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Viewing cable 08NICOSIA106, POSSIBILITY OF PAPADOPOULOS RE-ELECTION WEIGHS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08NICOSIA106 2008-02-13 14:44 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Nicosia
VZCZCXYZ0012
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0106/01 0441444
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY AD5BDE17 MSI8356-695)
P 131444Z FEB 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8562
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5132
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2091
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0039
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 1103
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1067
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000106 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (CHANGED PASS LINE) 
 
ANKARA PASS TO ADANA 
DEPT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018 
TAGS: PRGOV PREL TU SR CY
SUBJECT: POSSIBILITY OF PAPADOPOULOS RE-ELECTION WEIGHS 
HEAVILY ON TALAT 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. Ronald L. Schlicher for reasons 1.4 (a) and 1.4 (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Turkish Cypriot leader "President" Mehmet 
Ali Talat expressed doubt that substantive Cyprus Problem 
negotiations would resume in the event of a Papadopoulos 
re-election February 24, but assured that Turkish Cypriots 
were ready to start talks regardless of which Greek Cypriot 
prevailed. In an hour-long February 6 meeting with the 
Ambassador at the "Presidential" palace, Talat welcomed the 
deployment of a UN assessment mission and voiced support for 
an accelerated July 8 process leading to full CyProb 
negotiations.  He was less welcoming regarding possible 
confidence building measures, however, and danced around 
allegations that the Turkish military's intransigence 
underpinned the failure so far to open the Ledra Street 
crossing point.  Turning to other matters, he blamed European 
Union meddling for the Republic of Georgia's decision to pull 
its flag from a Turkish Cypriot ferry operating between 
Famagusta and coastal Syria, and accepted our offer to 
comment on the less-than-satisfactory "TRNC draft law" 
regulating casinos.  Oddly -- and refreshingly -- Talat did 
not raise Turkish Cypriot "isolation" during the 
conversation.  End Summary. 
 
Papadopoulos stuck on a "vision" 
 
2. (C) Appearing fit and in good spirits, Talat told the 
Ambassador that the fate of negotiations depends on the 
outcome of February 17/24 Greek Cypriot (G/C) presidential 
elections.  "There is little likelihood of progress," he 
warned, if RoC President Tassos Papadopoulos is reelected. 
He compared Papadopoulos to long-time T/C leader Rauf 
Denktash in his intransigent adherence to a "vision" -- in 
this case, G/C political domination and not political 
equality -- which was unacceptable for the Turkish Cypriots. 
Talat warned that the negotiations "will face difficulties" 
progressing under accepted UN parameters if the G/C incumbent 
is re-elected, but promised the T/Cs were ready for 
negotiations regardless.  The Ambassador urged Talat to "stay 
one step ahead" of the Greek Cypriots, and reiterated U.S. 
support for both the July 8 process and UN Secretary 
General's "established set of ideas". 
 
"Revitalization of July 8 or my September 5 proposal" 
 
3. (C) Talat was more upbeat in the event of a win by 
challengers Dimitris Christofias or Ioannis Kasoulides, and 
quipped that he hoped his "comrade" 
(Christofias) emerged victorious.  In the event of a 
Papadopoulos defeat, he believed that the July 8 Agreement 
could be revitalized as a time-controlled preparatory process 
leading to substantive negotiations -- a position he had 
outlined at his September 5 meeting with Papadopoulos and the 
UN Special Representative.  The Ambassador noted that "one 
had to go through the July 8 process to get beyond it to 
substantive negotiations," to which Talat nodded. 
 
"Need New U.N. Initiative" 
 
4. (C) Talat welcomed the suggestion of a U.N. assessment 
mission after the RoC presidential elections and called for, 
without further elaboration, engagement of the two sides in 
 
that process.  He again expressed concern that, if reelected, 
Papadopoulos would work to dilute established UN settlement 
parameters and deny T/C political equality by demanding that 
all G/C refugees be allowed to return to their homes and by 
seeking voting rights based on residency, not native language 
or ethnicity.  Talat added that only Annan V safeguarded T/C 
concerns, while under earlier versions of the Annan Plan, T/C 
welfare had been in danger. The Ambassador told Talat that 
the UN mission should focus on a narrow mandate of getting 
substantive negotiations started; the end-goal must remain 
the establishment of a bizonal, bicommunal federal solution 
along established UN parameters.  Both sides should endeavor 
to make the assessment mission a success and give UNSYG a 
positive reason to make Cyprus a higher UN priority.  Both 
should refrain from posing conditions and preconditions to 
meaningful engagement. 
 
"Problem lack of fundamental agreement, not confidence" 
 
5. (C) Ambassador urged Talat, along with the G/C 
 
presidential candidates, to undertake CBMs, either jointly or 
unilaterally, even before the assessment mission.  This would 
better the general atmosphere for engagement, "give the 
assessment mission something positive to assess," and in the 
T/C case help them to get back to a "one step ahead" posture. 
 Talat, however, was largely pessimistic about the efficacy 
of confidence-building measures (CBMs).  CBMs "were not 
helpful," he argued, because the problem between the Cypriot 
communities was not a lack of confidence, but rather a lack 
of agreement on fundamentals, namely "political equality." 
That said, he appeared willing to seek further CBMs and told 
us that the UN recently had approached him to start talks on 
military de-confrontation measures.  The UN had wanted to 
commence these discussions before broader settlement talks 
resumed, but Talat favored conducting the two concurrently, 
out of fear that wider talks would be stalled forever if the 
CBM discussions went nowhere.  He then added - somewhat 
sheepishly - that focusing solely on military-related CBMs 
might portray the CyProb as solely a matter of Turkey's 
military presence on the island.  The Ambassador again urged 
Talat to deliver on CBMs after the elections but before the 
start of a U.N. assessment mission, and the T/C leader nodded 
in response. 
 
6. (C) Talat voiced bewilderment as to why the Ledra Street 
crossing had not yet opened, attributing the delay to G/C 
pressures on the UN over demarcation of the Buffer Zone (BZ). 
 In his only agitated moment during the meeting, he asked why 
demarcation had been mentioned in the last UNSC resolution on 
Cyprus, implying that it reflected badly on the TC/Turkish 
side.  Talat brushed off a question regarding the role of the 
Turkish military on Cyprus and rhetorically asked the 
Ambassador, "What is the Turkish military doing?  Nothing 
more than before."  He claimed that simple brush-cutting in 
the BZ by Turkish forces in 2007 was "being used against us 
to this day" by falsely showing the T/Cs wanted to extend 
their control further south.  Ultimately, he asserted, 
Papadopoulos did not want Ledra opened, period.  The 
Ambassador replied that the UN had not mentioned any G/C 
pressure regarding BZ demarcation at Ledra and urged the T/C 
leader to take measures, even unilaterally if necessary, to 
open it soonest after the G/C elections. 
 
G/C Pressure EU on Ferry to Syria 
 
7. (C) Talat was certain that EU pressure had forced the 
Government of Georgia to de-flag a T/C ferry that 
sporadically has made trips between Famagusta and Latakia, 
Syria.  The EU's office in Georgia had lobbied Tbilisi hard, 
he asserted, a "fact" he had decided to keep from the Turkish 
Cypriot population.  (Note:  On February 12, "TRNC Foreign 
Minister" Turgay Avci announced that the ferry service will 
recommence shortly, with the boats flying Turkish flags.  The 
route is heavily subsidized by "TRNC" authorities and has 
served as a conduit for illegal migration.) 
 
Willing to Listen on Casino Law Draft 
 
8. (C) Though joint US/UK pressure is one big reason that 
Talat and his CTP addressed the issue to begin with, Talat 
knew little of a much-awaited "bill" to regulate Turkish 
Cypriot casinos, currently under committee study in 
"Parliament."  (Note:  International observers claim the 
"bill" does little to introduce mechanisms necessary to 
monitor flows of money and audit casino operators.) Talat 
admitted that he had "lost the opportunity" to stop the 
establishment and spread of casinos years earlier, but asked 
for our help in improving the "bill" and promised to work 
with the head of the "parliamentary committee" -- an old 
friend -- to that end (Post is working through a USAID 
contractor to 
provide detailed commentary). 
 
Little talk of "TRNC Isolation" 
 
9. (C) Oddly, Talat did not directly bring up the issue of 
"TRNC isolation" or seek direct U.S.-to-Ercan Airport 
flights, a frequent but unrealistic T/C request.  He listened 
eagerly, however, when the Ambassador told him that that T/C 
"isolation" had to be addressed by the EU, and that a 2004 
European Commission decision on direct trade should not be 
allowed to "wither and die" simply because the Greek Cypriots 
 
did not favor the idea.  Talat also welcomed the Ambassador's 
suggestion that the internationally-recognized T/C Chamber of 
Commerce engage the French Embassy (as France will occupy the 
EU Presidency in the second half of 2008) on implementing the 
Direct Trade Regulation. 
 
10. (C) Comment:  Like many pro-solution Turkish Cypriots we 
have engaged of late, Talat is troubled by the prospect of a 
Papadopoulos re-election and its potentially negative effect 
on Cyprus Problem negotiations.  We can empathize.  That 
said, we have attempted to impress upon him that, regardless 
of who wins February 24, Turkish Cypriots must be prepared 
for real and immediate negotiations with their G/C 
counterparts and the UN, and not continue with the stalling 
tactics which gave Papadopoulos a significant tactical and 
public-relations advantage throughout 2007. End Comment. 
SCHLICHER