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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUNICH 000062 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/AGS, SECDEF FOR OSD RICHARD DOTSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018 
TAGS: MARR NATO PARM PREL GM MW
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH MONTENEGRIN FOREIGN 
MINISTER ROCEN 
 
REF: MUNICH 52 
 
Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL ERIC G. NELSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D 
) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary Dan Fried met February 9 
with Montenegrin Foreign Minister Milan Rocen.  Rocen said 
Montenegro was ready for Kosovo,s independence and would 
control unwanted or destabilizing movement (e.g., 
paramilitaries) across the border while keeping it open for 
legitimate traffic.  In the longer run, Montenegro wanted to 
move forward on recognition in coordination with the other 
former Yugoslav republics:  Croatia and Macedonia.  Rocen 
said Montenegro would be ready for Intensified Dialogue at 
the April NATO Summit in Bucharest.  End summary. 
 
Kosovo and Serbia 
----------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) A/S Fried met with Montenegrin Foreign Minister Rocen 
at the latter's request, on the margins of the Munich 
Security Conference.  Fried noted that Kosovo would become 
independent very soon, and Rocen asked if the rumor was 
accurate that a declaration of independence would occur 
February 17.  Fried said it was likely in February, but did 
not enter into speculation about the exact date.  Fried 
underscored that the U.S. did not plan to press Montenegro to 
recognize Kosovo immediately, for which Rocen said he was 
grateful.  Fried said that the U.S. did, however, want 
Montenegro to keep the shared border open, while ensuring 
that no radical Serbs or other troublemakers of whatever type 
crossed through Montenegro into Kosovo.  Further, we needed 
to embrace and help pro-Western forces in Serbia.  It would 
be a difficult time, but the U.S. wanted to move NATO 
relations with all the countries in the region forward. 
 
¶3.  (C) Rocen said Montenegrin authorities were ready and he 
was confident upheaval could be averted.  With respect to 
recognition, Montenegro would proceed deliberately, consult 
with the U.S. and European partners, and take a decision in 
line with its desire to strengthen its partnership with the 
Euro-Atlantic community.  Rocen expressed the hope that 
Croatia, Macedonia, and Montenegro would be able to move 
forward together. 
 
¶4.  (C) He had spoken February 8 with Serbian President Tadic 
and Foreign Minister Jeremic -- they realized Kosovo 
independence would happen.  It was possible that Kosovo Serbs 
in the north would declare their unification with Serbia. 
Tadic and Jeremic would not recognize such a declaration, 
using the justification that all of Kosovo remained part of 
Serbia. 
 
¶5.  (C) Rocen said there was likely to be a de facto 
partition of Kosovo and asked Fried whether Kosovo would be 
prevented from joining international organizations.  Fried 
said the Russians could block UN membership for Kosovo, but 
they did not have the power to keep Kosovo out of the World 
Bank and IMF.  The international community would not 
recognize separatist moves by Kosovo Serbs.  Fried noted that 
the U.S. and Europe would neither recognize nor tolerate 
Kosovo Serb separatism.  The border crossings would remain in 
international hands, and hindrances to movement, such as 
Kosovo Serb checkpoints, would be taken down.  It might be 
hard to prevent parallel Kosovo Serb institutions from 
arising, but the international community would be ready to 
prevent violence and respond robustly if necessary. 
 
¶6.  (C) Rocen highlighted the "arrogant" Serbian stance and 
said Tadic had told him he would organize a referendum on 
reunification of Montenegro with Serbia.  Rocen agreed with 
Fried that it was an outrageous idea and described it as an 
expression of Serb weakness.  Serbia might also encourage 
separatism among Bosnian Serbs. 
 
Euro-Atlantic Integration 
------------------------- 
 
 
MUNICH 00000062  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Rocen said Montenegro hoped the three Membership 
Action Plan (MAP) countries (Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia) 
would be invited to join NATO together at Bucharest.  This 
would have a stabilizing impact at a critical time and would 
be encouraging for the aspirations of other countries in the 
region.  Montenegro was working hard with NATO on its 
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP).  Rocen joked that 
Montenegro really wanted a membership invitation at 
Bucharest, too, but said Montenegro also would be ready for 
Intensified Dialogue (ID).  He said he wanted to ensure 
Montenegro was not forgotten by NATO; this happened at times 
(especially with some Europeans) because Montenegro was small 
and did not have any pressing international problems.  Fried 
assured him that the U.S. would not forget Montenegro. 
Intensified Dialogue for Montenegro would have an additional 
benefit of demonstrating to Serbia that all the other 
countries in the region were moving in the same direction. 
This was integral to U.S. efforts to help Kosovo and 
western-oriented Serbs move toward NATO and European 
integration. 
 
¶8.  (C) Fried said a major problem related to NATO 
enlargement was the Macedonian name dispute with Greece. 
Rocen thought the U.S. would be able to influence Greece. 
Fried said there was no guarantee - the Macedonians must work 
with UN Special Envoy Nimetz  The Macedonians had made some 
mistakes, especilly on the airport name.  Rocen agreed, 
commenting that some Macedonians had told him that given achoice between the name of their airport and NATO embership, 
they would choose the airport, an allor-nothing view he 
considered short-sighted. 
 
.  (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Fried and coordinated 
with Embassy Berlin. 
NELSON