VZCZCXRO7601
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHFR #0187/01 0321820
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011820Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1857
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 1550
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 1157
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1469

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000187 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM UV IV FR
SUBJECT: BURKINA FASO/COTE D'IVOIRE:  FOREIGN MINISTER 
KOUCHNER'S VISIT 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d 
). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner's 
January 27 visit to Burkina Faso focused on Cote d'Ivoire and 
the need to remain engaged on ensuring free and fair 
elections there, according to the MFA desk officer 
responsible for both countries.  The main priority is to 
enable the elections process to go forward so that SRSG Choi 
Young-Jin can certify them as acceptable, whenever they take 
place.  Kouchner's statement to the effect that the elections 
could be delayed for "a month or two" was not intended as a 
suggestion that the elections be postponed but rather a 
statement of fact in view of the still complex work on 
identification and registration that must take place before 
elections can be held.  France's Operation Licorne will draw 
down to the 1,800 level, which France intends to maintain 
until the end of the Licorne/UNOCI mandate, assuming no 
drastic change in circumstances in Cote d'Ivoire.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
Burkina Faso 
------------ 
¶2.  (C)  Karim Ben Cheikh, MFA desk officer for Burkina Faso 
and Cote d'Ivoire, discussed FM Kouchner's trip to the former 
on January 27, following stops in the DRC and Rwanda 
(septel).  He said that Kouchner's two previously planned 
trips to Burkina Faso had been postponed and that the GOF 
wanted to meet with Compaore to express the GOF's desire to 
maintain close and stronger ties with Burkina Faso. 
Specifically, Kouchner wanted to express appreciation for 
Compaore's leadership on Togo and especially Cote d'Ivoire. 
He also wanted to congratulate Compaore for having been 
elected chair of ECOWAS and for Burkina Faso's having 
obtained a seat on the UN Security Council.  Ben Cheikh said 
that Kouchner was well received by Compaore and that the 
visit went smoothly. 
 
Cote d'Ivoire 
------------- 
¶3.  (C)  Ben Cheikh said that most of Kouchner's discussion 
with Compaore focused on Cote d'Ivoire.  Ben Cheikh then 
provided an update from the GOF perspective.  He said that 
the GOF remained firmly committed to the Ouagadougou Accords 
and the peace process that they had put in motion.  There 
was, however, cause for concern.  Little work had been done 
on the two key tasks that must be accomplished before 
elections could be held -- identification and voter 
registration.  Lack of progress in these areas was what led 
Kouchner to state that postponing the elections for "one or 
two months" would be acceptable.  Ben Cheikh said firmly that 
in making that assessment, Kouchner was not trying to suggest 
that the elections "should" be postponed but that if 
technical problems could not be resolved in time, the June 
date could slip with no harm done.  Ben Cheikh noted that 
critics had seized on Kouchner's comments, speculating that 
he was sending a message or somehow trying to manipulate the 
process, but that was not the case. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Ben Cheikh continued that it was not possible to 
determine whether Gbagbo or any of the other political actors 
had a hidden agenda or that they wanted to sabotage the 
elections process.  This remained a possibility.  However, 
Ben Cheikh suggested that Gbagbo and other leaders understood 
that Cote d'Ivoire risked a severe rebuke from the 
international community of the elections did not take place 
within a reasonable period after the June target date, if 
that date could not be met.  Ben Cheikh doubted that Gbagbo 
would take that risk, especially since it was quite possible 
he could win a free and fair election.  Ben Cheikh speculated 
that Gbagbo might have learned from the Togo experience, 
where the Faure regime's standing had risen significantly 
after the successful October 2007 legislative elections. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Ben Cheikh said that France's top priority, which he 
hoped Ivoirians shared, was for elections to take place in 
June 2008 or not long thereafter, and that these elections be 
sufficiently fair and transparent that UN SRSG Choi could 
certify them.  That remained the ultimate goal -- elections 
worthy of Choi's certification and stamp of approval.  Ben 
Cheikh noted that the French were quite satisfied with the 
job Choi had been doing.  He was serious, engaged, and able 
to prod sufficiently but inoffensively in a manner that made 
him effective.  Ben Cheikh had the impression that Ivoirian 
parties on all sides respected Choi.  For his part, Choi 
seemed bent on having the electoral process develop 
successfully and yield the certifiable elections everyone 
wanted. 
 
 
PARIS 00000187  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6.  (C)  Ben Cheikh confirmed that France would begin drawing 
down Operation Licorne, to about the 1,800 level.  He noted 
that the reductions would not be among combat or mobile 
troops.  Most of the reductions would consist of support and 
logistics staff that were no longer necessary since other 
parts of Licorne had already departed before the current 
round of drawdowns.  Ben Cheikh said that, under present 
conditions, Operation Licorne would remain at the 1,800 level 
for the remainder of its mandate, assuming there were no 
drastic changes in the overall situation.  He said that 
Licorne would be able to support UNOCI as mandated at this 
level for the duration of the two missions. 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
PEKALA