VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #0685 0600417
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 290411Z FEB 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0000
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0000
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0000
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0000
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0000
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0000
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC 0000
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHINGTON DC 0000
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T STATE 020685 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL KCRM EAID ADCO KISL ASEC KU
IZ, SY, JO, SA, TU 
SUBJECT: READOUT FROM DECEMBER 4 IRAQ AND NEIGHBORS RSI IN 
AMMAN, JORDAN 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR Dell Daley FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) 
and (d) 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary: U.S. Chiefs of Mission and embassy 
representatives from Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, and Turkey, joined by S/CT Coordinator Ambassador 
Dell Dailey and other U.S. interagency representatives, 
met December 4 in Amman to discuss regional 
counterterrorism strategies at an Iraq and Neighbors 
Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) conference 
(participants listed para 19).  The meeting focused on the 
flow of foreign fighters (FF) into and out of Iraq. 
Significant outcomes and taskers from the meeting 
included: 
-- A needs assessment for S/CT counter-terrorism training 
of Iraqi Security Forces. 
-- Intelligence community review of the use of Cairo 
airport by foreign fighters. 
-- Review of releasability of Objective Massey data to 
Syria. 
-- Development of an easily accessible database of 
documents and videos of statements by Muslim clerics and 
leaders encouraging moderation and/or supportive of U.S. 
efforts. 
-- Development of material on "best practices" for 
promoting moderation and countering radicalization. 
-- Schedule SVTC for Amb. Dailey to brief on foreign 
fighters to the countries he will not be visiting. 
-- Schedule follow-up Biometric Conference in Spring 2008. 
-- Identify venue for next in-field RSI conference in late 
¶2008. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S) Ambassador David Hale Embassy Amman hosted an Iraq 
and Neighbors Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) 
conference on December 4 attended by Chiefs of Mission and 
other embassy representatives from Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey.  They were joined by the 
S/CT Coordinator and other representatives of the 
interagency process.   Amb. Dailey noted past successes in 
the RSI process, including Jordan's regional biometric 
database initiative, expansion of the TIP/PISCES program, 
establishment of S/CT regional counterterrorism 
coordinator  positions, development of new regional IV 
programs, progress in critical energy infrastructure 
protection, and a financial needs assessment in northern 
Iraq to combat the financing of the PKK and other 
terrorist groups.  Amb. Dailey described the CT philosophy 
behind the RSI concept as a triangle, with the top 15 
percent representing kinetic action (kill or capture), the 
middle 20 percent representing efforts to disrupt FF 
networks by hindering or eliminating their recruitment, 
travel, training and operation, and the bottom 65 percent 
representing efforts to address root social, ideological, 
political and economic causes behind violent extremism. 
While DOD, the CIA and law enforcement agencies have the 
lead in the top 40 percent, the State Department has the 
lead in the lower 60 percent, he stressed. 
 
Leveraging OBJ Massey 
 
¶3.  (S) Participants were briefed on and discussed the 
importance of documents seized during a U.S. military 
operation raid on Abu Muthanna(OBJ Massey), the primary 
al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) leader responsible for facilitating 
the infiltration of foreign fighters from Syria into Iraq. 
Charge Corbin noted that the Syrian government knows AQI 
plans to target Syria, and that while FF facilitators 
continue to operate and questions remain about Syria's 
role, there is clear evidence of Syrian moves against 
extremists. 
 
¶4.  (S) Amb. Dailey pointed out that when areas of 
conflict quiet down, FF tend to return home to make 
trouble, and urged Posts to make it clear to host 
countries that FF bleed-out into their countries of origin 
creates a common threat.  He reported that he had briefed 
leaders in Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Yemen on OBJ Massey in 
November and plans to brief governments of Algeria, 
Morocco, and Tunisia in February. NOTE: Briefings took 
place February 7-11. END NOTE.  Amb. Dailey argued that 
the U.S. could have the biggest impact by sharing the 
names obtained during OBJ Massey with host countries and 
let them "run traps" for those FF listed.  Most 
participants cited sharing this information with Syria as 
vital, but requiring policy decisions in Washington. 
NOTE: Subsequently, Embassy Damascus has been given the 
green light to brief the Syrians yet no date has been set. 
The OBJ Massey data on individual terrorists is already 
available to Syria through INTERPOL.  END NOTE. 
 
Deradicalization and Combating Extremism 
 
¶5.  (S) Participants turned to the question of confronting 
extremist ideology and how to redirect confirmed radicals 
and potential recruits from terrorism.  Ambassador Ford 
Fraker briefed on Saudi efforts, which treat confronting 
extremism as a struggle to win hearts and minds, not 
solely as a police matter.  Their key tactic is to deal 
with extremists and returnees from Iraq as victims, not 
criminals.  Returnees from Guantanamo and Iraq, as well as 
those extremists that the SAG captures at home, are first 
evaluated by psychologists and religious officials. 
Second, the subject goes through a religious re-education 
program that uses Islamic sources to refute extremist 
ideology.  Third, the SAG works with the subject's family 
and wider community to integrate him back into society, in 
part through financial incentives and health care services 
to the family and by providing employment to the subject 
and encouraging marriage.  The SAG continues to monitor 
the rehabilitated individuals. 
 
¶7.  (S) Major General Michael Barbero of MNF-I noted that 
Iraq was deploying similar programs, using tribes and 
religious re-education to turn extremists toward 
moderation and away from AQI.  Charge DAffaires Alan 
Misenheimer noted that Kuwait has a "Moderation Center" 
that uses a variation of the Saudi tactic, but stressed 
that the Saudi template would not work everywhere.  The 
Kuwaitis, however, are not sharing the findings from their 
research on extremism in Kuwait.  EmbAmman DCM  briefed on 
GOJ efforts to win hearts and minds through the November 
9, 2004 "Amman Message" (www.ammanmessage.com).  This 
message, issued by members of different schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence whom King Abdallah II brought together, 
sought to delegitimize "takfir," the labeling of other 
Muslims as unbelievers worthy of targeting by extremists. 
It stressed Islam does not condone terrorism and Muslims 
must be loyal and law-abiding members of the states and 
societies in which they live. 
 
What About U.S. Public Diplomacy? 
 
¶8.  (S) RSI participants discussed the applicability of 
Amman Message-type projects in other countries, 
particularly in Saudi Arabia, perhaps with U.S. help. 
Participants concluded that a U.S. role, particularly an 
overt one, in supporting moderates in the intra-Muslim 
dialogue is problematic, and would likely be 
counterproductive.  The key to getting host-government 
buy-in on anti-extremism efforts is appealing to their 
desire for self preservation.  Governments that recognize 
extremism is a direct threat are more likely to confront 
extremism and terrorists, and to take more significant 
steps against AQ and FF transit through their territories. 
 
¶9.  (S) The participants agreed on the utility of 
expending resources in two areas:  1) compiling a database 
of and access to significant statements by Muslim 
religious and other leaders on moderation as an Islamic 
tenet, including public source videos and documents, and 
2) acquiring access to anti-extremist curricula from host 
governments that have successfully de-programmed 
extremists, with the aim of sharing these curricula with 
third party governments when appropriate. 
 
Merits of Engaging with Damascus on FF 
 
¶10.  (S) The NSC representative briefed on IA efforts to 
stem FF flows through Damascus airport.  The NSC has 
spearheaded an effort to provide unclassified briefings 
for aviation companies that serve Damascus to raise 
awareness and elicit information that could illuminate 
trends in foreign fighter travel. 
 
¶11.  (S) Returning to the subject of increased engagement 
with Damascus, participants weighed using a visit by 
General Petraeus or another high-level U.S. official to 
change Syrian behavior and direct attention to the FF 
issue.  The group agreed that DC policymakers would need 
to be convinced that such a visit would be a net gain. 
Baghdad PolMil Minister-Counselor Ambassador Marcie Ries 
observed the Iraqi government has gotten Damascus to 
listen to its FF concerns through engagement with 
counterparts in Syria.  The possibility was raised of 
using the Damascus-hosted Iraq neighbors' working group on 
border security to address the FF issue and create a basis 
for information sharing.  Several members of the group 
pointed out the presence of Iran in the working group 
would make it difficult for many Arab governments to share 
information through this mechanism. 
 
Status of GOJ Regional Biometric Initiative 
 
¶12.  (S) Amb. Hale reported that, as proposed at the 
August RSI video conference, a team of technical experts 
from Washington had visited Jordan in October to evaluate 
the GOJ's progress toward developing a fingerprint-sharing 
database system for known and suspected terrorists.  The 
visiting team determined that following the purchase of 
commercial software and two-to-three months of 
development, the GOJ could have a functioning system which 
could be demonstrated at a second Biometrics Conference. 
The GOJ currently envisions a database populated initially 
with fingerprints submitted by each member country. 
Member countries would be able to make their own 
independent queries and searches against that database. 
The GOJ may be in a position to host the second conference 
in late spring 2008.  Amb. Hale pointed to this initiative 
as a good tangible outcome of the RSI process. 
 
Counter-Terror Finance (CTF) 
 
¶13.  (S) Amb. Ries briefed on the visit of the Iraq Threat 
Finance Cell (ITFC) to the Kurdistan region of Iraq in 
November.  The ITFC was looking into the financing of the 
PKK and found that they raise money in Europe, Turkey, and 
the U.S. through criminal and legitimate means.  Most of 
the money is moved through an informal financial system 
based on hawala-like money exchangers.  An S/CT-led 
Financial Systems Assessment Team (FSAT) followed up the 
ITFC assessment during a December 8-14 visit to northern 
Iraq.  Deputy Assistant Attorney General Swartz added that 
the Resident Legal Advisor in Ankara has been working on 
disrupting the financing of the PKK from Europe for the 
past year. 
 
Critical Infrastructure Protection 
 
¶14.  (S) Amb. Fraker briefed on continuing U.S. efforts to 
work with the Government of Saudi Arabia to protect 
critical infrastructure.  Since the December 2006 signing 
of an MOU between the Department of State and the SAG, a 
joint working group has met four times and several 
assessment teams have visited Saudi oil and gas 
facilities.  Charge Misenheimer reported that in Kuwait an 
USG assessment has been conducted and a MOU drafted but 
the GOK has failed to identify an agency to sign the MOU. 
 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) 
 
¶15.  (C) DHS Deputy Assistant Secretary Paul Rosenzweig 
discussed the benefits of passenger name record (PNR) data 
analysis.  Every passenger who travels via commercial air 
generates two sets of data: the passenger manifest (name, 
sex, country of origin, passport number, country of 
issuance) and commercial data (address, phone number(s), 
emergency contact information, traveling companions, 
travel agency, etc.).  While manifest data is effective in 
identifying known threats, commercial data can identify 
new threats by linking people to those who have 
connections to known terrorists, he noted. 
 
¶16.  (S) All airlines that service the U.S. are required 
to provide DHS with both sets of data, which has allowed 
DHS to identify previously-unknown threats and travel 
agencies that specialize in crimes such as trafficking. 
DHS wants this information from flights that do not have a 
nexus to the U.S. but are known FF routes.  DAS Rosenzweig 
recounted successes in the Caribbean under CARICOM.  To 
implement an PNR arrangement, a country needs (1) laws 
requiring carriers to provide commercial and manifest 
data; (2) a way of transmitting the data to U.S.; and (3) 
the infrastructure to compile this data.  DHS has already 
approached the Libyans, Yemenis and the Saudis.  The 
Libyans were receptive and the Yemenis were also 
interested but lack the required infrastructure.  The 
Saudis seek additional proof that it works.  Amb. Fraker 
suggested that a six-month trial in Saudi might be the 
easiest way to convince the SAG of its value.  Amb. Hale 
commented that Jordan would be very receptive, but would 
likely expect U.S. financial assistance to implement. 
Dailey encouraged all embassies to approach host 
governments and describe the benefits of a PNR sharing 
arrangement.  DAS Rosenzweig agreed to send DHS teams to 
brief host countries as needed. 
 
Other Initiatives 
 
¶17.  (C) Deputy Assistant AG Swartz reminded participants 
of additional ways that DOJ can support CT efforts.  In 
addition to LEGATTs posted throughout the region, DOJ has 
posted several federal prosecutors in places like Cairo, 
Ankara, and the UAE to develop capacity-building programs 
to build networks and give ownership to host governments. 
Amb. Dailey discussed the value of DOD-sponsored MIST 
teams that have been highly effective in South America and 
Asia and announced upcoming Voluntary Visitor Programs 
(VVPs) focused on counterterrorism training.  S/CT, in 
collaboration with R, hopes to design multi-country VVP 
programs that encourage regional cooperation and use of 
open source materials.  Dailey also reminded participants 
of the CT Fellowship Program which is designed for two- 
three star equivalents, parliamentarians, deputy 
ministers, etc.  Interested embassies should follow-up 
with nominations through their Defense Attachs.  Amb. 
Hale reminded participants of the need to amplify the 
message of these programs and encourage attendees to think 
creatively about how to broaden the effect when trainees 
return home.  Others noted DOD's ability to develop 
websites and blogs to counter radical views. 
 
¶18. (S) In wrapping up the session, Amb. Dailey identified 
the following issues to be addressed: 
 
-- A needs assessment for S/CT counter-terrorism training 
of Iraqi Security Forces.  NOTE: DS/ATA is looking into 
Embassy Baghdads request and is putting together a list 
of courses to offer to the Government of Iraq. END NOTE. 
-- Intelligence community review of the use of Cairo 
airport by foreign fighters.  NOTE: IC has been tasked 
with conducting the review.  END NOTE. 
-- Review of releasability of Objective Massey data to 
Syria.  NOTE:  NSC approved release of OBJ Massey 
information by the Embassy Damascus. END NOTE. 
-- Development of an easily accessible database of 
documents and videos of statements by Muslim clerics and 
leaders encouraging moderation and/or supportive of U.S. 
efforts. 
-- Development of material on "best practices" for 
promoting moderation and countering radicalization. 
-- Schedule SVTC for Amb. Dailey to brief on foreign 
fighters to the countries he will not be visiting.  NOTE: 
SVTC will be conducted the week of March 10. END NOTE. 
-- Schedule follow-up Biometric Conference in early 2008. 
-- Identify venue for next in-field RSI conference in late 
¶2008. 
 
 
¶19.  (U) List of participants at the December 4 RSI 
conference in Amman, Jordan: 
 
Amb. David Hale (Amman) 
Amb. Dell Dailey (S/CT Coordinator) 
Amb. Ford Fraker (Riyadh) 
PolMil Minister-Counselor Amb. Marcie Ries (Baghdad) 
CDA Michael Corbin (Damascus) 
CDA Alan Misenheimer (Kuwait) 
 
Regional Affairs Counselors (Amman, Ankara, Kuwait, and 
Baghdad) 
Dallas Brown, Director, Joint Interagency Coordination 
Group (Centcom) 
Maj. Gen. David Scott (USSCOM) 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Swartz 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of DHS Paul Rosenzweig 
Maj. Gen.  Michael Barbero (DCS MNF-I C3) 
Brig. Gen. Michelle Johnson (DD/War on Terrorism/DOD) 
Mark Hunter (Assistant Director DS/T) 
Lynnda Tibbetts (Deputy Director DS/T/ATA) 
Matt Diascro (Director, Combating Terrorism, NSC) 
Garry Reid (Principal Director OSD SO/LIC) 
Lt. Col. Michael Foster (JIATF-West) 
Commander Christopher Engdahl (Strategic Planner/War on 
Terrorism/DOD) 
CIA Briefer 
Stephen Newhouse (DD NEA/ELA) 
Carol Reynolds (S/CT Regional Coordinator) 
Elizabeth Ingalls (S/CT) 
 
Ambassador Dailey's Comment 
 
¶20. (S) Much of the discussion at this RSI focused on 
bilateral issues, and most of the "due-outs" from the 
conference were bilateral and will not likely have a 
regional impact.  To make the RSI process meaningful to 
Ambassadors, a more regionally-oriented counterterrorism 
focus is needed.  Ongoing programs that accomplish this 
are the biometrics conference and S/CT's funding for the 
participation of counterterrorism officials in the IVLP. 
S/CT will work on refocusing the RSI on having more of a 
multilateral CT angle.  Amb. Dailey asks for Ambassadors' 
assistance in thinking more regionally and invites the 
field to recommend strategies and programs toward that 
end. 
 
 
Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ 
RICE