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C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000140 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2018 
TAGS: IAEA KNPP AORC IS EG
SUBJECT: IAEA/GC:  ARAB LEAGUE SEEKS DIALOGUE ON ISRAELI 
THREAT RESOLUTION 
 
REF: 07 UNVIE 557 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for 
reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) Arab League representative Wael Al-Assad met with 
like-minded Missions (EU-3, U.S., Australia, Norway, Japan) 
on February 21 to discuss the General Conference (GC) 
resolution on the "Israeli Nuclear Threat" (INT). Al-Assad 
appealed for dialogue with those Missions that had 
successfully opposed the resolution in the last two IAEA 
General Conferences (reftel).  He confirmed that an AL 
Ministerial in early March would take the final decision on 
the INT resolution, and promised that the Arab Group in 
Vienna would have a broad mandate to negotiate text.  That 
said, there was no indication the AL would withdraw the INT 
resolution singling out Israel, which many of the like-minded 
advised was unacceptable.  The AL is frustrated with the old 
compromise (two agenda items one resolution); blamed Israel 
for the failure of the Middle East Forum and is not inclined 
to engage Israel directly.  Al-Assad took under advisement 
suggestions for having one resolution on Middle East 
Safeguards that included elements of the INT.  Whether it is 
in one resolution or two, and even if the language is less 
truculent, it is clear that the AL seeks in some way to 
highlight Israel's failure to accede to the NPT as a threat 
to Middle East security.  End Summary. 
 
Arab League Appeals for Dialogue 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Canadian Mission invited like-minded Missions (EU-3, 
U.S., Australia, Japan, and Norway) to unofficial, 
working-level consultations February 21 with Arab League 
representative Wael Al-Assad, Director, Department of 
Multilateral Relations.  His office has responsibility for 
the IAEA General Conference (GC) resolution on the Israeli 
Nuclear Threat (INT).   Al-Assad came to Vienna to discuss 
the issue in advance of an early March Arab League 
Ministerial, which will hold a special session on the 
proposed GC resolution.  Vienna-based Arab League Ambassador 
Wehbe accompanied Al-Assad, but the Arab Group in Vienna was 
notably absent.  Algerian Ambassador Feroukhi, Chair of the 
Arab Group in Vienna, previously told Ambassador Schulte that 
the AL is exerting tremendous pressure on the Group, which it 
sees as ineffective, to do something substantive in the 
General Conference on this issue. 
 
¶3. (C) Al-Assad characterized this issue as a priority for 
Middle East security and placed Arab League concerns in a 
historical context, noting efforts dating back 33 years to 
establish a Middle East WMD-free zone.  He cited a 1995 AL 
decision for Arab states to accede to the NPT in the hopes of 
exerting international pressure on Israel to do the same, as 
well as subsequent NPT Prepcom debates and more than 100 
resolutions in various international fora.  Al-Assad relayed 
the frustration of AL states that felt taken for granted 
since signing the NPT.  He noted that they are now being 
asked to undertake new commitments (i.e. the Additional 
Protocol) while Israel got away scot-free. (Note: Pressed on 
this point, Al-Assad said that Arab states were not "averse" 
to the AP and denied it was a negotiating card. End Note.) 
He observed that the last two General Conferences were a 
disappointment to the AL.  The no-action motion that cut off 
debate on the INT at the 50th GC in 2006 was a surprise, and 
the outcome of the 51st GC with no resolution and no 
statement was "even worse."  Arab League experts meeting last 
month recommended that the AL Ministerial special session in 
March give the Arab Group in Vienna a broad mandate to 
negotiate the INT resolution. 
 
¶4. (C) Invoking a "new spirit of Cairo," Al-Assad appealed 
for dialogue and asked like-minded Ambassadors to negotiate 
the substance of the INT resolution, with specific 
objections, but not to rule out the resolution.  There was 
"no way," he said, the AL would not request the inclusion of 
the INT on the GC agenda.  He argued against direct linkage 
 
of the Middle East Safeguards and INT agenda items and noted 
that the GC in 1991 adopted both resolutions.  Asked about 
the Middle East Forum, Al-Assad blamed Israel for setting 
impossible pre-conditions for discussing a WMD-free zone.  He 
also saw no point to engage Israel directly and argued that 
international pressure must be brought to bear on Israel. 
 
 
Like-minded Hold Firm 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Canadian DCM Wood underlined the desire of the 
like-minded to move back to a consensus approach on Middle 
East issues in the GC and urged direct negotiations among the 
parties concerned.  He also relayed concerns that there 
should not be spillover of the Middle East debate in the 
omnibus Safeguards and Technical Cooperation GC resolutions. 
He and other like-minded Missions argued that Vienna is not 
the place for political discussions more suited to the UNGA 
First Committee or the NPT Prepcom.  French DCM Gross 
underscored the importance of the IAEA to France, and argued 
that Middle East issues should not be allowed to detract from 
the core technical work of the Agency.  He also referred to 
the Egyptian government's letter to 46 member states that had 
"regrettably" abstained on the Middle East Safeguards 
resolution, and noted that the GOF had approached Cairo about 
reviving the Middle East Forum but had not received any 
positive signals. 
 
¶6. (C) Australia proposed a consensus approach based on the 
old package coupling the Middle East and INT agenda items. 
However, Al-Assad argued that the old consensus had been 
unproductive; nothing had happened for so many years and it 
was time to push for a resolution.  He also pointed out that 
the AL did not control the Middle East resolution, which 
Egypt chose to de-couple.  Germany further pressed for a 
consensus approach, questioned whether two agenda items on 
the Middle East were needed and noted that the Arab group 
could not negotiate on the basis of fixed positions. 
Germany, Canada, Australia and Missionoff opposed any 
resolution that would negatively single out or "name and 
blame" Israel.  Wood further urged flexibility and more 
constructive engagement.  He clarified that the problems with 
the INT language extended beyond just the title of the 
resolution.  Canada "did not want to see Israel backed into a 
corner on security matters."  Al-Assad promised that the Arab 
group would be authorized to discuss the language of a 
resolution.  He insisted that the INT resolution does not 
condemn Israel but simply calls upon Israel to join the NPT. 
 
¶7. (C) Norwegian DCM Lundby noted that the vote on Middle 
East Safeguards resolution last year was due to the AL's 
insistence on the INT.  He noted that the two rival 
resolutions on the Middle East could "get in the way of one 
another," and the Arab group is setting itself up for two 
"flops."  Lundby suggested that it would be tactically smart 
to combine elements into a single resolution.  The UK agreed 
it was not inconceivable to do so, though Egypt has been 
unwilling to negotiate the Middle East Safeguards resolution. 
 Canada and the UK observed that the Egyptian resolution had 
less and less to do with safeguards but more with a WMD-free 
zone.  Al-Assad inquired whether a single resolution would be 
more acceptable, the like-minded clarified that it depends on 
what the resolution says. 
 
¶8. (C) Asked whether the Arab League had taken a formal 
decision to pursue the INT resolution, Al-Assad insisted that 
no decision would be taken until the March Ministerial.  He 
assured Vienna Missions once again that the Arab Group would 
have flexibility and broad parameters to negotiate.  France 
cautioned, however, that once the Arab Group requested a GC 
agenda item with the same title, this triggered a "rapport de 
force" that risked cutting off dialogue. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) This overture from the Arab League, though welcome, is 
clearly motivated by the debacles of the last two General 
 
Conferences.  The Arab League is seeking a way to salvage the 
INT and while Al-Assad did not say so directly, one obvious 
way to negotiate the language of the INT resolution is to 
drop the word "threat."  Arab Group Chair Feroukhi recently 
told Ambassador Schulte that she and other colleagues would 
support such a proposal though the group remains divided on 
this point.   A similar resolution on "Israeli Nuclear 
Capabilities" is adopted annually with EU support in the UNGA 
First Committee.  If this were proposed (whether in a 
standalone resolution on Israel or a combined Middle East 
resolution), it could split the EU in Vienna. 
 
¶10. (C) However, given the last two victories in successive 
GCs, the like-minded are holding firm and do not want 
divisive Middle East debates once again to overshadow the 
work of this year's General Conference.  Certainly, we all 
have an interest in averting another debacle and remain open 
to dialogue, but the AL does not seem willing to compromise 
on the key point of singling out Israel in some way.  End 
Comment. 
SCHULTE