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DE RUEHMZ #0070/01 0451155
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O 141155Z FEB 08
FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4292
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK PRIORITY 0055
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQUSEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHRL/USDAO BERLIN GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUNICH 000070 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018 
TAGS: MARR NATO PARM PREL GM BO
SUBJECT: FRIENDS OF BELARUS MEETING ON THE MARGINS OF THE 
MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE 
 
REF: MUNICH 52 
 
Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL ERIC G. NELSON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Lithuania organized a meeting of the 
Friends of Belarus on the margins of the February 8-10 Munich 
Security Conference.  The meeting was characterized by 
agreement that the U.S. and EU should maintain pressure on 
Belarus for the release of political prisoners, and by a 
commitment to U.S.-EU consultation on the way forward 
thereafter.  The participants also briefly discussed the gas 
dispute between Gazprom and Ukraine.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Lithuanian FM Vaitiekunas hosted a Friends of Belarus 
meeting February 10 on the margins of the Munich Security 
Conference.  Representing the U.S. were EUR A/S Fried, Amb. 
Stewart and EUR DAS Kramer.  Latvia (Klava) and Sweden 
(Lyrvall) were represented at the Political Director level, 
as was Germany (Stanzel).  The EU Council's Helga Schmid also 
attended, and British Ambassador Arthur represented the UK. 
 
¶3.  (C) The Lithuanian FM began the meeting by giving a 
readout on his recent bilateral meeting with Belarus FM 
Martynov on the margins of the conference.  Martynov said 
Belarus wanted to pursue better relations with both the U.S. 
and EU, but did not want to appear to be "giving in" to the 
U.S. or Europe.  Martynov reportedly noted that Belarus had 
already released three political prisoners and, in accordance 
with Minsk's commitment, would follow through in releasing 
the rest.  Asked specifically about Kozulin, Martynov did not 
want to talk about names, but reiterated the Belarusian 
commitment, and said that "six means six, not five."  In 
return, Martynov said Belarus is seeking progress from the EU 
in three areas: 1) an end to the visa ban list; 2) EU 
cooperation on energy issues; and 3) an end to economic 
sanctions.  Vaitiekunas shared his personal doubts about 
Martynov's trustworthiness, but said that it was important to 
keep pushing the regime to fulfill its commitments. 
 
¶4.  (C) A/S Fried and Ambassador Stewart pointed out that 
progress up to now was the result of U.S.-EU solidarity and 
that it was important to maintain this going forward.  Fried 
said one had to be prepared for Martynov and Lukashenka to 
play games, such as releasing all the current political 
prisoners, but then arresting new ones.  If Minsk released 
all the political prisoners unconditionally, the U.S. was 
ready to suspend the expansion of sanctions, send a 
delegation to Minsk (perhaps jointly with the EU) to engage 
with the government (while also meeting with the opposition), 
and consider revisiting parts of the travel ban and asset 
freeze (at least not expanding the sanctions).  We would 
consult closely with EU partners.  He noted that it was 
important to keep Belarus "in play" to maximize its degree of 
sovereignty vis-a-vis Russia. 
 
¶5.  (C) DAS Kramer pointed out that if Belarus drags the 
release of political prisoners out until June, the U.S. 
government might choose not to seek a waiver on 
Jackson-Vanik, which would have the effect of cutting off 
most U.S. trade with Belarus.  It was important to maintain 
U.S.-EU leverage to gain the unconditional release of all 
political prisoners; it was also important to maintain 
leverage afterwards as well, because there were many other 
important goals beyond release of political prisoners. 
 
¶6.  (C) German PolDir Stanzel underscored the precarious 
situation Belarus was in, squeezed by both the West and 
Russia.  He noted that MFA State Secretary Erler had also met 
Martynov on the margins of the conference.  Erler reportedly 
had insisted on three preconditions for any movement by the 
EU: 1) no repression of political demonstrations; 2) release 
of all six political prisoners; and 3) a guarantee to hold 
free and fair parliamentary elections this fall with outside 
observers. 
 
¶7.  (C) Schmid said it was not in the West's interest to 
abandon Belarus to Russia, but stressed that all six 
prisoners had to be released before any concessions could be 
offered.  That was the minimum pre-condition for engagement 
-- she thought Martynov and Lukashenka understood that. 
 
MUNICH 00000070  002 OF 002 
 
 
Schmid noted that the EU visa ban list comes up for revision 
in March, an issue in which the Belarusian Ambassador in 
Brussels was keenly interested.  The EU would also be 
watching whether the regime cracked down on the Feb. 18 
entrepreneurs' demonstration.  She noted that Belarus had 
already released a statement welcoming ODIHR sending election 
observers to the fall parliamentary vote -- this reportedly 
had really irritated the Russians. 
 
¶8.  (C) British Ambassador Arthur agreed that EU-U.S. unity 
had borne fruit and should be continued.  The UK favored a 
joint EU/U.S. delegation to Minsk once all the political 
prisoners were released.  Swedish Political Director Lyrvall 
said that within the EU framework, Stockholm was examining 
what it could do to reach out to Belarusian civil society at 
the grassroots level, including through student exchanges. 
It plans to upgrade its current "Embassy Office" into a 
full-fledged embassy in the coming months and increase aid to 
some 14 million Euros per year. 
 
¶9.  (C) Lithuanian MOD rep noted that the Lithuanian Embassy 
in Minsk is the NATO contact point embassy for Belarus.  He 
suggested increased defense cooperation, including assistance 
with MOD reform, civilian control of the military, etc., as 
possible carrots for Belarus in return for releasing 
political prisoners.  A/S Fried and DAS Kramer thought this 
could be a good idea, but that it should only be offered once 
all the political prisoners have been released.  Kramer also 
noted that the U.S. would oppose an invitation to Bucharest 
for FM Martynov; attendance should be kept at the ambassador 
level. 
 
Gazprom's Threat to Cut off Gas to Ukraine 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) At A/S Fried's suggestion, the group briefly 
discussed Gazprom's threat to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine 
because of alleged debts.  Participants agreed with A/S Fried 
that it was best to be careful about being drawn directly 
into the details of this matter, given the complicated 
Ukrainian political landscape and murkiness of RosUkrEnergo's 
(RUE) ties both to Gazprom and to Ukrainian political 
figures.  Schmid agreed that the rivalry between Ukrainian 
President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko over the 
fate of RUE was particularly complicated.  Schmid reported 
that she had already told the Russian Ambassador in Brussels 
that the 2006 cut-off of gas supplies had damaged Russia's 
credibility and it might be a mistake to repeat that 
experience.  A/S Fried said the episode pointed up the 
benefits of the proposed Nabucco gas project, which would 
make Western Europe less dependent on Russian-controlled gas 
supplies. 
 
¶11.  (U) DAS Kramer and Ambassador Stewart cleared this 
cable, which was coordinated with Embassy Berlin. 
 
¶12.  (U) For more information on the 44th Conference and past 
conferences, visit:"http://www.securityconference.de". 
 
¶13.  (U) Previous reporting from Munich is available on our 
SIPRNET website at www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/munich/. 
NELSON