement.  All of these 
issues hint at military involvement, but the Secretariat had 
made the tactical decision to close them in order to rely on 
the "alleged studies" to get at the truth of the matter. 
Clearly, inspectors believe the studies documents to be 
credible.  However, he cautioned that the Secretariat seemed 
to lack a clear objective or approach and it is unclear how 
the report would cast this issue.  French Charge Gross noted 
that the Secretariat should publicly acknowledge the 
credibility of the information, but as an Australian Msnoff 
observed, they have been "cagey" on this point.  Ambassador 
Schulte agreed that the use of the term "alleged studies" is 
prejudicial. 
 
 
¶5. (S) Ambassador Schulte reported that the inspectors still 
have had no direct contact with the military and have not 
interviewed the former PHRC Director, Fakrezadeh.  He told 
the group that the U.S. was supporting IAEA requests for 
information and documentation, and encouraged others to do so 
as well.  German Ambassador Gottwald advised that German 
missile experts were providing technical expertise to the 
Agency. 
 
¶6. (S) It is also unclear how much emphasis the DG report 
would place on suspension or on implementation of the AP and 
Code 3.1, Canadian Msnoff observed.  The PIV at Natanz had 
assessed that P-1 centrifuges were not working well and the 
Secretariat is expected to report on IR-2 testing with UF-6, 
 
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though development of the IR-2 would take time (ref c).  He 
expected the report to acknowledge some additional 
transparency on the part of Iran, including the impromptu 
site visit to Kalaye.  Safeguards Director Nackertts has 
assured Australian Msnoff these steps fall far short of AP 
implementation.  However, Gross noted that the in his remarks 
at the February 9-10 Munich Security Conference, ElBaradei 
referred to Iran's de jure if not de facto implementation of 
the AP providing a good basis to understand its nuclear 
program.  After second-guessing UNSC requirements on 
suspension, Gross feared the DG was now eroding the AP, 
giving credit to Iran for piecemeal cooperation, and paving 
the way for routinization of the 
Iran file. 
 
UNSC to Await the DG Report 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) UK Ambassador Smith advised that UNSC deliberations 
had not made much progress because South Africa, Indonesia 
and Libya continue to slow-roll the UNSCR.  Ambassador 
Schulte reported that the P-3 and Russia are pushing for 
prompt adoption of the UNSCR.  The EU-3 planned to circulate 
a slightly amended resolution next week.  However, as the 
date for the DG's report drew closer, Smith was resigned to 
the fact that the UNSCR would be delayed until after the 
report.  Gottwald questioned to what degree the DG report 
would keep the work plan "open" and whether that could 
complicate action in New York.  Gottwald remained hopeful, 
however, that a report attributing a clear military intention 
to Iran's nuclear program could "give a boost" to NY. 
 
¶8. (S) Comment:  Notably, like-minded COMs did not voice 
reservations raised in previous meetings (and over the past 
two years) that Board action is contingent on the UNSC 
process (ref a).  The discussion turned entirely to the 
prospect of a Board resolution.  End Comment. 
 
Window of Opportunity for a Board Resolution 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (S) Gervais-Vidricaire made a strong pitch for Board 
action, which was secunded by Australia, Germany and the UK, 
the latter "enthusiastically."  Since the February DG report 
is unlikely to close all issues, she argued the March Board 
presented a window of opportunity for the Board to assert 
itself, reaffirm suspension and render its judgment, putting 
the onus on Iran without being critical of the Secretariat. 
She expected that the February report would plead for more 
time.  By the time of the June Board, that window would have 
closed as the Secretariat would likely have completed the 
work plan and countering its assessment would be much more 
difficult.  The Board had not pronounced itself in two years 
and the time to do so was now, she concluded.  Canada's 
priority was reasserting the credibility of the Board; it was 
essential for the Board to say something.  Iran would no 
doubt spin the report and a Board resolution would be a 
corrective to Iran and the NAM. 
 
¶10. (S) Australian Charge Kruse envisaged a Board resolution 
that welcomed "progress" and noted the Secretariat's 
conclusions but also reasserted the need for answers to all 
questions and a robust verification regime before closing the 
Iran file.  A resolution would make clear, Gervais-Vidricaire 
concurred, that the work plan was "not the end of the story." 
 Neither Canada nor Australia were prepared to take the lead 
on a Board resolution but suggested the like-minded move 
 
forward as a group.  Gottwald agreed that this was not the 
end of the road, and the Board should "map the road ahead" on 
all that remains to be done.  He underlined the need for a 
robust inspection regime given the Secretariat's admittedly 
"diminishing knowledge" of Iran's ongoing program, though he 
was more "flexible" on the AP. 
 
¶11. (S) Smith advised that London was "enthusiastic" about 
working on a resolution but cautioned that much depended on 
the DG report.  A report that acknowledged the impasse with 
Iran would allow for a non-critical resolution, lauding the 
Secretariat's efforts.  However, a report that purported to 
 
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"solve" the Iran file would result in a critical resolution 
that would not get consensus.  Smith cited "loose words" in 
the press attributed to Secretariat officials, though 
probably not the DG, concerning "hype" and countries with 
agendas.  He saw a clear possibility that the DG would report 
Iran's "baseless allegations" response and asked whether the 
like-minded should consider criteria for a satisfactory 
report. 
 
¶12. (S) Gervais-Vidricaire preferred to focus on a Board 
resolution that need not get into the minutiae of the DG 
report.  Rather, a resolution could refer to previous Board 
decisions; opine in general terms on insufficient progress in 
the work plan and missed deadlines; and note the confidence 
building measures that are still required.  Getting into the 
detail of the DG's report would lend the appearance of 
second-guessing the Secretariat.  She also advised against 
developing criteria in advance of the report for the same 
reason. 
 
¶13. (S) Japanese Ambassador Amano was the only one to express 
some reservation about the value added of a Board resolution, 
though he remained open-minded.  He felt the resolution two 
years ago remained strong and attempts to recreate it could 
weaken it.  However, if a similar resolution could gain 
consensus it would add value because the previous resolution 
was voted on; he observed that the Board composition was the 
best one could hope for, though South Africa could be 
spoiler.  The possibility of consensus depended on the DG 
report.  Amano also cautioned against re-opening previous 
Board decisions on suspension and the AP in operative 
language, so as to not give others an opportunity to 
challenge these decisions.   Nuclear Counselor noted that 
seeking consensus could not be an end in itself and that the 
threat of a vote was tactically necessary. 
 
Reigning in the DG 
------------------- 
 
¶14. (S) Ambassador Schulte worried that the DG was desperate 
to report progress at any cost, even that of ignoring UNSCRs, 
and was not ready to declare the work plan dead or pass 
judgment on weaponization.  The U.S. had advised the DG 
privately that the Agency's credibility is at stake and the 
report could not be a whitewash; Iran must fully disclose its 
past weapons program and allow the IAEA to verify, including 
through the AP, that it has stopped and will not restart. 
Ambassador Schulte observed that the Board had not passed a 
resolution in two years so as to not get in the way of the 
UNSC, but in so doing, it had ceded authority to the DG.  The 
work plan had abetted Iran by drawing out the process and 
delaying a UNSCR.  He agreed it was time to reassert the 
Board's authority.   The added value of a resolution would be 
to pronounce Iran's cooperation inadequate, reaffirm Board 
decisions on suspension and the AP as well as Code 3.1, and 
to lay down a marker that the Board would decide when the 
Iran file was closed. 
 
Next Steps 
----------- 
 
¶15. (S) Like-minded COMs agreed to reconvene following the 
issuance of the DG report and that experts should meet on 
February 20 to draft resolution elements.  (Note: Mission 
intends to participate and contribute the suggested elements 
in ref b.)  Gottwald noted that the resolution could be 
divided into two parts, reaction to the results of the report 
and expectations beyond the work plan, and suggested that the 
like-minded begin engaging others on the idea of a Board 
 
resolution.  Canada insisted on the need for absolute 
confidentiality as it would be damaging if the NAM knew we 
 
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were working on a resolution prior to the DG's report.  Japan 
noted that the Secretariat could also delay issuance of the 
report.  The like-minded agreed that the Board Chair should 
be advised of a resolution as soon as practicable after the 
report.  The French noted that EU3 3 Political Directors were 
expected to meet soon after the report was issued and should 
seek Russia and China's agreement on a Board resolution. 
 
Consultations with China 
------------------------ 
 
¶16. (S) Ambassador Schulte met separately with Chinese 
Ambassador Tang on February 14, and had also consulted with 
Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky, who was in a listening mode, on 
the NIE and the forthcoming DG report on Iran.   Ambassador 
Schulte advised Tang that the Secretariat was in the end game 
on the critical issue of weaponization, information it 
considers credible, authentic and worrisome.  Tang who had 
met with Iranian Ambassador Soltineh that morning repeatedly 
asked whether the IAEA had been provided evidence.  According 
to Tang, Iran did not think the "alleged studies" were a 
problem, and claimed not to have received the information the 
IAEA had promised. 
 
¶17. (S) Based on his discussions with ElBaradei and DDG 
Heinonen, Tang expected a report positive for Iran noting 
that progress had been made on three work plan issues and 
that Iran was now addressing military issues.  China had also 
urged Iran to cooperate and restore confidence.  If the 
report is positive, Tang believed the Board should welcome 
and encourage Iran's continued cooperation.  Ambassador 
Schulte underscored the need for full disclosure of the past 
weapons program and assurance it is not re-started.  He 
cautioned that the DG is desperate to report progress and the 
work plan has only served to delay a UNSCR. 
 
¶18. (S) Tang stressed the need for a negotiated solution and 
new framework for negotiation.  He suggested that the P5 1 
could be recast as P6 1 (i.e. including Iran) or P6 1 1, 
adding Iran and the IAEA as negotiating partners.  Ambassador 
Schulte advised that including the IAEA would confuse the 
Agency's role, which is verification, not negotiation, and 
noted that the IAEA was not a part of the Six Party Talks on 
the DPRK.  The IAEA had a role in the outcome but not in the 
talks.  Tang believed the IAEA should be part of the Iran 
talks at a certain stage. 
SCHULTE