VZCZCXRO3942
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #0348/01 0521708
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211708Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7878
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000348 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO), EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS/STINCHCOMB); 
NSC FOR BRAUN; OSD FOR BEIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PNIR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - PIC MEETS AMID BREWING POLITICAL CRISES 
IN BOSNIA AND FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGES TO DAYTON 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles English.  Reason 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Political 
Directors will meet in Brussels on February 26-27 as Bosnia 
enters yet another in a long series of political crises, 
which stretch back to May 2006.  Bosnia's continued political 
deterioration has shaped an emerging consensus among PIC 
members (excluding Russia) that OHR must remain open beyond 
June 2008.  There is also broader support among the Quint for 
the HighRep's "objectives-based" approach to OHR's closure, 
but we will need to defend this position against Russian 
demands for a clear end date and/or a watered down set of 
benchmarks.  OHR's future is the main topic on the PIC 
agenda, but Republika Srpska's (RS) response to Kosovo 
independence, particularly assertions by RS PM Milorad Dodik 
and other senior RS officials that the RS enjoys the right to 
self-determination, is the more pressing issue confronting 
the PIC.  These claims, coupled with rhetoric and actions 
from the RS over the last 20 months, appear to be elements of 
a calculated strategy to eventually achieve an independent 
RS.  We must use the PIC to begin a serious discussion about 
steps we and the Europeans could take after the PIC to 
counter it.  At the same time, we should anticipate trouble 
after the PIC from Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris 
Silajdzic.  Silajdzic, who assumes the Chairmanship of the 
Tri-Presidency on March 6, has already signaled his intention 
to revive controversy over Srebrenica and the International 
Court of Justice's (ICJ) February 2007 verdict that genocide 
occurred in and around the municipality in July 1995. 
Silajdzic's agenda will further radicalize Bosniak politics, 
which will provide Dodik and the Bosnian Serbs with 
ready-made excuses to press their own anti-Dayton agenda. 
END SUMMARY 
 
The PIC in Context: Bosnia 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The political situation in Bosnia has worsened since 
the October PIC.  Fueled by near constant rhetorical sparring 
about future constitutional arrangements and the competencies 
of the state, ethnic tensions have increased.  Bosnian Serb 
leaders, particularly RS PM Dodik, have regularly attacked 
the legitimacy of the Bosnian state and undermined 
state-level institutions by preventing them from functioning. 
 The Bosniak political leaders' tendency to take an all or 
nothing approach on issues and to seek political advantage at 
their rivals' expense have undermined the reform process, 
particularly efforts to pass critical police reform 
legislation.  Croats, emboldened by the rhetoric from 
Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs, reiterated calls for changes to 
Dayton that amount to plans for a third (Croat) entity.  As a 
consequence of all this (and the structural weaknesses of 
Dayton governance structures), the Bosnian state continued to 
struggle to perform the functions necessary to sustain itself 
and reforms required for Euro-Atlantic integration have 
stalled.  Dodik's obstruction of an agreement on movable 
defense property threatens to derail Bosnia's aspirations for 
Intensified Dialogue at the Bucharest Summit.  The Party for 
Democratic Action's (SDA) backing out of the Mostar/Sarajevo 
agreements on police reform is blocking signature of an EU 
SAA. 
 
OHR's Future 
------------ 
 
¶3. (C) We cannot consider dismantling the Dayton-established 
OHR framework while the state's sustainability remains an 
open question.  There is consensus among most PIC countries 
that OHR must remain open beyond June 2008.  There is also 
broad support for the HighRep's proposal to tie OHR closure 
to specific, "critical" objectives, whose implementation OHR 
assesses as essential to the creation of a peaceful, viable 
Bosnian state and would allow the transition from OHR to EUSR 
to go ahead.  We have successfully pressed the HighRep to 
include Washington's-proposed rule of law objectives among 
those he will present to the PIC.  We have not received any 
signals from Quint partners that these objectives are 
problematic.  Our proposal for adoption of a framework on the 
implementation of the Constitutional Court's constituent 
people's decision, however, raised eyebrows among Quint 
members and was rejected by the Russian Ambassador.  The 
Russians have also objected to elements of the HighRep's 
 
SARAJEVO 00000348  002 OF 003 
 
 
approach and to our emphasis on rule of law.  Their 
preference remains for OHR to close as soon as possible, and 
this could translate into an effort to minimize the number of 
objectives the PIC sets for transition to EUSR and/or an 
insistence on setting a new target date for closure.  We 
should be prepared to defend our position on the importance 
of all of the Quint-agreed objectives and reject any Russian 
demands for setting an OHR end date at the Contact Group 
meeting prior to the PIC, and at the PIC itself. 
 
¶4. (C) The reality is that Bosnia's problems go much deeper 
than the "objectives" exercise the HighRep has embarked on. 
We should be under no illusions that they will be sufficient 
to ensure Bosnia's sustainability, especially if current 
political trends continue.  Robust international engagement 
will be required to reverse those trends and to accomplish 
even the limited objectives set by the PIC.  We will have to 
argue forcefully, over Russian objections, that a stable 
security and political situation in Bosnia is the sine qua 
non for OHR's closure.  We recognize that OHR's capacity and 
credibility are limited, and that they have continued to 
decline under Lajcak.  Lajcak's management of the crisis over 
his October 19 measures is partially to blame for this. 
Nonetheless, our interests would not be served by allowing 
OHR's authority to wither further.  Doing so would kill the 
objectives exercise before it even started.  In that context, 
the PIC must provide clear political support to OHR, 
including a signal that it would support use of the Bonn 
Powers to accomplish the PIC endorsed objectives. 
 
The PIC in Context: Kosovo 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Though OHR's future is the major item on the PIC's 
agenda, discussion of Lajcak's proposed objectives is likely 
to be overshadowed by discussion of the growing crisis over 
the RS response to Kosovo's independence.  Since May 2006, 
Dodik and senior RS officials have sought to push the 
boundaries of acceptable rhetoric and actions.  Attacks on 
the state, demands for the return to the RS of competencies 
transferred to the state, and threats of a referendum have 
become so commonplace by Dodik and Bosnian Serb officials 
that they no longer raise eyebrows.  However, Dodik and his 
SNSD allies managed to shock the international community 
again on January 31 when SNSD asserted that the RS already 
had the right to self-determination.  RS officials, including 
Dodik, are now using Kosovo's declaration of independence to 
cement their rhetorical claims about an RS right to 
self-determination.  These assertions constitute a 
fundamental challenge to Dayton. 
 
Republika Srpska's Future 
------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) It is unlikely that Dodik will seek to exercise the 
self-proclaimed right to RS self-determination in the near 
term.  Nonetheless, Dodik's rhetoric and actions over the 
last 20 months, particularly since August 2007, coupled with 
the newly asserted right to RS self-determination appear to 
be elements of a calculated strategy to eventually achieve an 
independent RS.  Key components of Dodik's strategy involve 
attacking the state's legitimacy; preventing the state from 
functioning; arguing the state's poor performance is "holding 
back the RS;" reviving war time claims about Bosniak 
victimization of Bosnian Serbs; characterizing reforms as 
attacks on the RS; and finally, when it is judged to be the 
right moment, rolling it all up into a tidy justification for 
the RS to exercise its right of self-determination.  HighRep 
Lajcak sees the danger, but not all the Europeans do, or care 
to.  (Note: In the current regional climate, we doubt the 
Russians care. End Note) We must use the PIC to shake the 
Europeans out of their stupor and begin a serious discussion 
about steps we and they could take after the PIC to counter 
Dodik. 
 
Silajdzic is Waiting in the Wings 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Dodik is not the only challenge we face.  The PIC will 
meet on the one-year anniversary of the ICJ's verdict that 
genocide was committed in and around Srebrenica in July 1995. 
 Silajdzic assumes chairmanship of the Presidency shortly 
 
SARAJEVO 00000348  003 OF 003 
 
 
after the PIC on March 6, and he has already signaled that he 
plans to once again make Srebrenica a political issue.  We 
are hearing rumblings about plans to revive 2007's campaign 
for secession of Srebrenica from the RS.  Once the dust on 
Kosovo settles, Silajdzic plans to reopen the constitutional 
reform debate and to press his case for a "Bosnia of regions" 
(read: abolishing the RS).  All of this suggests we can 
anticipate a further radicalization of Bosniak politics in 
the months ahead.  The destructive force of Bosniak 
nationalism has already claimed the U.S.-brokered package of 
constitutional amendments as a victim.  It may yet derail the 
Mostar Declaration and Sarajevo Action Plan on police reform 
and further delay Bosnia's signature of its Stabilization and 
Association Agreement with the EU.  In other words, even if 
Dodik decides that he has a tactical interest in keeping 
quiet after the PIC, Silajdzic's agenda will ensure that 
Bosnia's cycle of political crises will continue. 
Ultimately, Dodik will use Silajdzic's rhetoric and actions 
to justify a return his own anti-Dayton agenda.  Breaking 
this vicious spiral will be critically important to acheiving 
the progress needed to ensure that OHR's mandate can credibly 
be ended. 
ENGLISH