VZCZCXRO9758
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0144/01 0591302
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281302Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8621
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1087
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000144 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2023 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY
SUBJECT: CHRISTOFIAS SEEKS EARLY ENGAGEMENT WITH TALAT 
 
REF: A. STATE 18922 
     ¶B. NICOSIA-EUR/SE EMAIL 2/26/08 
     ¶C. NICOSIA 94 
     ¶D. NICOSIA 123 
     ¶E. NICOSIA 134 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  "If Mehmet Ali (Talat) and I cannot solve 
the Cyprus Problem, who can?" pondered RoC President-elect 
Dimitris Christofias in his February 26 meeting with the 
Ambassador, their first gathering since the February 24 
election.  Greek Cypriots had selected Christofias due 
primarily to his moderate, pro-solution views and close ties 
with Turkish Cypriots, the President-elect claimed; he 
intended to justify their decision by winning early CyProb 
progress.  His first tete-a-tete with Turkish Cypriot leader 
Talat, likely in late March, represented a vital first step 
in re-invigorating moribund negotiations.  The Ambassador 
solicited a follow-on meeting to explain U.S. interests and 
programs in Cyprus, and Christofias welcomed the offer.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------- 
POTUS Congrats Appreciated 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Ambassador sought the sit-down with Christofias 
to deliver President Bush's congratulatory letter (Ref A) and 
convey the Embassy's hopes that 2008 see significant progress 
in solving the Cyprus Problem.  Surprisingly energetic and 
showing no signs of campaign exhaustion, the President-elect 
accepted the letter, read it appreciatively, and responded, 
"I'm glad Mr. Bush is not afraid of a Communist Cypriot 
president!"  He immediately turned to the national issue, 
claiming that Greek Cypriots considered him a moderate, 
pro-solution politician whose uninterrupted, productive 
relations with Turkish Cypriot leaders made him better able 
to bring the sides together.  "This is the significance of my 
victory!" Christofias asserted.  A refugee from "occupied" 
Kyrenia himself, the President-elect understood that the 
island's de facto division had caused pain in both 
communities.  With pro-solution leaders in place on both 
sides for the first time, however, the prospects for progress 
seemed bright. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) "Greek and Turkish Cypriots are children of the 
same land," Christofias reasoned.  While they might have 
different ethnicities, faiths, and languages, their customs 
and traditions were similar.  "My friends the Turkish 
Cypriots have more in common with us than with Turks," he 
argued.  Bringing the sides together on a settlement 
therefore was not impossible.  The Ambassador agreed.  To 
complement the formal negotiating process and build a more 
conducive environment for rapprochement, he suggested that 
Christofias state publicly his desire for increased contacts 
between the T/C and G/C communities.  A further, positive 
step might entail the government giving the green light to 
Greek Cypriot newspapers to carry advertisements from Turkish 
Cypriot firms (currently this practice is not illegal, but 
G/C publishers normally refuse the ads out of fear they'll be 
deemed "traitors"). 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Seeking a Formal, Vice Social, Meeting 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Media reported recently Christofias's pledge to seek 
an early meeting with Talat; the Ambassador asked whether 
they had set a date.  Late March/early April was his reply. 
Talat had telephoned on election night to congratulate the 
historic victory, Christofias revealed, and they briefly 
discuss the get-together.  It would not be "to drink a coffee 
at Talat's house in Kyrenia," a commitment that presidential 
challenger Ioannis Kasoulides had made in order to break the 
inter-communal ice.  Rather, Christofias sought a formal 
gathering under the UN's auspices, and would express this 
wish to UNFICYP head Michael Moller shortly. 
 
¶5.  (C) The July 8 agreement would dominate the leaders' 
gathering, Christofias predicted.  He had to hear -- 
"directly from Mehmet Ali's mouth -- the Turkish Cypriots' 
version of why the sides had reached deadlock, and how they 
might break free.  Could July 8 realistically bring progress? 
he wondered.  Christofias aimed to find out first-hand at the 
late March meeting.  He also agreed with the Ambassador that 
Talat's tone and message were spot-on in his February 25, 
negotiations-related press conference, boding well for future 
talks. 
 
NICOSIA 00000144  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
--------------------------- 
An Unhelpful Step Backward? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Not so perfect was Talat's most recent letter to UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon (Ref B), the Ambassador warned. 
 
SIPDIS 
 Talat's letter discounted the usefulness of the July 8 
agreement and demanded reinstatement of the Annan Plan as a 
basis for future negotiations, the latter a clear G/C 
non-starter.  Local P-5 ambassadors and UNFICYP's Moller had 
agreed the letter was unnecessary, inappropriately timed, and 
contradicted the T/C leader's press conference remarks. 
"That sounds like the voice of Turkey, not Talat," 
Christofias replied.  His fellow community leader had a 
tendency to speak rashly, getting himself -- and now 
Christofias -- in trouble.  The President-elect recollected 
an anecdote from an old comrade:  "Talat began his political 
life as a Cypriot.  Later he became Turkish Cypriot.  Now 
he's a Turk."  Christofias, by personally engaging the Talat 
early and often, hoped to make him Cypriot again. He promised 
to treat the latest letter coolly and impassionately. 
 
------------------- 
Opposition Subdued? 
------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Christofias concluded by discussing post-election 
internal politics.  Relations between his AKEL and right-wing 
opposition DISY were bound to improve, he thought, a product 
of his outreach efforts, as House Speaker, to DISY leader 
Nikos Anastassiades.  The right-wing party looked ready to 
rejoin the National Council, a consultative body of former 
presidents and representatives from all major parties which 
debates the RoC's Cyprus Problem policy.  With DISY back on 
the Council, its support for any eventual settlement plan 
seemed more assured, Christofias ventured. 
 
-------- 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Still aglow from his February 24 victory, Christofias 
remains convinced that he, unlike Tassos Papadopoulos, can 
solve the Cyprus Problem.  We agree that the 
President-elect's pro-dialogue pedigree and friendly 
relations with Turkish Cypriots give him advantages the 
crusty Papadopoulos lacked, but Christofias should not 
underestimate the task.  With Talat's recent letter to Ban, 
it would seem the inter-communal honeymoon may have ended 
after only 48 hours.  And should Christofias break his 
"coolly/impassionately" pledge and respond by publicly 
touting the G/C's own redlines, we worry another opportunity 
for immediate CyProb progress could be lost. 
SCHLICHER