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Viewing cable 08UNVIEVIENNA129, IAEA/IRAN: EU-3 PREPARED TO SPONSOR A BOARD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA129 2008-02-27 13:24 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET UNVIE
VZCZCXYZ0028
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0129/01 0581324
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 271324Z FEB 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7590
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0679
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0602
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0533
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0897
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0659
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0506
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0747
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0517
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1109
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000129 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018 
TAGS: KNPP PARM IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: EU-3 PREPARED TO SPONSOR A BOARD 
RESOLUTION 
 
REF: SECSTATE 18857 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b, d and h 
 
 Summary 
------- 
 
1. (S) At a UK hosted-meeting on February 26, like-minded 
COMs (P3 1, Canada, Australia and Japan) agreed to pursue a 
Board of Governor's resolution on Iran assuming adoption of a 
UNSCR on Friday, February 29.  The EU-3 agreed to prepare a 
draft.  In order to mitigate any risk of interfering with the 
New York process, the like-minded also agreed not to engage 
Russia and China, or the EU, or table a Board resolution, 
until early after a UNSCR resolution is approved.  A Board 
resolution would seek to reassert Board decisions on Iran, 
including suspension, to support the Secretariat's 
investigation of weaponization and to assert that outstanding 
issues are not resolved.  France, Canada and other 
like-minded want to seize the momentum of the technical 
briefing (reftel).  As Canada has argued, the March Board 
also presents a singular window of opportunity to demonstrate 
both UNSC and Board involvement.  Timely passage of a UNSCR 
in New York will facilitate Board action.  If a draft is 
tabled Monday, March 3, on the first day of the Board, 
consultations could to extend to the end of the week.  End 
Summary. 
 
New York First, Vienna Second 
----------------------------- 
 
2. (S) Opening the like-minded meeting, UK Ambassador Simon 
Smith provided London's assessment of P5 1 PolDirs 
consultations the day before.  He said that the UNSCR on Iran 
was on track for adoption February 29, despite the remaining 
Chinese hurdle on the joint ministerial statement.  Given the 
dynamics in New York, Smith sensed reservations UKUN raised 
last week that a Board resolution not interfere with the New 
York process had been mitigated, though he had not spoken 
with UKUN this week and had found their concerns a bit 
overblown.  He believed work on a Board resolution should 
continue among the lines the like-minded had discussed, but 
the timing of such a resolution was contingent on the UNSC 
process.  Like-minded COMs agreed that the UNSC process had 
priority, but all were poised to move forward in the Board as 
soon as a UNSCR was adopted.  The U.S., Canada and Australia 
encouraged the EU-3 to take the lead in sponsoring a Board 
resolution.  The EU-3 agreed to prepare a draft. 
 
3. (S) The like-minded further agreed not to discuss a Board 
resolution beyond this core group until a UNSCR is adopted. 
Several Missions had heard that the Russians were not 
supportive when the issue of a Board resolution was raised on 
the margins of the P5 1 PolDirs meeting.  While the Chinese 
are focused on the P5 1 statement, the like-minded did not 
want to give them another pretext for delay in New York by 
raising the prospect of a resolution in Vienna.  That said, 
most Board members are aware of the potential for a 
resolution on Iran, and the like-minded agreed to advise the 
Board Chair as soon as it was practicable, but likely not 
until early in the week of the Board. 
 
More Reasons to Pursue a Board Resolution 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4. (S) Ambassador Schulte advised that there were several 
good reasons to pursue a Board resolution.  In addition to 
reasserting Board authority, a resolution would signal that 
the Iran issue has turned a new page in light of the DG 
report and the technical briefing on Iran.  The like-minded 
agreed that a resolution would accomplish three goals: 
reinforce past Board decisions including suspension; support 
the Secretariat's investigation of weaponization issues and 
assert the Board's understanding that, contrary to Iran's 
claims, the work plan was not "over" and outstanding issues 
were not resolved, as the Secretariat had made clear.  French 
Ambassador Deniau reported that Iran planned to send a letter 
to the UNSC President stating that the work plan was "over," 
thus putting the Secretariat in an awkward position.  In his 
opinion, a Board resolution would help shield DDG Heinonen 
from NAM criticism.  Ambassador Schulte agreed that the Board 
 
should support Heinonen, who had put himself out on a limb by 
deciding on his own initiative to present the information in 
the technical briefing (reftel). 
 
5. (S) Deniau also saw a Board resolution as means to 
"publicize" the Secretariat's findings on weaponization.  He 
noted that the technical briefing was somewhat below the 
radar and did not have the same standing as a discussion in 
the Board.  Although the room was packed at the briefing, a 
number of Board Ambassadors did not attend, and out-of-town 
Governors also did not have the opportunity to hear the 
briefing.  He suggested that any Board member without a 
Permanent Mission in Vienna could ask the Secretariat to 
repeat the briefing in the Board room.  Others recalled that 
the Secretariat had provided DPRK briefings during Board 
meetings in the past, but were not sure if they would agree 
to repeat this briefing. 
 
6. (S) Canadian Ambassador Gervais-Vidricaire reiterated her 
argument that the March Board presented a singular window of 
opportunity for Board action.  The momentum gained from the 
technical briefing further reinforced this view.  She 
observed that the Secretariat had placed its credibility 
behind the weaponization information, which was based on 
multiple sources and its own investigations.  French DCM 
Gross also advised that if the Board did not seize this 
moment when the Secretariat had so clearly laid out its 
concerns on weaponization, the technical briefing would be 
brushed aside.  Canada strongly believed that the time for 
action to demonstrate that the UNSC and Board were actively 
involved was now.  Ambassador Schulte further noted that the 
June Board may not be as propitious an opportunity for a 
Board resolution since the draft UNSCR requests the DG to 
report within 90 days, which would be just before the June 
Board, and thus work on a Board resolution then could 
interfere with another possible UNSCR. 
 
7. (S) Australian Charge Kruse observed that there was a more 
positive dynamic in the Board now, with Iran pitted against 
the Secretariat.  However, he cautioned that a resolution 
could risk a defensive reaction from the NAM.  Australia 
agreed the Board should support the Secretariat's prerogative 
to undertake the investigation of weaponization.  He noted 
that UNSCR 1737 had asked the Secretariat to investigate 
outstanding issues and that previous DG reports had included 
the alleged studies.  Iran had not opposed their inclusion 
until it was confronted with damning evidence, he added.  UK 
Missionoff also noted that the 2005 Board resolution refers 
to weaponization issues. 
 
8.(S) German Charge Kimmerling likewise supported a simple 
and straightforward resolution that stressed the authority of 
the Secretariat, which had been put into question by some, 
and needed to be clarified in a Board decision.  He argued 
that a consensus (or near consensus) resolution pitting the 
Board against Iran would further isolate Iran.  Kimmerling 
also suggested that the like-minded could float a consensus 
draft with Russia and China before Friday to lend support to 
the UNSC process. 
 
9. (S) However, other like-minded Missions preferred to wait 
out the New York process before engaging Russia and China. 
Gervais-Vidricaire expressed some concern if there is no 
agreement in New York, UNSC deliberations could drag into 
next week.  She trusted that Missions in New York were aware 
of the prospect of a Board resolution and that time was of 
the essence. 
 
Timing and Tactics 
------------------ 
 
10. (S) Smith advised that the EU-3 will take on the lead 
drafting role and sort out the content and timing of a 
resolution.  He noted that a resolution had to strike a 
balance between being useful and attracting consensus and 
that certain elements, such as asserting Board authority, 
were non-negotiable.  Smith acknowledged that it would be 
risky for the Board to be seen as reinterpreting the DG 
report, and Deniau believed it would be best to adhere as 
closely as possible to the report and technical briefing. 
 
11. (S) Deniau observed that a resolution should aim at 
consensus, and that the current composition of the Board 
would help in this regard.  Venezuela, which had called for a 
vote on two previous Board resolutions on Iran, was no longer 
on the Board, and the NAM would risk splitting their votes if 
a vote was called.  Japan worried, however, that South Africa 
may call for a vote.  Ambassador Schulte agreed that the 
resolution should aim for as broad a consensus as possible, 
but the like-minded must also be prepared to call for a vote. 
 He advised that the text should build in some giveaways for 
negotiating purposes, though Canada noted that the time for 
negotiation would be short. 
 
12. (S) The EU-3 will prepare a draft resolution.  Pending 
UNSC action, the UK believed that Russia and China and EU 
members could be consulted early March 3, on the first day of 
the Board.  The Board Chair would also be consulted early. 
Requests for instructions and consultations with various 
groups could take another three days, bringing us to action 
on the resolution by the end of the week. 
SCHULTE