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C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000344 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EASS EFIN FR LE SY
SUBJECT: ELYSEE READOUT ON LEBANESE PM SINIORA'S FEBRUARY 
21 MEETINGS IN PARIS 
 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4. (b), (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  French Presidency NEA adviser Boris Boillon on 26 
February provided a quick readout of Lebanese Prime Minister 
Siniora's February 21 meetings with French President Sarkozy 
and Prime Minister Fillon.  Boillon stressed that the main 
message was one of French support to Lebanon's head of 
government and acting head of state in a way that underscored 
the legitimacy of the Lebanese state.  The visit was brief, 
and the meetings confined to Sarkozy and Fillon.  (Comment: 
Kouchner's absence from France ruled out a possible separate 
Siniora meeting with him.  End comment) 
 
¶2.  (C)  According to Boillon, Sarkozy asked Siniora for a 
rundown of the situation in Lebanon and whether there was 
anything new that might break the longstanding impasse.  Both 
leaders agreed that the Arab League initiative remained the 
only game in town, and Sarkozy pledged continued French 
support.  Boillon said that Sarkozy reviewed French efforts 
with Syria to secure agreement on a new Lebanese president 
and promised that France had abandoned that approach in the 
face of Syrian dishonesty and the intransigence of March 8. 
The two leaders agreed on the necessity of maintaining 
pressure on Syria (as well as Iran) via support for the rapid 
establishment of the Special Tribunal, use of the Arab summit 
as leverage over Damascus, and the formulation of a solid EU 
position regarding further high-level political contact with 
Syria over the coming weeks. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Regarding the Arab summit, Boillon claimed the 
French have now seen evidence that the Syrians are "more 
interested" than they had been in seeing the summit occur as 
planned in Damascus.  He claimed signs of preparation were 
evident in the city, and FM Mu'allim was traveling to other 
Arab capitals.  As for the issue of getting the EU to adopt a 
tough common position on contact with Syria, Boillon 
acknowledged that this would remain a major challenge. 
France was trying to secure agreement that Solana would be 
the only channel for high-level contacts with the Syrian 
regime.  He described the UK as "solid," but Spain and Italy, 
with elections approaching, continued to be troublesome. 
Germany, Boillon added, was also difficult because of what he 
called Chancellor Merkel's "Steinmeier problem." 
 
¶4.  (C)  In tandem with the political support France sought 
to convey, Boillon noted the signature of an accord providing 
for a 15-year, 375-million Euro bilateral budget assistance 
package meant as France's fulfillment of a pledge made at the 
Paris III donors conference in early 2007.  As reported in 
the media, the first tranche of 150 million Euros was 
disbursed the same day.  Boillon stated that in addition to 
this assistance, France was providing aid to the Lebanese 
Armed Forces.  He refused, however, to provide details of 
that assistance except to say that it was a combination of 
programmed and impromptu help. 
 
¶5.  (C)  With respect to French efforts on Lebanon, Boillon 
stated that the days of the Elysee dealing directly with 
Lebanese intermediaries representing March 8 were over.  He 
stressed France's firm attachment to the Arab League 
initiative, even though he acknowledged little current reason 
to believe it was on the verge of ushering in a breakthrough. 
 Boillon, with some exasperation, observed that only the 
Lebanese were capable of resolving their crisis.  He hoped 
that continued Egyptian and Saudi pressure on Syria through 
use of the Arab summit as a lever would eventually cause the 
Lebanese to "act like adults."  He was not optimistic, 
however, given the news about the failure of ALSYG Amr Musa's 
latest trip to Beirut and the latest postponement of the 
presidential election. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
STAPLETON