VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0434/01 0461441
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151441Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6657
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000434 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2018 
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC KNNP PINR AF IN JP IR RS
SUBJECT: DFM LOSYUKOV ON IRAN, PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, 
SIX-PARTY TALKS AND JAPAN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns.  Reasons 1.4 (B/D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In a February 14 meeting with Ambassador, 
DFM Losyukov expressed frustration with the Iranian regime's 
arrogance and inflexibility.  Considering Iranian domestic 
politics, the GOR foresees no serious political discussion 
occurring prior to its March 14 parliamentary elections. 
Losyukov expected that the Year of Russia declared for 2008 
in India would bring the two countries closer, as was the 
case in China in 2006.  Although the bilateral relationship 
is improving, he said India was in no hurry to push forward 
joint work in areas such as civilian nuclear cooperation.  He 
stressed Pakistan's fragility and questioned whether the U.S. 
democracy agenda might be courting destabilization.  Losyukov 
underlined that Russia was constrained by its past in 
Afghanistan when it came to military assistance, but was 
considering aiding certain groups in the North.  He said that 
he remained skeptical of the DPRK's willingness to submit a 
complete declaration of its nuclear program.  Losyukov 
indicated that the territorial issue would keep relations 
with Japan on hold for the foreseeable future.  In March, 
Losyukov will leave the MFA to join the state nanotechnolgy 
company.  End summary. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶2.  (C) DFM Losyukov told the Ambassador February 14 that the 
GOR was disappointed with the Iranian regime, which reacted 
to all U.S. and Russian proposals with the same inflexibility 
and arrogance. The GOR's continuous engagement policy had 
made no difference, he said.  Although there are different 
groups in Iran willing to engage in dialogue, the domestic 
atmosphere precludes serious discussion of Iran's nuclear 
development plans. 
 
India and Pakistan 
------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) After a brief description of PM Zubkov's visit to New 
Delhi this week, Losyukov said he hoped the Year of Russia in 
India in 2008 would boost the bilateral relationship, 
including the current, low USD 10 billion annual trade 
volume. He sensed the Indians were cautious about nuclear 
cooperation with Russia, mindful of the need to balance other 
players, such as the U.S.  Losyukov reported that the Indians 
were watching events in Pakistan closely and were worried 
that their bilateral relationship would be spoiled by 
continuing uncertainty.  Losyukov was most worried that the 
Pakistan government was not in total control. He worried that 
USG democratization efforts in such a "fragile country" might 
risk destabilization. The Ambassador pointed out that 
Pakistan's state of affairs complicates the situation in 
Afghanistan.  Losyukov agreed, arguing that most Pakistanis 
considered Afghanistan no more than a "special" province of 
Pakistan. An additional complicating factor is the disharmony 
between the Pakistani military and intelligence communities, 
he added. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Losyukov seconded the Ambassador's emphasis on 
coordinating international efforts in order to combat the 
narcotics trade in Afghanistan.  He suggested further efforts 
to monitor and stop terrorism and narcotics along the porous 
Afghan borders.  Losyukov noted that the Afghans, unlike 
earlier in the year, were producing "good quality," processed 
narcotics, which meant that the necessary ingredients were 
being transported in bulk from Iran, Pakistan or Uzbekistan. 
The ease with which raw ingredients and final products 
migrate across borders demonstrated the urgency of 
coordination among the U.S., Russia, Iran, Pakistan and 
Central Asian countries. Losyukov suggested the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization as one mechanism, perhaps in 
informal coordination with NATO. To the Ambassador's question 
on a possible Russian offer of military assistance to 
Afghanistan, Losyukov responded that Russia, motivated by 
fear of the Taliban's return, may be willing to support 
certain groups in the North -- despite the suspicions this 
may provoke. Its past experience had made Russia wary of 
geopolitical games in the region, however. 
 
Six-Party Talks 
--------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Losyukov likened working with the DPRK to walking 
through a jungle, machete-ing a path, but getting scratched 
and cut regularly in the process.  He sympathized with A/S 
Hill, but was pessimistic on the future of the talks.  He had 
predicted that the DPRK would be reluctant to submit a full 
 
list of its nuclear programs and since then had heard 
directly from the North Koreans that they would not include 
military programs in the list which, according to Losyukov, 
was the whole reason for the Six-Party Talks. Although he had 
no knowledge of what the DPRK shared with the U.S. team, he 
understood that the North Koreans had a different 
understanding of what was to be disclosed. Losyukov said that 
the GOR backed the USG desire to make the DPRK nuclear-free 
but the Six-Party nations must act together. The Ambassador 
said that the U.S. shared the GOR's frustration with the 
DPRK, but patience and persistence had to prevail.  Losyukov 
suggested that the U.S. could remove the DPRK from the 
"lists" or halt the process as a tactic if there is no 
progress in sight. 
 
Japan 
----- 
 
¶6.  (C) Per Losyukov, the bilateral relationship has improved 
steadily, while the search for a resolution of the 
territorial dispute remains on the agenda. With the long and 
unfortunate history of confrontation still fresh in the minds 
of many in both countries, the issue could move forward only 
with time, when the public is prepared for a compromise.  The 
GOR would be willing to return two islands according to the 
1956 agreement, a proposal that had been rejected by the GOJ. 
The GOR was examining the possibility of creating a common 
economic development zone, where former Japanese residents of 
the islands could return and work.  What is clear, Losyukov 
warned, is that the return of all four islands was out of the 
question. Losyukov said that the GOJ had rejected the GOR's 
suggestion that FM Komura visit Moscow March 20-21 and was 
seeking a PM Fukuda meeting with the outgoing or incoming 
Russian president before the G8 Summit in Hokkaido. That 
would be difficult to arrange during the transition, Losyukov 
thought. 
 
Losyukov to the Private Sector 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Losyukov regretted to the Ambassador that the meeting 
would likely be their last in his current capacity.  He plans 
to leave the MFA in March for a state nanotech company. 
BURNS