VZCZCXRO7081
PP RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMO #0392 0441508
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131508Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6570
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000392 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018 
TAGS: PREL MARR ZF XW RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA ON UNSC DISCUSSIONS ON CHAD, KENYA, 
ETHIOPIA/ERITREA, DARFUR 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 281 
 
     ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 352 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary. The MFA told us that it would send four 
helicopters and 200 personnel to Chad, and was concerned over 
growing tensions on the Ethiopia/Eritrea border, but would 
take a "wait and see" approach to further UNSC involvement in 
conflicts in Kenya.  The GOR believed that international 
pressure had played a critical role in bringing Kenyan 
leaders to the negotiating table and supported and were 
optimistic about Annan's efforts.  The MoD has still not 
decided whether to send helicopters to Darfur.  End Summary. 
 
Chad 
---- 
 
¶2.  (C) In a February 12 meeting, MFA International 
Organizations Principle Counselor Vitaliy Liplinskiy told us 
the GOR had decided to send four MI-24 helicopters and 200 
personnel to Chad (reftel A).  He noted that the GOR shared 
the U.S.'s position in the UNSC, and felt that "some 
progress" had been made on the ground.  He reiterated GOR 
appreciation of French aid in evacuating diplomats' families 
from N'djamena. 
 
Kenya 
----- 
 
¶3.  (C) The MFA issued two statements, on February 1 and 5, 
condemning the violence in Kenya, calling on political 
leaders to restore peace, and noted with satisfaction the 
decision of the two parties to search for a negotiated 
solution.  While the GOR supported the February 6 UNSC 
Presidential Statement, East Africa Section Chief Aleksei 
Filipov told us Russia did not believe that accusations of 
election fraud should be mentioned, as such claims are a 
matter of "internal politics and not the province of the UN." 
 He said Russia viewed the situation as stemming from a 
political crisis that had now turned into a tool for personal 
gain through ethnic violence by the population and through 
political hardlining in the elite.   Filipov told us that the 
GOR supported Annan's call for a political settlement, but 
with an emphasis on immediately stopping the violence. 
 
¶4.  (C) Liplinskiy said the GOR was "optimistic" about 
Annan's chances, owing to his popularity in Kenya, but that 
the GOR would "wait and see" what, if any, actions would need 
to follow in the Security Council.  He noted that the GOR at 
this time was reluctant to consider the specter of sanctions 
or peacekeeping.  Filipov added that Kenyan parties had 
resisted negotiations, but concerted pressure from the 
international community had brought them to the negotiating 
table. 
 
Ethiopia and Eritrea 
-------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) MFA International Organizations Counselor Albert 
Sitnikov told us the GOR was watching the situation with the 
UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in the Horn of 
Africa with concern (reftel B).  The GOR believes that 
Eritrea must end fuel restrictions to UNMEE and end troop 
restrictions in the DMZ immediately, Sitnikov said.  He told 
us that the GOR proposed to demarche Asmara in concert with 
P-5 members, but Beijing believed that it was "not time" yet. 
 Consequently, Sitnikov said the MFA would prepare a letter 
from Lavrov to Asmara warning it of possible consequences for 
its actions.  Sitnikov told us that the GOR was very 
concerned about the situation and felt that, combined with 
military buildups on both sides, any provocation could 
re-ignite conflict. 
 
Darfur 
------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Liplinskiy apologized that our request for 
helicopters for Darfur was still "languishing" with the 
Russia Ministry of Defense, and told us he would contact us 
when a decision has been made. 
BURNS