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DE RUEHFR #0304/01 0521314
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O 211314Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2034
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES  PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 PARIS 000304 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EAID EFIN SHUM FR IZ
SUBJECT: S/I SATTERFIELD DISCUSSES IRAQ WITH FRENCH 
OFFICIALS, 14-15 FEBRUARY 2008 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso 
ns 1.4. (b), (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  S/I Satterfield discussed Iraq at the 
French Presidency and the MFA February 14 and 15.  The French 
provided their formal response to the paper Satterfield had 
presented at the end of December.  In addition to briefing 
the French on our view of the situation in Iraq, Satterfield 
asked for confirmation of the French decision not to host the 
next meeting on the Iraq Compact.  Diplomatic adviser to the 
French president Levitte said the GOF had decided not to host 
the Compact meeting because of the press of other commitments 
(notably the Afghan donors conference and an expected 
announcement of French reinforcements in Afghanistan) and 
concern that hosting the Compact could heighten hitherto 
minimal domestic criticism of French foreign policy.  French 
FM Kouchner's adviser for conflict and crises, Eric 
Chevallier, on February 15 offered to raise the issue one 
more time with Kouchner, but he was not optimistic the GOF 
would change its mind.  (Chevallier later reported back that 
Kouchner was not prepared to re-open the question.)  In 
addition to encouraging France to use its upcoming EU 
presidency to engage with Iraq's neighbors, Satterfield 
presented our view that the French proposal to host a 
national reconciliation conference was less pressing given 
recent progress among Iraqi leaders to work together on key 
legislation.  The conversations underscored French concerns 
about Iran's role in Iraq and a continuing negative view 
within the Quai of the worth of international efforts to 
promote Iraqi reconstruction.  End summary 
 
¶2.  (C)  S/I Satterfield met with French Presidency 
Diplomatic adviser Jean-David Levitte and MFA officials 
February 14 and 15, primarily to discuss the situation in 
Iraq and the USG's desire that France play a more active role 
in Iraq's reconstruction.  In all his meetings, Satterfield 
made the following core points: 
 
--Our overall message is a positive one. 
 
--There has been tremendous progress on nearly all the 
security fronts, and al-Qa'ida in Iraq increasingly 
constrained in terms of where it can operate and the tactics 
it can employ.  It cannot, for example, operate as 
effectively in Baghdad and has been largely pushed northward 
into Kurdish areas.  Using women to carry out suicide bomb 
operations has underscored al-Qa'ida's desperation. 
 
--Similarly, the threat posed by the Jaysh al-Mahdi has eased 
partly because of splits within the movement.  Some followers 
have moved toward the GOI and us while others have become 
more radical and moved closer to the IRGC and Iran. 
 
--The Awakening Councils are a transitional force that the 
GOI must deal with via a combination of absorbing a portion 
into Iraqi security forces and finding jobs for their 
members.  The USG expects this to happen this year. 
 
--We have pushed hard to improve the dynamic between PM 
Maliki and the governing council as the best mechanism to 
achieve national reconciliation.  We have stressed the need 
for a common agenda and a determination to work together in a 
cohesive manner. 
 
--Major change has occurred in recent weeks.  The recently 
passed laws on amnesty, de-Ba'thification, and provincial 
governance required major deal-making among Iraqi leaders, 
took a long time, and was extremely difficult. 
 
--A major problem still exists in passing a new hydrocarbon 
law.  This is aggravated by mistrust between Kurds and Arabs, 
and we have told Mas'ud Barzani that he is going down the 
wrong road by concluding unilateral contracts with oil 
companies.  Pending agreement on a national law, there must 
be a moratorium on such contracts.  This is not the only 
complication, however, as the Iraqi government refuses to 
abandon the model of rigid central control over hydrocarbon 
extraction, refining, and distribution.  This has dissuaded 
many foreign firms from investing to make up for decades of 
neglect of infrastructure. 
 
--On provincial elections, a rapid movement forward would 
mark a dramatic advance in terms of achieving basic national 
reconciliation. 
 
--The economic situation is improving, although the main 
barrier to reconstruction and other progress is Iraq's 
inability to apply its growing oil revenues to specific 
development projects. 
 
--The critical U.S. goal in 2008 will be to replace the 
 
PARIS 00000304  002 OF 006 
 
 
Chapter VII UN mandate for the multinational force with a 
bilateral status of forces agreement. 
 
Engaging the Elysee 
------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Levitte on February 14 indicated that the French 
embassy in Baghdad was sending in similar analyses of the 
positively evolving situation.  He said that the French -- 
and specifically President Sarkozy -- appreciate that this 
change was a direct result of the military successes stemming 
from the surge of U.S. forces.  Levitte cited a recent 
high-level GOF strategy meeting on Afghanistan in which FM 
Kouchner opined that a solution would only be possible based 
on fostering political reconciliation among Afghan factions 
-- and not on a stronger military push.  President Sarkozy 
took issue with the viewpoint, citing the success in Iraq 
that was directly attributable to military and security 
efforts.  Levitte added that Sarkozy contended that NATO's 
failure to improve the military situation would risk overall 
failure and the population turning against NATO's presence. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Levitte acknowledged that while the GOF's engagement 
with Iraq has been limited it remains ready to help. 
Unfortunately, this would not include readiness to host a 
meeting of the Iraq Compact for the time being.  Satterfield 
noted our strong hope that France would agree to host the 
next meeting and asked whether that was the final position. 
Levitte replied that it was and explained that the GOF judged 
that taking on the Iraq Compact would risk an overload of 
French international commitments that could have an adverse 
political impact domestically.  France will host a major 
donors conference on Afghanistan and will announce its 
intention to reinforce its military presence there.  This 
will coincide with France moving forward on NATO along with a 
new commitment to ESDP.  The Elysee anticipates these 
decisions will prompt debate about NATO and Afghanistan where 
there has been none before.  Adding Iraq to the mix could tip 
the balance for a French public that has been largely 
quiescent on foreign policy. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Satterfield expressed disappointment with the GOF's 
decision but appreciated Levitte's explanation of the overall 
context.  He noted that we had heard from the MFA that its 
preference to host a meeting on national reconciliation was 
one of the main reasons for not agreeing to host the Compact 
meeting.  Levitte demurred, stressing that while France had 
expressed its willingness to host such a conference, it had 
not made it a precondition to other engagement on Iraq.  He 
repeated that the Compact is seen primarily as a U.S. 
initiative, and the GOF had no desire to see the debate in 
France turn in the wrong direction.  Sarkozy continues to 
want to help with Iraq but hopes another European country 
would be willing to host the Compact meeting this time. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Turning to other areas in which we hope France can 
help, Satterfield called on France to do more with Iraq's 
neighbors and to help with respect to humanitarian relief, 
improving Iraq's health care system, and with internally 
displaced persons.  He provided Levitte an update of the 
paper he had left in late December on ideas about how France 
could play a significant role in Iraq.  Satterfield pointed 
out, for example, that the rules governing the International 
Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) have changed to 
allow donor countries to earmark their funds to accomplish 
specific goals.  This could allow France to contribute for 
internally displaced persons, if that was what it would 
prefer to do.  Satterfield referred to French and EU training 
in the legal and judicial fields to say we hope that France 
would seek to undertake more such activities in Iraq itself. 
The GOI would prefer this, and we could come up with creative 
proposals to make it happen.  Returning to the need for 
greater regional support, Satterfield referred to President 
Bush's campaign to get Iraq's Sunni neighbors more involved 
and engaged with the GOI.  French help with Iraq's neighbors 
would be greatly appreciated. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Levitte mentioned that the French and U.S. 
presidents were in the Gulf region at the same time last 
month.  None of the Gulf leaders with whom Sarkozy met wanted 
to discuss Iraq at length.  Saudi King Abdallah did not raise 
Iraq or Iran and preferred to focus on Lebanon.  Satterfield 
responded that we hope France will lend its important voice 
to promote closer engagement by Iraq's neighbors as France 
assumes the EU presidency, and he said we would welcome 
French assistance in the run up to the next neighbors 
ministerial in Kuwait in April. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Levitte asked for U.S. views on Iran in the context 
of Iraq.  Satterfield replied that this was a timely question 
in light of the last-minute cancellation of 
 
PARIS 00000304  003 OF 006 
 
 
U.S./Iraqi/Iranian talks.  We do not know what Tehran's 
calculation is, but Iran might be waiting for President 
Ahmadi-Nejad's upcoming visit to Iraq before proceeding with 
talks.  Perhaps there is significant internal disagreement. 
Right now, it seems the Iranians are continuing the dialogue 
as a tactic but are refusing any real engagement.  Levitted 
offered to ask the French embassy in Tehran for its analysis 
of Iranian motives.  He added that France believes the 
Iranians see themselves as currently the dominant regional 
power and want to keep Iraq weak and to see U.S. forces in 
Iraq suffering.  The French argue that real democracy taking 
root in Iraq would pose a threat to Iran's interests. 
 
¶9.  (U)  As the meeting finished, Levitte provided a copy of 
the official French response to Satterfield's earlier paper. 
Embassy has transmitted a scanned copy of the text to the 
Department via e-mail. 
 
Meetings at the MFA 
------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  Satterfield, accompanied by visiting France deskoff 
Cervetti and poloff, met February 15 with acting NEA 
A/S-equivalent Gilles Bonnaud, French inter-ministerial 
coordinator for Iraq reconstruction Xavier Roze, and French 
MFA Iraq desk officer Olivier Masseret.  In addition to 
covering the core points in para 2, Satterfield praised UN 
special representative de Mistura's efforts to help defuse 
tension in the Kurdish areas.  He also briefed the French on 
our interactions with Turkey over Turkish military operations 
against the PKK. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Satterfield handed over a copy of the revised paper 
referred to in para 6 and noted that we had received a 
response to the earlier version.  In response to 
Satterfield's observation that the GOF is not currently 
interested in hosting the next Iraq Compact meeting  Bonnaud 
emphasized that France is not against the Compact but would 
prefer to see a more positive evolution of the political 
situation first.  France is concerned that the Compact is too 
focused on economic and commercial elements.  Iraq is not a 
poor country, and France did not want to risk having some 
Iraqi leaders manipulate international economic assistance 
for their personal enrichment.  Bonnaud reiterated FM 
Kouchner's readiness to organize a national reconciliation 
conference along the lines of the Selle-Saint-Cloud 
conference of Lebanese leaders. 
 
¶12.  (C)  Satterfield rejoined that neither the Iraqis nor we 
see hosting a national reconciliation conference as a 
priority.  Of greater importance is support for Iraq's 
economy and diplomatic engagement with Iraq's neighbors.  He 
repeated USG hopes that France would use its upcoming EU 
presidency to engage with Iraq's neighbors.  Bonnaud 
responded that FM Kouchner is prepared to attend the 
neighbors conference set to occur in Kuwait this April.  He 
offered France's analysis that Iran had interfered positively 
to cause Muqtada al-Sadr to show restraint but expressed 
concern that Iranian FM Mottaki's attendance at recently 
slain Hizballah leader 'Imad Mughniya's funeral in Beirut as 
a worrisome sign.  Satterfield replied by offering our 
analysis that al-Sadr and other Jaysh al-Mahdi leaders had 
opted for a cease-fire in prudent acknowledgment that the GOI 
would stand up to it in future confrontation.  Fissures 
within the movement were also a factor tending toward further 
restraint.  Iran's motivations, however, were more difficult 
to read.  According to Satterfield, Iran currently feels 
overconfident and is perhaps less interested than it had been 
in dialing back the activities of armed Iraqi groups over 
which it has influence. 
 
¶13.  (C)  French inter-ministerial coordinator for Iraq 
reconstruction Roze asked about economic conditions in Iraq. 
The French analysis is that there are some signs of 
macroeconomic progress, but the provision of basic services 
and the economic wellbeing of individual Iraqis have not 
changed enough.  Satterfield responded that food is plentiful 
but basic services have not kept pace.  Electricity 
generation is up, but the demand is outstripping supply.  The 
real challenge, Satterfield continued, is to ensure the 
security of power lines and to upgrade the transmission 
system and the infrastructure for delivering electricity to 
homes and businesses.  For this, the Iraqis again have the 
money but need outside technical help.  Satterfield linked 
these difficulties to the overall ill state of the 
hydrocarbon industry and infrastructure to refine and 
distribute fuels domestically. 
 
¶14.  (C)  When Roze raised French problems with IRFFI funds, 
Satterfield referred to new rules that allow states to 
earmark their funds.  When Roze linked security conditions to 
 
PARIS 00000304  004 OF 006 
 
 
inefficiencies related to development projects, Satterfield 
countered that security is less the issue than weak Iraqi 
institutional capacity to spend its revenues and to build in 
a way that meets Iraq's real needs.  This is why there is 
still a need for a transitional phase of international 
support despite the mounting reserve of funds from which Iraq 
can draw.  Returning to the Compact, Satterfield argued that 
its primary purposes -- forcing Iraq to abide by market 
forces as it undertakes economic reform and attracting 
foreign private sector and commercial investment -- were 
fully consistent with Iraq's economic needs. 
 
¶15.  (C)  Bonnaud mentioned that the French embassy's branch 
office was operational.  Satterfield said we will soon have a 
larger regional office of our own in Irbil and hope we can 
work together and provide any assistance the French operation 
might need. 
 
¶16.  (C)  Satterfield, accompanied by polmincouns and poloff, 
met later the same day with FM Kouchner's special adviser for 
crises and conflicts, Eric Chevallier, who offered to discuss 
the French decision not to host the Compact once more with 
Kouchner.  Chevallier was not optimistic, given concern about 
overload from all the other French-hosted meetings, but he 
agreed that hosting the Compact would be consistent with 
Kouchner's desire to help Iraq in some concrete way.  (Note: 
Chevallier reported to us later tha he had raised the Compact 
again with Kouchner, who declined to reconsider the French 
position.)  In response to Satterfield's other points about 
the inadvisability of a Selle-Saint-Cloud-type national 
reconciliation conference, our preference that France engage 
with Iraq's neighbors, and the new mechanism for earmarking 
IRFFI contributions, Chevallier said they were all "clear 
messages" that he would convey to Kouchner.  He confirmed 
that Kouchner would attend the expanded Neighbors Conference 
to be held in Kuwait in April. 
 
Nerac 
----- 
 
¶17.  (C)  In his Elysee and MFA meetings, Satterfield 
informed his interlocutors that he would seek to get a 
written response to France's request for any information we 
had on the March 2003 disappearance of French video cameraman 
Frederic Nerac near Basra.  He stated, however, that the 
answer was that we had no new information to supplement our 
earlier investigation.  Levitte and Bonnaud expressed 
appreciation for this response and underscored the GOF's 
desire to close this file as much as it can for Nerac's widow. 
 
¶18.  (U)  Following is the text of the updated paper 
Satterfield handed to the French: 
 
Increasing French Involvement in Iraq 
Updated from December 2007 
 
Economic Assistance 
 
--Host a ministerial meeting near May 4 to mark the one year 
anniversary of the International Compact with Iraq (ICI). 
The meeting is needed to focus high level international 
attention on the progress that Iraq is making toward meeting 
ICI goals and on the support that international donors are 
providing, all toward building momentum for achieving the 
Compact,s long-term goals for economic self sufficiency, 
political reconciliation and peace and security.  France 
participated actively in the preparations for the Compact. 
Although most of the specific goals laid out in the Compact 
are economic, the benefits for Iraq are more far reaching, 
including to develop government institutions and fight 
corruption in order to address deeper social and political 
issues.   Hosting the event need not entail any additional 
financial commitment. 
 
--Contribute at least $10 million to one of the Iraq Trust 
Funds of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for 
Iraq (IRFFI), thereby becoming a member of the IRFFI Donors 
Committee.  France,s contribution could be earmarked for 
pressing humanitarian or medical needs, which deserve funding 
even if reconciliation issues remain to be addressed.  The 
next formal meeting of the Donors Committee will be in June 
in Baghdad.  It will be preceded the day before by the first 
meeting of the Iraq Consultative Group (ICG) ) the body that 
represents the international community on matters related to 
implementation of the Compact.  We want France to bring its 
leadership and support to efforts for international 
cooperation on behalf of Iraq. 
 
--Encourage Iraq's remaining creditors to reach bilateral 
debt reduction agreements with the GOI:  These countries 
include China, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Poland, Brazil, 
 
PARIS 00000304  005 OF 006 
 
 
Algeria, Greece, Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar.  Russia recently joined Bulgaria 
and the former-Yugoslavia countries in agreeing to reduce 
Iraq,s Saddam-era debts on terms that meet or exceed those 
of the Paris Club.  France helped to bring this about and 
could do the same with other countries. 
 
Health Sector 
 
--Assist the KRG Ministry of Health and the Central Ministry 
of Health with regional health projects.  This could include 
instituting action plans and preventative measures to combat 
the spread of cholera.  Cholera remains endemic in the north 
and, although, the spread of the bacteria has slowed due to 
the cold weather, another outbreak is possible later this 
year.  Avian flu preparedness is also critical in the north 
and public education campaigns that have proven helpful in 
the past should be consistently repeated.  The KRG Ministry 
of Health has also been interested in Health and Wellbeing 
Programs (quitting smoking, maternal-child healthcare, and 
other preventive measures), as well as focusing on oncology 
issues. 
 
--Provide medical support to refugee camps and IDPs in 
northern Iraq.  The International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) is reporting that conditions for many IDPs throughout 
Iraq continue to be critical.  Medical assistance to these 
people is critical, as many do not have access to healthcare 
services. 
 
Rule of Law 
 
--Help train judges and upgrade court infrastructure.  The 
Iraqi legal system is Napoleonic, making French expertise 
invaluable for capacity-building assistance.  Such training 
could address concerns over judicial corruption and increase 
the speed and effectiveness of legal proceedings. 
 
--Develop youth diversion programming and provide training to 
Juvenile Police and Juvenile Court staff.  The Iraqi juvenile 
justice system lacks the capacity to handle its burgeoning 
juvenile detainee population.  Without system reform and 
capacity enhancement, juvenile detainees might have to be 
mixed with adult offenders. 
 
--Sponsor a training program for the Iraqi security forces by 
the Gendarmerie.  The GOI has requested that any future 
training occur inside Iraq.  Training in northern Iraq could 
be a viable option.  Training in-country is more 
cost-effective; increases the number of people who will 
benefit; and does not remove ISF personnel too far from where 
they might be needed.  Concerns about militia infiltration of 
the ISF would be addressed by putting in place a system of 
vetting of those to be trained, as is the case for current 
programs run by others. 
 
--Provide civil code drafting experts and other professionals 
to assist in the lawmaking process and help establish a 
legislative tracking system.  Because the Shura Council is 
modeled after the Council of State in France and French 
universities have been leaders in the field of drafting 
legislation, the French would be well-positioned to provide 
assistance in this area.  This could include technical and 
training assistance to the Shura Council and training 
seminars in legislative theory and methodology, i.e., 
drafting and analysis.  Training by subject experts in areas 
such as taxation, oil and gas, revenue sharing, 
constitutional law, and federalism would be particularly 
helpful.  We are conducting an assessment of Shura Council 
needs and would be glad to share it once it is completed at 
the end of March. 
 
Diplomatic Engagement 
 
--Use France's position as local EU Presidency in 2008 to 
encourage a greater EU presence and involvement in Iraq (both 
as the Commission and as individual Member States). 
 
--Encourage French to support UNAMI,s efforts to carry out 
its expanded mandate.  This need not necessarily be through 
the provision of specific funds, but could include the offer 
of a French expert to the UNAMI staff and humanitarian 
assistance with the upgrading of local emergency hospitals. 
 
--Participate in upcoming meetings of the Expanded 
Neighbors, Ministerial and Working Groups and encourage 
regional states to make better use of the Neighbors 
mechanism.  The next working group meetings are expected to 
take place in coming weeks.  The next Ministerial meeting 
will take place in Kuwait on April 22, 23 or 24.  France 
could attend Working Group meetings as an observer and use 
 
PARIS 00000304  006 OF 006 
 
 
this and its attendance at the Ministerial to encourage 
regional states to make better use of the process. 
 
--As EU Presidency, and in a national capacity, France could 
urge Arab countries to open Embassies/Consulates in Baghdad 
and elsewhere as a demonstration of their support for, and 
commitment to, a stable and prosperous Iraq. 
 
--Support GOI efforts to peacefully reintegrate returning 
Iraqis and contribute to UN humanitarian appeals for Iraq. 
--The displacement of two million Iraqis overseas and two 
million internally has humanitarian, political, security, and 
development implications, affecting regional and internal 
stability and the eventual reconstruction of Iraq.  Efficient 
and peaceful integration of returning Iraqis will require the 
GOI to finalize a national policy as well as create a 
bottom-up strategy and put the infrastructure in place to 
carry out both.  International humanitarian organizations 
have cautioned that conditions continue to be extremely harsh 
for many displaced Iraqis.  France could contribute to the UN 
appeal for $265 million launched on February 12. 
 
End text of paper 
 
¶19.  (U)  S/I Satterfield did not clear this cable. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
PEKALA