VZCZCXRO3354
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPG #0082/01 0391444
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081444Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0032
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0344

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000082 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DHS FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BARTH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2018 
TAGS: CVIS PREL CMGT EZ EUR
SUBJECT: CZECHS AGREE TO TEXT OF DHS SECURITY MOU 
 
 
Classified By: ADCM Stuart Hatcher for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
(C)  1.  SUMMARY 
--------------------- 
Czech negotiators from the Ministries of Interior and Foreign 
Affairs reached tentative agreement February 6 with DHS 
negotiators on the language of a security memorandum of 
understanding.  The MOU is required as part of the process 
for DHS to exercise its authority to waive the 3 percent 
refusal rate requirement for participation in the Visa Waiver 
Program.  Both sides were hopeful the agreement would be 
ready to sign when Czech Prime Minister Topolanek visits 
Washington on February 26 - 27.  During working-level 
meetings in the morning, as well as calls on the Foreign 
Minister, Interior Minister, and Deputy Prime Minister, the 
Czechs expressed their readiness to move forward on the MOU 
despite concerns raised by the EC.  That said, they did 
request, in our press statement, a nod to Brussels as 
political cover.  They were also eager for similar progress 
in Tallinn for the safety in numbers that would provide.  See 
action request paragraph 3.  End Summary. 
 
(SBU)  2.  DHS AND CZECHS REACH AGREEMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
DHS Assistant Secretary for Policy Richard Barth and Visa 
Waiver Program Office Director Marc Frey visited Prague on 
February 6 to negotiate the terms of a security Memorandum of 
Understanding, and to have several political-level meetings 
to ensure political support for this project.  They were 
accompanied by a representative from the DHS legal advisor,s 
office, and representatives from CA/VO and EUR/PGI.  DHS 
shared the draft MOU with the Czechs prior to the visit, and 
the Czechs replied with a marked-up copy and a list of 
questions.  (Note:  This early leg work by both sides was 
crucial to the success of the February 6 negotiations.  End 
note.)  Czech negotiations were led by Ministry of the 
Interior Director for Asylum and Migration Policy Tomas 
Heisman and Foreign Ministry Director General for Consular 
and Legal Affairs Jaroslav Horak.  During the morning, each 
side surprised the other with its flexibility in 
negotiations, with the result that by the end of the day the 
two sides had an agreed upon text we expect to be fully 
cleared within the next week.  With regard to their 
motivation, the Czechs remarked that the U.S. and the Czech 
Republic had been working for a long time for Czech 
participation in the Visa Waiver Program.  They also sensed a 
window of opportunity that could soon close if they did not 
take advantage of it.  Finally, they were hopeful they could 
have a document to sign when Prime Minister Topolanek visits 
Washington. 
 
(SBU)  3.  MOU Signing at the White House?  Action Request 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
During his visit to Washington, Prime Minister Topolanek is 
scheduled to meet with DHS Secretary Chertoff on February 26 
and President Bush on February 27.  The Czechs want to sign 
the MOU during this visit.  The Czechs suggest that it would 
be appropriate for Minister of Interior Langer and Secretary 
Chertoff to sign the MOU, and that this might be done during 
the White House visit.  Post requests desk, NSC and DHS to 
work together to form an appropriate ceremony to accomplish 
this signing during the prime minister,s visit, accompanied 
by suitable references to the MOU during public remarks at 
the White House. 
 
(C)  4.  Implementing Arrangements 
----------------------------- 
At each meeting A/S Barth stressed that the MOU was only a 
first step, and that it would have to followed up by 
implementing arrangements.  One example was the HSPD-6 
agreement ) referred to with the Czechs as the Terrorist 
Screening Center agreement.  The  Ministry of the Interior 
noted that they viewed this agreement favorably.  The MOI is 
trying to figure out how the agreeement could implemented, 
and hopes to present it to the cabinet for approval next 
month.  A/S Barth also said that not all implementing 
arrangements need to be formal; pre-existing informal 
information-sharing arrangements may suffice, but this would 
have to be determined on a case-by-case basis.  Additionally, 
not all information requested needs to be immediately 
available; it can be useful to start at a less than optimum 
level and move up incrementally. 
 
 
(U)  5.  Barth and the Press 
------------------------ 
A/S Barth did two press events involving live television. 
The visit was covered widely despite the looming February 8 
presidential elections.  A full transcript of his afternoon 
 
PRAGUE 00000082  002 OF 002 
 
 
press event can be found on the Embassy,s public website 
(www.prague.usembassy.gov).  The main points were: 
 
--  The United States and the Czech government made 
"excellent progress" on negotiations that hopefully will lead 
to visa waiver in 2008. 
 
--  Electronic Travel Authorization must be up and running 
before the Czech Republic can enter visa waiver.  It has been 
fully funded and could be in effect in the August-September 
timeframe. 
 
--  The Czech Republic has indicated to us their need to 
maintain their obligations within the EU and we certainly 
respect that.  We expect that all agreements will be 
consistent with existing obligations that the Czech Republic 
has to the EU. 
 
(C)  6.  Ministerial Visits a Victory Lap 
------------------------------ 
A/S Barth called on Interior Minister Langer, Deputy Prime 
Minister Vondra and Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg after the 
morning session.  In addition, during lunch, he met with new 
Deputy Foreign Minister Kohout and MFA Political Director 
Poveijsil.  All interlocutors at the political level 
expressed a determination to make the process succeed.  All 
also mentioned that a displeased EU was a significant hurdle 
they had overcome.  They noted in particular that Justice and 
Home Affairs deputies had met on February 1, and the Czechs 
claimed to be the only ones to speak up in favor of 
negotiating bilaterally (they specifically said that the 
Greeks, Hungarians, and Estonians were silent).  The Czechs 
said they were pulled in two directions, by their desire to 
reach agreement with the U.S. on the one hand, and their 
desire not to anger the EU on the other.  They said they were 
"dancing on eggshells" with the EU, but in the end they were 
prepared to defy EU wishes in favor of the MOU.  As the day 
wore on and it became clear that  we would reach agreement on 
the MOU, and that we would make some public statement 
referencing the EU to give them "political cover", they 
became visibly more comfortable with their decision, and 
almost proud that they had decided to stand up to Brussels. 
They are also hopeful that things will go well in Tallinn so 
they are not alone.  They don,t want to be "100% black 
sheep."  As Interior Minister Langer put it, "once we make a 
hole in the dam, the rest of Europe will flow through.  If 
bilateral agreements are signed, the shouting in Brussels 
will die down."  A/S Barth assured them that DHS would work 
with current VWP members as well, and hoped to have MOUs 
signed in those countries by October 2009.  Both Langer and 
Vondra said they might go to Brussels and Vondra would try to 
explain things to Commissioner Frattini.  It was also 
important to explain that ETA was not a visa. 
 
(C)  7.  Comment 
----------------------- 
We attribute success in these negotiations to a number of 
facts that serendipitously came to bear at the same time: 
The Czechs are strongly motivated to do something on visa 
waiver when their Prime Minister visits Washington.  The 
Czechs very much want to be in the VWP before beginning their 
first EU presidency in January 2009.  We convinced the Czechs 
this was a window of opportunity that, if not taken now, 
could slam shut for a long time.  DHS flexibility was a 
surprise to the Czechs.  In light of Greek indecision the day 
before, and probable Estonian success next week, the Czechs 
saw an opportunity to move to the head of the queue.  The 
ease of these negotiations and the Czech decision to defy 
Brussels have sent Czech expectations for Visa Waiver 
accession in 2008 into orbit.  As difficult as it may be, it 
would be useful if Department and DHS developed a time-line 
for the various steps that need to be taken, so we can 
sustain the momentum and keep everyone moving in the right 
direction.  End Comment. 
 
(U)  8.  Assistant Secretary Barth did not have an 
opportunity to clear this cable before departing post. 
Graber