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S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000064 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN/MNSA, PARIS FOR U/S ROOD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2018 
TAGS: IAEA KNPP AORC IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON IRAN AT THE 
MARCH BOARD 
 
REF: UNVIE 31 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for 
reasons 1.4 b,d and h 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (S) Our principal goal for the Iran agenda item at the 
March 3-7 Board is, as it has been for the last two years, to 
support dual-track strategy and, in particular, the Security 
Council process.  Since the Board passed a resolution on 
February 4, 2006, referring the file to the UNSC, we have not 
sought a new Board resolution because of concerns about 
distracting attention from the New York process, worries 
about divisive debates, and qualms about providing 
opportunities for those who wish to bring the Iran issue back 
to Vienna.  The French have attempted to circulate elements 
for a resolution prior to the last two Boards, but were 
rebuffed by Russia.  Now, however, with P5 1 agreement on 
elements of a new UNSCR, and with the endgame approaching for 
the DG's work plan to address weaponization issues, and with 
a Board lacking clear anti-American or pro-Iranian members, 
the time has come to seriously consider a new resolution. 
Initial contacts indicate our P3 1 partners are supportive 
but have a range of interests: the UK wants a strong 
resolution, voted if necessary (even with opposition from 
Russia and China), to exert authority over the DG; the French 
are not interested in taking on the DG but would like a 
consensus resolution focusing on Iran; and the Germans are 
not opposed but say that "New York has priority" so if it 
looks like the Vienna process will interfere with New York, 
they would back off.  Everybody understands the content of a 
resolution will depend on the results of the work plan the 
wording of the DG's report, and progress on a third UNSC 
sanctions resolution in New York.  Counselors will work on 
elements for different scenarios in the next week and proceed 
from there.  If we are instructed to seek a resolution, the 
UK is likely to take the pen.  However it is couched, a 
resolution would need to assert Board authority over the Iran 
issue, reaffirm Board/UNSC requirements and reign in the DG. 
 
¶2. (S) As we prepare for the Board our public and private 
statements in the coming weeks must set high expectations for 
the work plan, particularly on weaponization.  We recommend a 
P3 1 demarche prior to the DG report cautioning him that 
anything that looks like a whitewash of Iran's weapons 
activities would risk a rupture with the IAEA's largest 
donors.  Our public diplomacy efforts will also continue to 
enlist the support of key countries to maintain international 
pressure on Iran and the DG, making it clear that the litmus 
test for the work plan is whether Iran has made full 
disclosure of its past weapons work and allows the IAEA to 
verify that it stopped.  End Summary. 
 
Board Objectives 
---------------- 
 
¶3. (S) Our overarching goal for the March Board is to support 
the UNSC process by reinforcing international pressure on 
Iran and preventing Iran from using Vienna as a pressure 
release valve.  Iran has become adept at pitting Vienna 
against New York, and playing us off against the Director 
General.  Our objectives for the Board and the work plan are 
to: 
 
-- diminish the value of the IAEA and the work plan as a 
"pressure relief valve" for Iran; 
-- reinforce Board requirements for suspension, AP and Code 
3.1, bridging the "gap" with the UNSC; 
-- make clear that the UNSC and the Board, not the DG, must 
make a final decision on whether to return Iran to "routine" 
verification; 
-- reassert Board authority over the DG and dispense with the 
work plan. 
 
Pros and Cons of a Board Resolution 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (S) We have pursued these goals with like-minded 
counterparts during successive Boards in national and EU/EU-3 
 
statements.  However, the Board as a whole has not taken any 
decisive action since referral of the Iran file to the UNSC 
two years ago.  For six months now, the work plan has 
distracted from UNSC and Board requirements for suspension 
and AP implementation, and sidetracked the UNSC process.  The 
most definitive means of reaffirming Board authority and 
dispensing with the work plan is a Board resolution.  A 
resolution could also address important technical issues such 
as Iran's unilateral abrogation of modified Code 3.1 of the 
subsidiary arrangements, which the Board has not previously 
addressed. 
 
¶5. (S) Since the 2006 referral to the Security Council, the 
P3 1 and other like-minded have been circumspect about 
pursuing a Board resolution that would detract from the UNSC 
process or allow the G-77/NAM to exploit the perception that 
the Iran file has been returned to the Board.  Passage of a 
Board resolution absent a UNSCR would be an uphill battle and 
a divisive Board debate could widen the gap with New York. 
The last attempt by the French to float a resolution in the 
November Board met with Russian opposition.  Mitigating 
against this now is the fact that we have P5 1 agreement in 
the UNSC and we have arguably the best Board we have seen in 
recent years due to the departure of several NAM standard 
bearers.  There is also little overlap, beyond the P5, in 
Board and UNSC membership - only Italy, Croatia and South 
Africa, the most problematic, are on both the Board and the 
UNSC. Prompt passage of a UNSCR prior to the March Board 
(even if it is just prior) would clearly facilitate Board 
action.  A Board resolution could reinforce the UNSCR and 
demonstrate that New York and Vienna are in lockstep, 
countering Iran's premise that Board and UNSC are at odds 
with one another. 
 
¶6. (S) Our P3 1 partners are now more open to the idea of a 
Board resolution.  In a February 4 P3 1 strategy session, UK 
and French Ambassadors were supportive of Board action even 
absent a UNSCR, though prior passage of a UNSCR is 
preferable.  German Charge Kimmerling was more insistent on 
giving priority to the UNSC process.  UK Ambassador Smith 
indicated that London is much less nervous about the prospect 
of a Board resolution and is soliciting his input. He 
tentatively agreed in private to be the main drafter of such 
a resolution.  The impetus for this shift is growing UK and 
French recognition that the Board needs to reign in Director 
General and the work plan, which has detracted from the UNSC 
effort to step up pressure on Iran. 
 
Low Expectations of the DG Report 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) We predict the DG will report one of three outcomes on 
the work plan:  Iran has come clean, Iran has given a 
"plausible story" or Iran's cooperation has been 
unsatisfactory.  Since the Secretariat has more or less 
closed the all other issues, P3 1 partners agree that 
everything hinges on the DG's treatment of the "alleged 
studies."  French Ambassador Deniau reported that the 
Secretariat has included one "nuance" on the contamination 
 
SIPDIS 
issue in its letter to Iran concerning procurement 
information that could be linked to the alleged studies. 
This, he said, was designed to prevent the Iranians from 
releasing the letter.  Kimmerling reported that the Iran has 
provided significant new information allowing the Secretariat 
to dispense with the Gachine mine and polonium-210 issues, 
assessing that there was no military involvement in the 
former and Iran had not gone beyond basic research on the 
latter.  Deniau also reported that Iran told the Belgian and 
Croatian Missions in New York that the DG's next report would 
close all outstanding issues except alleged studies, which 
the Iranians continue to claim are baseless and politically 
motivated. 
 
¶8. (S) Mission's assessment is that Iran is unlikely to admit 
its weaponization work.  If Iran were to do so, both the UNSC 
and the Board would be well-placed to reassert the need for 
confidence building given Iran's clear violation of the NPT. 
A Board resolution would be much more difficult if the DG 
reports, prior to the passage of a UNSCR, that Iran has 
offered a "plausible story."  Conversely, if the DG reports 
 
dissatisfaction with Iran's cooperation, a Board resolution 
would be much easier, especially if a UNSCR is passed. 
 
¶9. (S) The UK and the French are preparing for the worst. 
Smith fully expected that the DG report would not be helpful, 
and the best we could hope for would be that the DG convey 
the Secretariat's efforts on the work plan in a neutral 
manner, leaving it for the Board to pass judgment on Iran's 
credulity.  In the worst case scenario, the DG would report 
that Iran's explanations of the alleged studies were "not 
inconsistent."  Deniau advised that such an outcome, leaving 
it up to member states, while technically feasible, is 
politically risky for the DG.  The UK discounted any 
possibility of a report negative for Iran, even if Safeguards 
staff is dissatisfied with Iran's cooperation, since the DG 
has vested so much in the success of the work plan.  The 
Germans envisage an indeterminate report that would leave the 
issue of the alleged studies open.  As in past reports, 
Deniau and Kimmerling believed the DG would include something 
for everyone, i.e. Iran is cooperating more than before and 
some issues have been 
removed from the list of outstanding questions but work 
remains to be done on alleged studies.  The Germans do not 
think the DG would be bold enough to close this issue. 
 
Next Steps:  Pressuring the DG 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (S) In the coming weeks we must continue to set a high 
bar for the work plan and make clear in our public and 
private comments that the work plan is meaningless unless 
Iran admits weaponization activities and allows the IAEA to 
verify they have stopped.  We must also warn the DG in very 
stark terms that the IAEA's integrity and his own credibility 
are at stake and that any hint of whitewash of Iran's weapons 
activities would cause irreparable harm to the Agency's 
relationship with major donors. 
 
¶11. (S)  We recommend conveying these messages through a P3 1 
demarche in Vienna, an appropriately-timed phone call from 
the Secretary, ElBaradei's contacts in Paris and Munich in 
mid-February, and a possible stop by U/S Burns in Vienna next 
week.  A P3 1 demarche should take place prior to the 
issuance of the report, expected sometime between February 
20-25.  The French are not sure of joining such a demarche 
just after the DG's February 14 trip to Paris where he would 
have already heard a similar message from the GOF, but we 
have asked them to reconsider.  A demarche prior to the DG 
report would also allow us to better assess where the DG 
stands on the work plan, and how to frame a Board resolution. 
 
Critical Vs. Consensual Resolution 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (S) The P3 1 will also work quietly on preparing a 
resolution, which could be tabled upon the issuance of the 
report.  As to the content of that resolution, P3 1 
Ambassadors considered options for a more critical vice 
consensual assessment of the Secretariat's efforts.  If, as 
expected, the DG is not prepared to say Iran's cooperation on 
the work plan has been unsatisfactory, the UK is of the view 
that the Board will have to do so for him.   A resolution 
would underline the Board/UNSC's basic requirements including 
suspension.  The UK argued for a more critical resolution to 
"put an end to the work plan episode."  Smith warned that in 
the face of an uncritical DG report, we will need to 
challenge the work plan, even if means a vote.  He said his 
vote counting gave us a bare majority in the Board even if 
the Russians and Chinese vote against.  The French are more 
inclined to minimize or ignore the work plan and stress other 
requirements.  They also noted that the draft UNSCR language 
on work plan "progress" would make it difficult to be too 
tough.  A more consensual approach would give the Secretariat 
an "E" for effort and stress the failure of Iran to resolve 
issues within and outside the scope of the work plan.  The 
Germans advised that if we want a broader based resolution, 
we are limited in our ability to criticize the Secretariat. 
The UK is open to either option, a more critical resolution 
that wins a bare majority or a more consensual resolution. 
Kimmerling cautioned that Iran would interpret a bare 
 
majority as a victory and a consensual text is a safer bet. 
Regardless of how assessment of the work plan is couched, our 
P3 1 partners agree that the resolution must underline the 
basic mandate of the Secretariat: verifying the "completeness 
and correctness" of Iran's declarations, consistent with its 
safeguards obligations. 
 
Timing/Tactics 
-------------- 
 
¶13. (S) We will continue to consult with P3 1 in Vienna and 
aim to have resolution elements ready to be deployed, if 
instructed, upon the release of the DG's report.  Early 
Department guidance on elements of such a resolution would be 
appreciated.  If the UNSC also waits for the DG's report our 
timing in Vienna will be very restrictive, though not 
impossible.  The key will be enlisting Russia, China and 
South Africa.  An EU-3 sponsored resolution will have EU 
support and we will also reach out quickly to friendly NAM 
and GRULAC.  Getting South African support will help 
marginalize NAM opposition.  Any effort to garner consensus 
would take at least until the end of the Board week and 
perhaps beyond.  We may also need Washington support with 
demarches in capitals, which depending on timing, may need to 
be deconflicted with demarches on a UNSCR. 
 
¶14. (SBU) We will continue our Public Diplomacy efforts to 
enlist the support of key countries and keep international 
pressure on Iran and the DG, while making it clear that the 
litmus test for the work plan is whether Iran has made full 
disclosure of its past weapons work and allows the IAEA to 
verify that it stopped..  Ambassador Schulte will visit Egypt 
next week where he will speak on the Iran nuclear issue and 
hold a press roundtable, using points similar to those he 
just made in Berlin and Saudi Arabia.  We plan to approach 
our Embassies in select Board member states, Croatia, Mexico, 
Ecuador, Pakistan and South Africa about holding press 
roundtables via DVC prior to the BOG.  We will reach inside 
Iran via Ambassador Schulte's Persian blog and Radio Farda, 
emphasizing the Secretary's message that suspension provides 
an exit ramp for Iran to normalize its relationship with the 
U.S. 
SCHULTE