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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 020329 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2018 
TAGS: ECON ENIV ENRG KGHG PREL PGOV EAID XB XC XD XE XH JA
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS'S MEETING WITH JAPANESE 
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER SASAE, JANUARY 28, 2008 
 
Classified By: Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 
¶R. Nicholas Burns, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  U/S Burns met for two hours on January 29 
with his new Japanese counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister 
Kenichiro Sasae, to discuss G8, UNSC reform, Iraq, Iran, 
Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Burma.  Sasae 
described Japan's priorities for the G8, which include 
climate change/energy security, development in Africa and 
more "traditional issues" such as non-proliferation, 
counterterrorism and peace building.  U/S Burns assured Sasae 
that the U.S. continued to support Japan for a permanent UN 
Security Council seat while emphasizing the importance of UN 
reform.  U/S Burns briefed on the situation in Iraq; Sasae 
stressed Japan continued to support U.S. efforts there.  U/S 
Burns asked for Japan's political support in New York for a 
third UN Security Council resolution on Iran and pressed 
Sasae for GOJ sanctions in line with those the EU is expected 
to implement.  Sasae and U/S Burns agreed on the increasingly 
intertwined importance of Afghanistan and Pakistan.  U/S 
Burns briefed on U.S. policy toward India; Sasae described 
growing Japanese government and business interests there. 
Sasae described Japan's interest in supporting Gambari's 
Burma mission and said that Japan would like to address Burma 
through the G8; he also said he wanted to visit Burma 
himself, which U/S Burns supported.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Japan's G8 Priorities 
--------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Kenichiro Sasae told 
U/S Burns January 29 that Japan's priorities for the G8 would 
include: climate change; development in Africa; and more 
"traditional issues" such as non-proliferation, 
counterterrorism and peace building.  Japan planned that the 
Leaders' Statement would address all of these.  Sasae said 
European counterparts had proposed institutionalizing the G8 
plus 5 during his just-concluded consultations.  Sasae noted 
that, in accordance with the G8's agreement in Heiligendamm 
to engage in continuous dialogue with the five largest 
emerging economies (China, India, Mexico, Brazil and South 
Africa), Japan would agree to such a dialogue, but not an 
institutionalization of this outreach.  Japan also did not 
want to enlarge the G8; G8 enlargement should also not be 
linked to UNSC reform.   Sasae also said that in addition to 
the plus 5, Japan would invite three Asian countries 
(Indonesia, Australia and the Republic of Korea) to attend, 
 
STATE 00020329  002 OF 006 
 
 
given the regional importance of environmental issues. 
 
------ 
Kosovo 
------ 
 
¶3.  (C) Sasae expressed some concern that Kosovo could emerge 
as an additional political issue in play; U/S Burns suggested 
Kosovo should no longer be an issue by the time of the July 
G8 Summit.  U/S Burns asked that Japan quickly recognize the 
newly independent Kosovo as the United States and many 
Europeans would do; Sasae made no comment.  U/S Burns said 
Russia could be expected to protest Kosovo's independence and 
could block its membership in the UN, but further UNSC action 
was not required for an independence declaration; having 
withdrawn troops and aid programs, Russia had lost its claim 
to have a voice on the issue and could not stop Kosovo's 
independence. 
 
------ 
Russia 
------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Sasae noted the increased difficulty of dealing with 
Russia; UK counterpart Mark Lyall Grant had frankly described 
Britain's bilateral problems with Russia and floated G7 
discussion of Russia.  U/S Burns said the Administration 
favored G7 discussions only within an economic framework, not 
political; we had made a decision in 1994 to bring them into 
the framework, making a dis-invitation difficult.  Informal 
discussions about Russia were acceptable, but should not be 
not institutionalized; Sasae agreed.  U/S Burns described the 
significant differences between today's Russia and the former 
Soviet regime and noted the areas in which we cooperated 
strategically (e.g., non-proliferation and counterterrorism). 
 Putin's Russia had centralized power, but society was much 
more open, and we were convinced economic integration with 
the West was in Russia's self-interest.  However, we must be 
prepared to oppose Russia's behavior in the ex-Soviet space 
that runs counter to our interests, e.g. in the Caucuses, 
central Europe and in Central Asia.  The centralization of 
power in the Kremlin, restrictions on the press and efforts 
to minimize domestic political competition were of concern. 
The U.S. saw a balance of interests and did not view Russia 
as a new enemy.  Sasae agreed, but noted Russia's protests 
regarding U.S.-Japan ballistic missile defense, and said that 
relations with Russia required "delicate balance." 
 
--------- 
UN Reform 
--------- 
 
¶5.  (C) U/S Burns noted that he and others in the State 
 
STATE 00020329  003 OF 006 
 
 
Department had had many conversations with Japan on UNSC 
reform.  The President had supported expansion of the UNSC in 
his September 2007 UNGA speech.  There was great interest in 
talking to Japan, India, Brazil and African countries.  The 
U.S. would respond to proposals.  U/S Burns noted that 
different views existed within the USG.  It did not make 
sense to undertake UNSC reform without coupling it with other 
reform measures, including managerial, budget, and ethical 
reforms.  A "winning package" of UNSC expansion and reforms 
was necessary. 
 
¶6.  (C) Sasae thanked U/S Burns for the encouragement and 
indicated Japan would try again this year to develop a 
proposal, consulting closely with the U.S.  U/S Burns said it 
was important to continue to consult, and reminded Sasae that 
Japan was the only nation the U.S. supported publicly for a 
permanent UNSC seat.  He suggested Africa would be the most 
difficult challenge, not China, which Sasae said now 
"understands Japan's interest in a greater role"; its 
neutrality to Japan's UNSC membership would be sufficient. 
 
---- 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶7.  (C) U/S Burns briefed on progress in Iraq, which he 
described as in better shape than a year ago:  the surge had 
positive effects, though political developments remained a 
concern; it was imperative for social stability that Kurds, 
Shia and Sunni cooperated; the U.S. would begin negotiations 
with Iraq on a long-term SOFA-like agreement; the U.S. 
remained interested in outside political and economic support 
for the Iraqi government.  Sasae agreed that the situation 
seemed to have improved and that the U.S. deserved greater 
credit for its "tremendous results."  Sasae asked if the 
localized dialogue with Iran had helped; U/S Burns said the 
channel, under Ambassador Crocker's direction, was not very 
active, but the U.S. hoped it would because of Iran's support 
to the Shia, which it equipped with IEDs. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Iran ) diplomacy and domestic politics 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Sasae asked whether Japan could help with Iran.  U/S 
Burns said that Iran needed to be a major issue for the G8 
agenda; he also asked that Japan give political support at 
the UN for a third UNSCR.  U/S Burns noted that once the 
UNSCR passes, the EU would pass much stronger EU sanctions 
toward Iran; Japan, the ROK and other major trading partners 
should consider similar sanctions to make diplomacy 
effective.  Sasae responded that Japan would follow the UNSCR 
and consider additional measures; while Japan did not order 
 
STATE 00020329  004 OF 006 
 
 
its banks to take actions, it made suggestions, which led 
them to reduce exposure on their own.  U/S Burns said that he 
believed that if not handled correctly, Iranian sanctions 
could become an issue in U.S.-Japan relations; the U.S. 
looked to Japan to do much more.  Sasae said he would see 
what he could do, adding that China's actions were important. 
 China as expanding its activities with Iran as others 
reduced them, and Japan did not want China to take advantage 
of this situation.  U/S Burns cautioned that it would be a 
mistake for Japan to measure its actions based on China's; 
China would do little and would be the "weak link."  Sasae 
said Japan was not linking its action to that of China, but 
that we collectively needed to work on China.  U/S Burns 
stressed the importance that sanctions succeed to make 
diplomacy work. 
 
¶9.  (C) Sasae suggested that a third UNSCR could help Iran's 
domestic political situation.  U/S Burns agreed, noting that 
we did not want to do anything to help Ahmadinejad in the 
run-up to the March 14 Majlis elections.  Sasae observed that 
a serious political struggle was occurring within Iran; 
society was divided; the fight was not just over power but 
the "pulse" of the country; and that we needed to consider 
how best to support moderates.  U/S Burns noted criticism of 
the perceived U.S. unwillingness to talk with Iran was wrong; 
we were on the record since June 2006 offering talks, and 
Secretary Rice had repeated this offer at Davos. Iran, 
 
SIPDIS 
however, rejected the offer, perhaps because of the lack of 
political unity within Iran; this became clear after Putin's 
visit.  Sasae suggested that Iran could be waiting for a new 
U.S. Administration, which U/S Burns said would be a mistake, 
given strong bipartisan agreement in Washington on the need 
to address the threat posed by Iran.  Sasae suggested 
continuing bilateral expert discussions on Iran, to which U/S 
Burns agreed. 
 
------------------------ 
Afghanistan and Pakistan 
------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) Sasae stated that Afghanistan and Pakistan needed 
greater attention, that our activities in the two should be 
linked, and that Japan planned to propose this for the G8. 
U/S Burns agreed that Afghanistan and Pakistan were 
increasingly important, that the Taliban would not be a 
strategic threat to the Afghan government as long as NATO 
troops were in-country, and that the military effort was 
going well, though additional troops and helicopters were 
necessary.  The U.S. was more worried by the civilian effort, 
which needed a strong person with a strong mandate; the UN 
was unfocused, and it was regrettable that Afghan President 
Karzai had reversed himself on Paddy Ashdown serving as UN 
Special Representative. 
 
STATE 00020329  005 OF 006 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Sasae noted that although France had proposed a 
donors conference for Afghanistan, an overall strategy was 
necessary first.  Japan, as G8 Chair, would work to develop a 
strategy.  The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board 
(JCMB), which Japan will host in Tokyo February 5-6, will 
provide an opportunity to discuss problems.  U/S Burns said 
that Afghanistan needed to be a subject for Leaders and 
Foreign Ministers in the G8, to which Sasae agreed. 
 
¶12.  (C) On Pakistan, U/S Burns described the need for 
Pakistan to more aggressively pursue Taliban and extremists 
in the tribal areas of the country.  The U.S. had opposed 
imposition of martial law and the postponement of elections; 
the assassination of Benizir Bhutto had been a tragedy, since 
Pakistan needed a stronger political center.  Sasae said that 
Japan would increase its assistance to Pakistan. 
 
----- 
India 
----- 
 
¶13.  (C) U/S Burns described the President's interest in 
pursuing a strategic relationship with India, of which the 
civilian nuclear accord was a major component.  India needed 
to conclude negotiations with IAEA chief El Baradei before 
going to the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear 
Suppliers' Group.  Sasae said Japan knew the U.S. position; 
Japan had to work through its domestic political process but 
ultimately would not oppose the deal.  U/S Burns said that 
the United States and India were increasing military 
cooperation, both exercises and sales.  This was important 
because the Soviet Union/Russia had been India's main 
supplier for 60 years.  He noted that 75,000 Indians attended 
U.S. universities; the economic relationship was exploding. 
Sasae said that Japan also moving toward increased 
engagement, including investment, with India.  Investment in 
China had a downside; Japan was shifting more investment to 
countries like India and Vietnam.  Japan and India have a 
security dialogue and an increasing number of exchanges. 
India realized it needed to improve its relations with other 
countries in the region, in part to balance relations with 
China but also on its own merits.  Japan wanted to see India 
more in Asia Pacific.  U/S Burns said the United States did 
not see India as a counter to China. 
 
----- 
Burma 
----- 
 
¶14.  (C) Sasae, calling Burma a "headache," said he was "at 
wits end."  He stressed Japan's desire to help Gambari "do 
his best."  U/S Burns described the interest of the President 
 
STATE 00020329  006 OF 006 
 
 
and First Lady on this issue.  The United States also 
supported Gambari but if there were no action and the UN 
process weakened further, the U.S. would consider more 
vigorous efforts at the UN.  U/S Burns agreed with Sasae's 
proposal to consider issuing a G8 statement before Gambari 
visited Burma.  U/S Burns noted that the channel between Aung 
San Suu Kyi and the Minister of Labor that the junta had 
established was not genuine.  Sasae expressed interest in 
traveling to Burma, though he needed to discuss the idea with 
his superiors; U/S Burns was supportive. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) Sasae invited U/S Burns to Japan for a final TSD 
Senior Officials Meeting; U/S Burns urged Sasae to hold a 
meeting after U/S-designate Bill Burns had assumed his 
responsibilities.  Sasae also solicited U.S. views about 
initiating a Japan-China-U.S. trilateral dialogue, a Chinese 
idea, and resuming a Japan-U.S.-ROK dialogue on global issues 
not connected to the Korean peninsula or the Six Party 
process; he indicated ROK counterpart DFM Shim had responded 
positively.  U/S Burns indicated we would consider the ideas. 
 
 
---------------------- 
IAEA Secretary General 
---------------------- 
 
¶16.  (C) Sasae told U/S Burns that Japan would put forth the 
candidacy of Ambassador Amano as Secretary General of the 
IAEA to replace the Algerian Secretary General El Baradei in 
¶2009.  U/S Burns said we would consider the matter. 
 
¶17.  (U) January 28, 2008; 12:15 PM ) 2:00 PM; Washington, 
D.C. 
 
¶18. (U) Participants: 
 
United States 
------------- 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns 
EAP/J Director James Zumwalt 
EAP/J Deputy Director Raymond Richhart 
P Special Assistant George Kent 
 
Japan 
----- 
Deputy Foreign Minister Kenichiro Sasae, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) 
Political Minister Masafumi Ishii, Embassy of Japan 
Principal Senior Policy Coordinator Takehiro Funakoshi, MOFA 
Policy Coordination Deputy Director Kengo Otsuka, MOFA 
RICE