VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNT #0133/01 0320204
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010204Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9152
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 3687
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 9897
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 4301
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0179

UNCLAS TASHKENT 000133 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR INL/AAE ANDREW BUHLER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PREL ASEC AFIN EAID UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN, 2007 INL END USE MONITORING REPORT 
 
REF: 07 STATE 163708 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - Please protect accordingly. 
 
¶1. (U) Per instructions in reftel, Embassy Tashkent presents the 
required annual End Use Monitoring Report to the Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) for 
calendar year 2007. 
 
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PROCEDURES 
---------- 
 
¶2. (U) Embassy Tashkent requires the Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) 
to sign an End User Certificate upon receipt of all INL-funded 
equipment.  This document requires relevant GOU agencies to provide 
the Embassy information regarding each donated item, including 
product description, serial number, and geographical location where 
the equipment is deployed.  Post submitted a diplomatic note to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as required, to request access to the 
equipment for monitoring purposes.  It is not possible to conduct 
random, surprise inspections at Uzbek installations where our 
equipment is located. 
 
¶3. (U) Post has one full-time Locally Engaged Staff (LES) position 
to support INL initiatives in Uzbekistan.  The Embassy continues to 
improve procedures for INL equipment monitoring.  During 2007 we 
created an INL equipment database containing records of all 
equipment provided to the GOU and records of previous inspections. 
The database includes all equipment-related information and supports 
dozens of different queries.  INL equipment has been distributed 
throughout all 12 provinces of Uzbekistan. 
 
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STATUS 
------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) During the first half of 2007 the bilateral relationship 
was particularly strained and Embassy travel outside of Tashkent was 
limited.  However, in recent months the situation improved and post 
made a concerted effort to make field visits to check the status of 
key INL-funded equipment.  We prioritized major equipment such as 
vehicles, laboratory instruments, and the extensive equipment 
provided to the counter-narcotics-focused Sensitive Investigative 
Unit (SIU) within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). 
 
¶5. (U) Poloffs and INL LES visited customs posts in Termez, Bukhara, 
Navoi, and Tashkent; the explosives laboratory of the Ministry of 
Interior; the main laboratory of the Ministry of Health; and the 
counter-narcotics-focused Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) within 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  The following major equipment, 
purchased during previous fiscal years, is included on our end-use 
monitoring inventory. 
 
¶6. (U) Computers to Border Guards -- In December 2002 post delivered 
27 laptop computers for use by border guards at 12 remote railroad 
border checkpoints along the borders with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Afghanistan.  We did not check the computers this year due to 
strained relations with the host country and difficulty in accessing 
border posts, however the equipment is believed to be at the end of 
its useful lifespan after years of productive use. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Computers to SIU -- In January 2004, Embassy delivered 25 
workstations to the counter-narcotics-focused Sensitive 
Investigative Unit within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) of 
Uzbekistan.  On our inspection visit it was clear that the computer 
equipment is in good condition and is being actively used by law 
enforcement officers for its intended purpose.  Extra equipment is 
carefully packaged and stored on the premises. 
 
¶8. (U) Communications Equipment to SIU -- In July 2003, 30 cellular 
telephones, 30 Motorola GP-360 handheld radios, and four Thuraya 
satellite phones were provided to the SIU within the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs.  An officer has been designated as responsible for 
maintaining and tracking the inventory, and all equipment is 
accounted for and in good condition given the timeframe of use.  The 
cell phones are now obsolete but many are still in use; in other 
cases officers have returned the phones for inventory purposes and 
prefer to use their personal phones instead.  The satellite phones 
are not in use due to the high cost of the service, which the SIU 
could no longer afford when the Government of Uzbekistan suspended 
cooperation with the DEA. 
 
¶9. (U) Vehicles to Customs -- In August 2000, the Uzbek State 
Customs Committee received nine 4-wheel-drive Jeep Cherokees and 
spare parts.  Uzbek Customs assigned three vehicles to 
counter-smuggling units in Tashkent Province (which includes rugged 
mountain terrain in its territory) as well as one each to Bukhara, 
Navoi, Karakalpakstan and Ferghana Provinces.  Customs officers have 
clearly done the best they can to maintain the vehicles, although 
the government has not provided resources to make repairs.  Thus, 
the vehicles in Buhkara and Navoi are inoperable and awaiting 
repairs.  However, they are securely stored and officers were able 
to explain how they use the vehicles to support their operations. 
We did not visit Karakalpakstan or Ferghana during this review 
cycle. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Vehicles to Customs continued -- In contradiction to the 
intended purpose, one Jeep was transferred to the State Prosecutor's 
Office, but we were given access to it and confirmed it is in 
excellent condition and being used for law enforcement purposes. 
Another was requisitioned by the National Security Service (NSS) 
and, despite requesting access via diplomatic note, we were not able 
to inspect the vehicle. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Vehicles to SIU -- In December 2003, INL delivered 28 
vehicles to the SIU.  INL Tashkent conducted a thorough check and 
found all vehicles in good condition and used by police officers of 
the current unit.  The fleet is intentionally mixed, including 
several local models, to allow undercover units to blend in with 
their surroundings. The local models are much easier for the SIU to 
maintain since there is ready availability of spare parts and 
mechanical expertise.  Two Opel Astras require approximately USD 
2,000 of repairs that the SIU has no funds to complete; however, the 
vehicles are kept in a secure garage and otherwise appear to be in 
good condition. 
 
¶12. (U) Laboratory Equipment - In July 2004, post delivered and 
finished installation of laboratory equipment to enhance the GOU's 
capabilities to perform forensic analysis of explosives and narcotic 
substances.  Equipment donated to the explosives laboratory at the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs included a Sabre-2000 portable 
explosive detector, five digital scales, and an Agilent 
Electrophoresis system.  A Nicolet IR Spectrometer system was 
previously delivered to the lab in 1999.  The main forensic 
laboratory at the Ministry of Health (which analyzes narcotic 
substances) received an Agilent Gas Chromatograph and Mass 
Spectrometer System, which greatly supported evidence processing in 
criminal drug cases.  At both laboratories, poloff was extremely 
impressed by the professionalism of the staff and the obvious pride 
they have in carefully maintaining their scientific instruments. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Miscellaneous Equipment to Border Guards -- In October 
2001, INL provided the then Committee for State Border Protection 
document examination equipment to improve passport control 
activities at border checkpoints.  Donated equipment included: 100 
Universal Desktop Magnifiers and spare lamps, 200 Hand-Held UV-spot 
detectors and spare UV lamps, eight Multifunctional Passport 
Readers, and one set of Passport computer software with samples of 
more than 2,000 different passports and identification documents. 
The equipment was distributed to more than 40 border posts and the 
computer software was donated to the Border Guard Academy.  We did 
not specifically inspect this equipment during this reporting cycle, 
but poloffs noted the equipment was utilized at the recently 
constructed modern border checkpoint on the Afghan border at Termez. 
 
 
¶14. (SBU) Miscellaneous Equipment to SIU - Basic investigative 
equipment was distributed to the Counter Drug Department of the 
Uzbek Ministry of Internal Affairs.  The equipment transferred 
included 21 digital video cameras, 68 portable digital audio 
recorders, 36 digital cameras, and 19 TV sets and VCRs.  Transfer of 
this equipment helped the MVD outfit their counter-narcotics units 
with basic equipment they previously did not possess.  It is all 
maintained in excellent condition, and a full-time technician helps 
officers utilize the equipment; they even made their own creative 
modification to use local handbags that make hidden cameras more 
discreet. 
 
¶15. (SBU) INL supported a joint border project with the Embassy 
Export Control and Related Border Security Program by providing 
modular shelters for Uzbek Border Guards.  They were placed in rural 
areas of the Uzbek borders with Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.  INL 
Tashkent purchased, delivered, and installed custom-made furniture 
for the shelters at a cost of USD 56,000.  We did not visit these 
border posts during this review cycle. 
 
¶16. (U) There are no INL-funded vessels, aircrafts, weapons, or 
canine programs to monitor in Uzbekistan. 
 
-------- 
PROBLEMS 
-------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Many of the laptop computers delivered to the Border 
Guards are now broken after years of extensive use.  The products 
have now exceeded their useful expected life span.  We have had 
difficulty accessing border posts, but we expect to discontinue 
monitoring the equipment in the near future. 
 
¶18. (U) One of the computers delivered to the SIU arrived without a 
hard drive several years ago and it has never been utilized.  SIU 
staff continue to carefully store and keep track of the hardware for 
possible future use.  Other computers are in active use at the 
facility. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Since the Government of Uzbekistan suspended cooperation 
with the DEA, the SIU has not been able to utilize the satellite 
phones due to insufficient operational funding to pay the expensive 
monthly bills.  However, officers have placed the equipment back in 
its original packaging and carefully keep track of it for possible 
future use. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Several years ago, nine Jeep Cherokees were provided with 
INL funds for the exclusive use of the State Customs Committee. 
However, soon thereafter one vehicle was transferred to the office 
of the Prosecutor General and one was taken by the National Security 
Service.  There was apparently a loophole in the paperwork at that 
time that allowed these powerful agencies to requisition the 
vehicles, and the State Customs Committee accepted this as an 
internal cost of doing business.  The Prosecutor's Office cheerfully 
accommodated our request to inspect the vehicle, and it is in the 
best condition of any vehicle we checked.  The Prosecutor's Office 
in Tashkent clearly has more financial resources to do maintenance 
than their colleagues in remote customs posts.  However, we were 
unable to gain timely access to the vehicle in the possession of the 
NSS.  We will attempt to do so during the 2008 inspection period. 
 
 
¶21. (SBU) We discovered that due to the low quality of the fuel in 
the Uzbekistan retail market, the majority of vehicles require 
replacement of the fuel systems.  The counter-smuggling unit in 
Tashkent city already replaced the engine on its Jeep Cherokee, and 
the Navoi counter-smuggling department is currently trying to 
identify the resources to replace its system.  The vehicle in 
Bukhara has not worked in well over a year after sustaining engine 
damage in a collision with a smuggler's truck.  They do not have the 
funds at this office to repair it and greatly miss the contribution 
the Jeep made in remote stretches of desert.  Jeep parts are also 
not available in Uzbekistan, nor do mechanics know how to work on 
this American model. 
 
¶22. (SBU) The Nicolet IR spectrometer and portable Sabre-2000 
explosive detector have long since broken and require replacement. 
Poloff noted the staff at the lab are very professional and have 
nonetheless taken excellent care of all equipment, but their 
effectiveness would be enhanced by the repair of these instruments. 
The gas chromatograph at the main forensic laboratory requires a 
replacement hydrogen gas pump. 
 
------ 
IMPACT 
------ 
 
¶23. (U) During the end-use monitoring inspection visits, poloff was 
favorably impressed by the amount of goodwill that INL contributions 
have generated among rank-and-file law enforcement officials. 
Customs and border posts throughout the country have benefited from 
U.S. Government-funded equipment and, equally important, numerous 
training programs.  Uzbek officials still proudly recall their 
participation in previous training events, especially ones that took 
place in the United States.  Uzbeks also enjoyed programs in which 
their field counterparts from the United States personally came and 
conducted trainings, providing a chance for counterpart 
professionals to discuss their field of expertise.  Many veterans of 
these programs have been promoted and now occupy more senior 
positions at field posts or in Tashkent headquarters.  They have 
requested more training programs on a variety of topics, which we 
support. 
 
¶24. (U) Border Guard officials reported that the laptops enabled 
officers to more efficiently process train passengers transiting the 
borders.  Officers can register passengers and identify wanted 
criminals using the database loaded onto the laptop computers. 
Previously, border guards used paper notepads to record passport 
data and submit it to headquarters for criminal check analysis.  SIU 
officers actively use their computers for investigative work in 
counter-narcotics cases.  The workstations are well-maintained and a 
dedicated technical officer provides support services, such as 
camera uploads and multimedia assistance, to help officers document 
evidence. 
 
¶25. (SBU) On all of the inspection visits, poloff was satisfied that 
local customs officials did their best to take care of the equipment 
despite a lack of resources from the Government of Uzbekistan. 
Embassy Tashkent recommends approximately USD 20,000 of additional 
funds to purchase miscellaneous spare parts for Jeep Cherokees at 
customs posts.  While the Government of Uzbekistan needs to take 
more responsibility, this small investment will generate more 
goodwill with local officials and enhance the overall utility of the 
investment in these vehicles.  Local officials described how 
effective the Jeeps are in supporting operations in rugged desert 
and mountain terrain; however it is difficult to find spare parts 
for foreign models, especially given the lack of resources provided 
by the Government of Uzbekistan. 
 
¶26. (U) As a vivid example of increased capability paying dividends, 
sophisticated laboratory equipment (and corresponding training) 
enabled the Ministry of Internal Affairs explosive laboratory to 
identify the explosive substances used by the suicide bomber who 
attacked Embassy Tashkent in July 2004. 
 
¶27. (U) Border guards have the ability to more thoroughly and 
confidently check passports and other documents right in the border 
checkpoints without having to consult with officials in Tashkent or 
make ill-informed spot decisions. 
 
--------------- 
PROGRAM CHANGES 
--------------- 
 
¶28. (SBU) The budget for new INL projects dropped as the bilateral 
relationship deteriorated.  However, now that relations are steadily 
improving, we expect that will be easier to implement border 
security and law enforcement assistance projects in Uzbekistan.  The 
Government of Uzbekistan has indicated that it welcomes the 
resumption of cooperation on these areas of mutual interest.  The 
Government of Uzbekistan is also keenly aware of the growing threat 
posed by record drug production in Afghanistan, which has been well 
documented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 
Uzbekistan is a major transit country for drugs heading north from 
Afghanistan (especially via Tajikistan), and counter-narcotics will 
be a major priority and an opportunity for collaboration. 
 
---------------- 
POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
 
¶29. (U) Timothy Buckley is responsible for the INL Tashkent program. 
 He can be reached by telephone at: 998-71-120-5450; fax: 
998-71-120-6335; or unclassified email: BuckleyTP@state.gov.  INL 
LES Dmitriy Dogovorov can be reached by office telephone: 
998-71-120-5450; fax: 998-71-120-5400; or unclassified email: 
dogovorovd@state.gov. 
 
NORLAND