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OO RUEHC
DE RUEHPU #0341/01 0601759
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291759Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7791
INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 1819
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 0125
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1624
RUEHQU/AMCONSUL QUEBEC PRIORITY 1047
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1446

C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT AU PRINCE 000341 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/EX AND WHA/CAR 
S/CRS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR 
INR/IAA 
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2018 
TAGS: ASEC EAID HA KCOR KCRM KDEM KJUS KPKO PGOV
PREL 
SUBJECT: HAITI IN 2008: FOUR YEARS AFTER ARISTIDE 
 
REF: A. PORT AU PRINCE 232 
     ¶B. 07 PORT AU PRINCE 1955 
     ¶C. PORT AU PRINCE 126 
     ¶D. PORT AU PRINCE 237 
     ¶E. 07 PORT AU PRINCE 1880 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Four years after the resignation of President 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti now enjoys a degree of 
stability not seen here in almost a decade.  A democratically 
elected President and Parliament, a growing national police 
force, strong international support, led by the United 
States, and the presence of a UN peacekeeping force, are 
primarily responsible for this positive development. Haiti's 
progress, however, remains fragile, and much work remains to 
be done. Executive-legislative relations have improved but 
still are marked more by confrontation than by productive 
cooperation.  Key judicial reform legislation has passed, but 
other parts of the government await modernization.  With 
security improved, the chronic misery suffered by the 
majority of Haitians is emerging as the main challenge for 
the government.  This issue, if left unaddressed, could 
galvanize potentially disruptive forces, including grassroots 
organizations linked to the party of former President 
Aristide.  Exogenous factors such as the death or 
incapacitation of the President could likewise upset Haiti's 
fragile recovery. Haiti's democratic institutions are taking 
hold but their roots are still shallow. We assess that 
Haiti's receptivity to Aristide's return or the rise of an 
Aristide-like messiah-figure remains low, but could rise if 
Haiti's institutional consolidation falters or if the economy 
suffers a major downturn. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary Continued: Consolidating Haiti's political 
institutions - key to the nation's future - will require 
building the capacity of weak GoH institutions plagued by 
systemic corruption, including the parliament, political 
parties, and government ministries.  President Preval has 
proven capable of structuring a working consensus on issues 
of national interest, although he has failed to meet key 
constitutional benchmarks, such as the holding of senatorial 
elections. Political parties, motivated more by strong 
personal agendas than by political ideologies, still struggle 
for greater involvement in the government and political life. 
 A young parliament coping with inexperienced lawmakers and a 
bloated and ineffective staff, needs to buckle down in order 
to earn the respect of the citizens and the Executive Branch. 
 Prospects for continued stability through the next 
presidential transition remain good, but by no means assured. 
A protracted political crisis, the death or disability of 
President Preval, or a perciptious departure by MINUSTAH, 
could call into question that transition.  Haiti's continued 
democratic evolution will require that the GoH and its 
international partners remain focused on long-term 
institution-building. The U.S. leadership role in this 
process is critical, demanding our continued political and 
financial engagement for the long term. End summary. 
 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Since Jean-Betrand Aristide's departure, four years 
ago today, Haiti has made important progress in shaping a 
brighter future for its citizens. With a democratically 
elected president and parliament and a constitutionally 
mandated/consensus government in place, an emerging civil 
society, an improving (albeit imperfect) security 
environment,  and progress on the macroeconomic front, 
today's Haiti is a long way from that of 2004.  However, 
these changes have been hard won and it is, as of yet, 
unclear if the fragile advances we see on the ground here are 
indeed irreversible.  At very least, they will require much 
reinforcement and care. That being said, remembering the 
violence, political crises and instability, and social 
disruption that marked Haiti four years ago, Haitians - and 
their friends - can take pride in the accomplishments of the 
past few years. 

Executive Branch 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Rene Preval came to the presidency in an election that 
was seen by most observers, both within Haiti and without, as 
being generally open, free and fair. Following two years of a 
maladroit, generally unpopular interim government, Preval 
made no claims of omnipotence, telling his countrymen he 
would roll up his sleeves and get to work. His 
passive-aggressive leadership style (low key and passive in 
public but aggressively managing the smallest details in 
private) has so far served him reasonably well.  His main 
accomplishment - achieved with a quiet and cautious approach 
largely behind the scenes - has been to defuse the deep 
political tensions that threatened to engulf the country at 
the time of Aristide's resignation on February 29, 2004.  He 
has achieved a degree of broad cooperation with his political 
agenda.  For example, he successfully gathered interested 
parties to resolve heated debates over contentious issues 
like justice reform and the formation of a new Provisional 
Electoral Council (CEP).  However, Preval refuses to take to 
the bully pulpit to advocate his consensus policies.  He 
rarely appears in public and refuses to use the power of the 
presidency to rally the nation.  At the same time, Preval 
exhibits a dogged unwillingness to delegate.  His failure to 
give autonomy to an enthusiastic Prime Minister or share 
power with Parliament has resulted in the need to build a new 
working consensus issue-by-issue.  His over-involvement in 
the workings of GoH institutions stifles government 
initiative, as everyone waits for Preval to make decisions 
and very few are prepared to tell him "no." 
 
¶5. (C) The lagging development of government capacity impedes 
development on all fronts.  Government ministries, more flush 
with funds than anytime in recent years, lack the capacity to 
spend the money in their budgets.  Like all Haitian 
institutions, ministries are vulnerable to corruption. 
Passive in his approach to capacity building, Preval has done 
virtually nothing to identify, recruit, promote, or otherwise 
reward capable government workers.  The functioning of entire 
ministries continues to depend on one or two key members of 
the permanent staff, whose careers lack the protection of a 
civil service system.  Haiti is still a long way from having 
ministries with the institutional capacity to outlast changes 
of directors, staff, and political changes at the top: 
ministers and the President of the Republic. 
 
¶6. (C) The current government is fragile and faces periodic 
assaults by an irresponsible legislature, either chamber of 
which has the power to sack one or more ministers or the 
entire government.  Rumors of an imminent cabinet shakeup 
surface periodically.  Minister of Public Works Frantz 
Verella and Minister of Commerce Maguy Durce top a long list 
of ministers whom civil society representatives, political 
parties, and the private sector argue should be replaced. 
Parliamentarians frequently remind Prime Minister Alexis that 
they have the power to dismiss the government, and threaten 
votes of no confidence periodically. In the latest example of 
this, the Prime Minister was summoned to the Chamber of 
Deputies February 28 to defend his government's economic 
policies (septel).  Although he easily won beat back a vote 
of no confidence, the political uncertainty the debate 
engendered has stalled movement in key areas, including 
elections. 
 
¶7. (C) Preval has taken a sometimes lax attitude toward 
Haiti's constitutionally mandated electoral schedule 
(although on other issues, such as amending the constitution 
by executive fiat, he has been more doctrinaire.) The 
successful elections of 2006 were a solid milestone on 
Haiti's path toward a stable democracy.  However, the GoH 
missed the next crucial benchmark: elections to renew 
one-third of the Senate should have been held in November 
2007, but even now the GoH has yet to announce an election 
date.  Interruptions in the election cycle and a capricious 
attitude of the executive toward parliamentary elections were 
one of the major factors undermining the democratic process 
during the Aristide era (which includes Preval's first term). 
 While Preval is right in arguing that the current electoral 
calendar, as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, is burdensome 
and expensive, it is crucial that the electoral process 
continue to consolidate the initial momentum and enthusiasm 
for elections generated by the 2006 national elections. 
 
¶8. (C) Preval's thus-far successful leadership style is 
running up against a non-cooperative economy.  The Haitian 
economy has stabilized, but the lot of Haiti's 
poverty-stricken majority is hardly better, and expectations 
the government should do something to help the poor 
immediately are beginning to grow.  In opening weeks of 2008, 
Preval made several public appearances emphasizing local 
production to combat suffering from the high cost of living. 
However, the GoH has taken no direct steps to combat the high 
cost of living and demands for action are mounting (ref A). 
(Note: Post will report septel on Haiti's economic landscape. 
 End note.) 
 
Parliament 
---------- 
 
¶9. (C) Most parliamentarians are wholly inexperienced and 
indifferent to their constitutional role as legislators and 
counterweights to the Executive.  Parliamentarians' interest 
in playing the role of "development agents" in their 
representative districts takes precedence over legislation, 
as they spend much time lobbying GoH ministries and 
international donors for project funding.  Absenteeism is 
chronic -- aggravated by frequent foreign trips legislators 
seek for the handsome per diem they are awarded.  When in 
session, members often prefer posturing on diversionary 
issues -- such as the double nationality of many legislators 
-- to focusing on substantive political issues.  The 
resulting dearth of legislative action provides fodder to 
skeptics who question Parliament's utility.  Despite the 
legislature's poor performance, cooperation between the 
Executive and the Parliament has improved over the last two 
years, with dialogue between the ministries and the 
Parliament occurring frequently. 
 
¶10. (C) Parliament has abdicated legislative initiative to 
the Executive, where nearly all bills originate.  When the 
legislature receives bills from the President, neither 
chamber has an established system to consider, debate, amend, 
or vote on the bills.  The process for tracking the 
whereabouts of and changes to proposed legislation is 
haphazard and disorderly.  Members often show up to vote on a 
bill having never seen the text.  There is no prioritization 
of the "legislative menu" by either parliamentary leadership 
or the executive branch.  The major success in the last year 
was the passage in the Senate and Chamber of major judicial 
reform legislation establishing a judicial council and 
defining the role of magistrates (ref B). 
 
¶11. (SBU) The Parliament faces a severe shortage of human and 
material resources.  It operates with a limited number of 
qualified technical staff, and only members of the two 
chambers' executive bureaus have offices and compuers. 
Space for committee meetings is limited to ne or two rooms 
in each chamber, so several commttees cannot meet 
concurrently.  Advancement in 008 will require reform of the 
internal regulatios of both chambers and the passage of a 
statute overning the roles of parliamentary staff. 
 
¶12. SBU) The election of Kely Bastien as new Senate 
resident (ref C) is an encouraging sign for the mauration 
of Parliament.  With an agenda focused onrestructuring both 
legislative houses, and with ajority support from his 
Senate colleagues, Bastien may just be the leader Parliament 
needs to curb its inefficiencies and lack of reliability. 
Bastien has promised to improve the current state of 
Executive-Legislative relations, institute decentralized and 
inclusive leadership in the Senate, and seek resources to 
properly train qualified Senate personnel. 
 
Parties and Civil Society 
------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Although Haiti's democratic institutions are 
beginning to take root, the country has not yet developed 
cohesive political parties that democracies require.  Party 
leaders and elected officials remain a disparate group of 
demandeurs focused on leading individuals and on procuring 
government resources for themselves and their constituencies. 
 Haiti's plethora of political parties remains largely 
personality-based.  Most parties lack an ideology or 
organizational structure.  Among the most popular parties, 
OPL (Struggling People's Party) is still the most structured 
and organized, though Senator Youri Latortue brings a great 
deal of discipline to his Artibonite in Action (LAAA) party. 
The two coalitions that took home the biggest wins in 2006 -- 
Fusion and Lespwa -- both find themselves in tenuous 
situations, with internal bickering and lack of consensus 
threatening to break them apart.  Aristide's departure left 
his once-mighty party, Fanmi Lavalas, fractured and bereft of 
clear leadership.  Continued infighting harms the party's 
credibility and undermines the party's main message -- 
Haiti's redemption through the return of Aristide. 
 
¶14. (C) Civil society remains an important sector that has 
been included in all the major debates of the last year, from 
justice reform to elections.  Although no longer banded 
together under the Group of 184 (the loose coalition of 
political parties, businesses and civil society organizations 
that played a leading role in ousting former President 
Aristide), civil society organizations still influence public 
opinion and are thus able to exert political pressure. 
Student groups and grassroots organizations mount periodic 
protests calling for GoH action to combat poverty, hunger and 
unemployment.  Post assesses that these groups do not pose a 
threat to Haitian stability, as they are not interconnected 
and have no charismatic leader to rally around.  More 
centrist groups, such as the Civil Society Institute, the 
Open Society Institute of Haiti, and Women in Democracy bring 
more sophisticated pressure to bear on the government. 
 
Local Government and Decentralization 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Local government officials lack the basic 
administrative, managerial and leadership skills to fulfill 
their constitutional mandates.  Local government budgets are 
too small and taxing authority too limited to take care of 
community needs, so they rely heavily on international aid 
and scant central government financing.  The bulky, 
multi-tiered framework of local government, designed to 
create a decentralized state, thus far has only created 
confusion over roles and responsibilities of local officials. 
 Even with increased USG and international focus on 
supporting local government, there is still a general lack of 
confidence in local government among Haitians, hampering the 
decentralization process.  Presidential inaction has halted 
the indirect elections process, leaving a large part of the 
decentralized structure incomplete. 
 
Labor 
----- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Haiti's weak organized labor sector lacks the 
initiative and organizational punch to make itself a 
significant political factor.  Both private and 
government-owned enterprises dismiss union workers and 
organizers at will, but with little social echo.  There have 
been a few demonstrations, numbering in the hundreds, of 
workers laid off from the bloated state telephone and 
electricity companies, but these have failed to merge with 
the more frequent street protests and parliamentary actions 
criticizing the government for inaction on inflation and job 
creation.  Preval however has recently urged the private 
sector to follow the GoH's public sector initiative and 
increase the minimum wage.  The GOH in its 2008 budget 
implemented a 20-35 percent wage increase for the public 
sector (ref D). 
 
Security and Justice Reform 
--------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) For the foreseeable future, MINUSTAH's presence in 
Haiti as an armed peacekeeping force will be essential for 
the preservation of stability and security in the country. 
Haiti's own law enforcement capability continues to expand 
but clearly has a long way to go.  Haitian National Police 
(HNP) numbers have increased, and residents of Port-au-Prince 
now see the police as a positive presence in their daily 
lives.  There is a semblance of law and order at the street 
level.  Slums like Cite Soleil continue to experience gang 
activity, albeit at a much lower level than a year ago (ref 
E).  Citizens are slowly regaining trust in the HNP and are 
venturing out more often, even at night.  No significant 
force in Haiti has the means or inclination to challenge 
legitimate authority.  (Note: Post will report septel on 
Haiti's security environment.  End note.) 
 
¶18. (C)  No matter the progress on the policing front, the 
inability of Haiti's weak and corrupt judiciary to 
effectively investigate and prosecute crime has created an 
atmosphere of impunity that threatens consolidation of 
Haiti's security gains, and hence, Haiti's stability. 
Despite gains in its capabilities, the HNP lacks the 
training, equipment, and mentality to pursue serious 
preliminary investigations to transfer to investigating 
magistrates.  The Ministry of Justice, like every other 
ministry, lacks a competent staff, and is unable in the great 
majority of cases to produce cases that can hold up in court. 
 Judicial personnel lack basic knowledge of the law as well 
as case processing and management skills.  Cases move 
erratically through the system, with legal deadlines in the 
penal chain overwhelmingly ignored.  Prisoners are dumped in 
overcrowded jails for prolonged period awaiting trial, often 
with no scheduled dates for judicial hearings.  Criminals and 
their cohorts can easily buy off or intimidate judges.  Drug 
trafficking adds a vicious twist to the security problem, 
with police sometimes participating in and benefiting from 
drug trafficking.  Particularly in the southern regions, 
deeply entrenched drug trafficking networks have infiltrated 
local police ranks and defied MINUSTAH efforts to uproot them 
(ref F).  With the judicial system overwhelmed and unable to 
pursue prosecutions, prisoners released due to lack of 
charges often return to a life of crime, including 
kidnapping. 
 
Looking Forward: Movers and Shakers 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (C) With Parliament beginning to assert itself more 
aggressively against the Executive, Senate President Kely 
Bastien (Lespwa) and Chamber of Deputies President Eric 
Jean-Jacques (Lespwa) are rising in prominence.  Haitians are 
already thinking about the race to take the Presidential 
Palace in 2011.  Obvious candidates so far include PM 
Jacques-Edouard Alexis and his archrival, Senator Youri 
Latortue; several senators and political elites; and hip-hop 
star Wyclef Jean, who is perhaps the best positioned to 
motivate large portions of the lower class in his favor. 
Among the class of possible Presidential hopefuls, we see no 
one who mimics the politics or style of, or who is as 
dangerous to Haiti's democratic consolidation as, former 
President Aristide. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶20. (C) Four years beyond Aristide, Haiti can point to 
important steps forward. We have seen marked progress in 
security, continuing prospects for which remain good through 
the next presidential transition - as long as MINUSTAH 
remains in-country with a robust security force.  President 
Preval's guiding principles of consensus building likewise 
enhance the prospects for political stability. However, there 
is a sense here that more could have been done during 
Preval's first two years. Lack of progress on employment and 
cost of living are causing discontent with the government. A 
prolonged political crisis - such as the failure to move 
quickly to put a government in place should the Alexis 
government fall or the passing from the political scene of 
President Preval - could undermine the development of a 
political culture of compromise for the common good that 
Haiti's stability and long-term development desperately 
needs.  It could also increase Haiti's susceptibility to the 
return of Aristide or the rise of an Aristide-wannabe, a 
probability we now assess as low.  A serious effort to 
address the immediate economic concerns of the population is 
crucial, as is getting elections back on schedule, and the 
continued maturation of political parties and parliament. 
 
¶21. (C) Comment continued:  The U.S remains at Haiti's 
indispensable partner at this critical stage of its 
development. Our leadership and our support, both bilaterally 
and in concert with our international partners, is key to 
Haiti's success over the long term. Yet we remain a source of 
some resentment and occasional friction here which we will 
have to weather. Our assistance and policies directly affect 
the daily lives of nearly every Haitian, but our ability to 
influence outcomes in this sovereign country is limited.  We 
must remain engaged, nimble, and imaginative, nurturing 
allies in Haitian society where we find them, and maintaining 
the current consensus within the engaged members of the 
international community that Haiti must stay on track. 
Success in Haiti - a democratic, prosperous, and secure Haiti 
- demands that we continue our strong policy focus and 
commitment into the next Haitian presidential transition 
(2011) with intensity equal to that of the past four years. 
SANDERSON