VZCZCXYZ0706
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHME #0614/01 0602219
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 292219Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0729
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RHMFISS/CDR USNORTHCOM
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

S E C R E T MEXICO 000614 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SECSTATE FOR WHA/MEX, S/CT, DS, NEA, INR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2018 
TAGS: ENRG MX PARM PEMEX PGOV PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: MEXICO-IRAN RELATIONS: A LOT OF TALK BUT NOT MUCH 
ACTION 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Charles V. Barclay for reasons 1.4 ( 
b)(d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) More than a year after a dynamic new Iranian 
Ambassador hit the ground running in Mexico, bilateral 
relations between the two countries have yet to move beyond 
the symbolic. Economic ties remain limited and soft-power 
projections by Iran in Mexico have had little public impact. 
Mexican officials pay a certain amount of lip service to 
expanding cooperation with Iran, but circumstances offer 
little fertile ground for doing so. Moreover, the provocative 
stance taken by the new envoy has caused some Mexican 
officials to take notice and may have alienated some in 
Mexico's small Muslim community. 
 
COOPERATION LIMITED MOSTLY TO SYMBOLIC AGREEMENTS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
¶2. (U) Ambassador Mohammad Hassan Ghadiri Abyaneh arrived in 
Mexico in July 2007 and has been making waves since. In 
interviews and public statements, he freely shares his 
opinions and ignites controversy by discussing, among other 
things, a possible US invasion of Iran, US domination of 
Latin America, and Iran's nuclear program. He is actively 
working to increase Iran's presence in Mexico for political 
and religious ends, attempting to build Mexican support for 
Iran in the international arena and to exert control over 
Mexico's small Muslim community. He is trying to convince GOM 
to make it easier for Iranians to obtain visas for travel to 
Mexico, a change that would allow him to attempt to increase 
Iran's cultural, religious, and political influence in Mexico 
on a greater scale. 
 
¶3. (U) In January 2008, the Ambassador orchestrated a visit 
to Mexico by Ali Reza Sheikh Attar, the Iranian Foreign 
Minister's First Deputy, who discussed bilateral economic 
cooperation with a variety of executive and legislative 
branch officials. While here, the Deputy Foreign Minister 
said that enhancing ties to Latin America is a foreign policy 
priority for Iran. Such ties stand to serve Iran politically 
by increasing international support for its government and 
its policies as well as religiously by allowing Iran to 
exercise influence over Latin America's Muslim communities. 
According to press reporting, the Iranian president 
instructed Tehran's Latin American ambassadors last month to 
present Iran's potential cooperation to Latin American 
governments and to emphasize that Iran is opposed to the 
"domination" imposed by the "empire" (the United States). 
Iran has already established close ties with Cuba, Venezuela, 
Bolivia, and Nicaragua. 
 
¶4. (U) Despite some encouraging noises from Mexican 
officials, however, the country offers little fertile ground 
for significantly expanded ties. Concrete economic 
cooperation between Mexico and Iran is quite limited. The two 
governments have made several symbolic pledges to hold 
meetings and focus on increasing economic cooperation and 
trade -- which stands just below $40 million, three fourths 
of which is Mexican exports to Iran. The most specific 
proposal involves sharing information about the Iranian 
experience of opening its oil sector to private investment -- 
an issue of great interest to Mexico as discussion of energy 
reform gets underway. 
 
¶5. (U) Deputy Minister Sheikh Attar's Mexican interlocutors 
ventured that energy cooperation might be a possibly fruitful 
area. Deputy Foreign Minister Lourdes Aranda said that the 
GOM would be willing to learn about Iran's experience of 
allowing private investment in its oil sector. Likewise, 
Chamber of Deputies President Ruth Zavaleta described 
Iranian-Mexican cooperation as very important and called for 
drawing on Iran's experience in energy as Mexico attempts to 
address the issues facing Pemex, Mexico's state-owned oil 
company. 
 
¶6. (U) However, there has been no indication that the GOM 
seriously intends to plumb Iranian expertise as a model for 
its own halting efforts to reform the energy sector here. 
Mexican officials are more interested in learning from the 
successful experiences of Brazil and the Nordic countries as 
they seek to find a politically acceptable reform package. 
 
 
¶7. (U) Apart from economic issues, Mexican officials have 
said the cultural arena offers possibilities for expanding 
ties with Iran. These gestures are mostly symbolic and are 
backed by limited substance. In her January meeting with Ali 
Reza Sheikh Attar, Deputy FM Aranda stressed cooperation 
between the two countries in the field of culture and history 
and called the 2007 display of Persian artifacts at Mexico's 
National Anthropology Museum a successful experience in 
cultural cooperation. Additionally, Luis Ortiz Monasterio 
Castellanos, Mexico's Ambassador to Iran, told the Iranian 
Foreign Minister that Mexico's great fondness for Iranian 
culture and art is an asset for strengthening bilateral ties. 
Such soft cooperation is not new; cultural exchanges also 
took place under President Fox. However, Mexican appetites 
for such exotica are growing only slowly and there is little 
evidence of keen appreciation among the public for a steady 
diet of Farsi films and artifacts that would soften the turf 
for its closer identification with Iranian political and 
diplomatic interests. 
 
CALDERON'S STANCE TOWARD IRAN 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) Calderon too has made occasionally positive-sounding, 
but largely empty, gestures toward Iran.  In December 2007, 
he met former Iranian President Mohamed Khatami and agreed 
with the latter (who made a thinly veiled assessment of the 
U.S.-Iran face off) that dialogue and negotiation were the 
way to deal with differences between countries. Last year, 
while receiving Ambassador Ghadiri Abyeneh's credentials, he 
noted his interest in expanding relations and said Mexico was 
ready to promote ties with a variety of regional and 
international actors. 
 
¶9. (U) However, unlike Venezuela's Chavez and Nicaragua's 
Ortega, who have offered truly warm welcomes to Iranian 
overtures, it is obvious that Calderon is not inclined to 
actively pursue the relationship. His pragmatic approach to 
foreign policy issues and desire to focus on Mexico's 
relationships with Latin American, the United States, and 
other important economic players will keep Iran from the top 
of the list of countries his administration actively courts 
in an effort to enhance ties. 
 
IRAN PLAYS TO MEXICO'S SENSITIVITIES 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (U) Mexico's longstanding foreign policy mantras -- 
"sovereignty and self-determinism" -- offer Iran its most 
useful leverage here. Iranian officials understand Mexico's 
cold-war era non-alignment fundamentals and its sensitivities 
surrounding living in the shadow of the United States. They 
play to these in seeking better ties and concrete Mexican 
support for Iran's positions on issues such as its nuclear 
development program.  In their public statements, Iranian 
officials have said pointedly that Iran trusts that Mexico's 
premium on autonomy and even-handedness in its foreign 
relations will permit expanded bilateral projects with Iran 
-- notwithstanding its close relationship with the United 
States. (Comment:  Post's contacts with SRE on Iran, in 
particular, have been colored by that institution's 
traditional diplomatic defaults. SRE has typically 
demonstrated little concern with Iran's push to shore up ties 
in the region and its nuclear ambitions. End Comment.) 
 
¶11. (U) Ambassador Ghadiri Abyaneh is especially adept at 
playing to Mexico's sensitivities and framing issues 
involving Iran -- no matter how fanciful -- in ways that make 
GOM support for Iran seem natural. In a December interview 
with La Jornada, he said he was confident Mexico would 
support Iran's right to develop a nuclear program with 
peaceful ends. He also said calling Latin America the United 
States' backyard was an insult to the region, adding that 
Iran is waiting for the day when Latin America will break 
free and discover the falsehood of the "American dream." He 
insisted that Latin America is underdeveloped and its people 
are forced to emigrate because of a history of US dominance 
in the region. Finally, Ghadiri Abyaneh said that because 
Mexico spoke out against US intervention in Iraq, he expects 
that Mexico will maintain that commitment to non-intervention 
in the future, noting that silence on the part of other 
countries in the face of a US attack on Iran would amount to 
 
participating in the war. 
 
 
ISRAEL'S INTEREST IN CONTAINING IRANIAN INFLUENCE 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶12. (C) Israel has an interest in Iranian influence in Latin 
America. A high-ranking Israeli official urged Mexican 
authorities in November to keep their eyes open and prevent 
Iranian citizens from penetrating Mexican territory, 
stressing that Iran is a strategic enemy of Israel that had 
committed terrorist attacks against Israeli centers and 
embassies in foreign nations. 
 
¶13. (S) The Political Counselor met recently with the Israeli 
DCM to discuss Mexico-Iran relations. He said Israel believes 
CISEN, Mexico's intelligence service, has a handle on any 
security issues related to the increased Iranian presence in 
Mexico. He also said that the Israelis themselves are 
watching for the entrance of Iranians who could be coming to 
Mexico for questionable reasons. He said they have not yet 
seen evidence of any such activity but will continue to focus 
on it here and in the region. He noted his government's 
concerns that Iran's attempt to increase its influence in 
Latin America, if successful, could provide a beachhead or 
network for future activities against Israeli interests. 
 
¶14.  (S) While he signaled concerns with Iran's intentions 
and the energy being put into furthering them by its 
Ambassador here, the Israeli DCM also said Ghadiri Abyaneh 
may have been too bold in his public posture and activities. 
He has drawn the attention of Mexican officials, both within 
SRE and CISEN and may also have alienated at least some 
members of Mexico's small Muslim community, who shy away from 
associating with him out of fear that his presence and 
activities will do more harm than good. (Comment: We too have 
been told by officials at both organizations that they are 
monitoring the Ambassador's activities carefully. End 
Comment.) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶15. (C) We suspect that much as it would like to cultivate 
Mexico as part of a regional strategy, Tehran probably 
recognizes that even its ambitious and energetic Ambassador 
faces an uphill battle. Ghadiri Abyaneh is no doubt operating 
under the same set of marching orders given to all of Iran's 
envoys in Latin America. While he's made a bit of headway, 
the Mexican government and public remain focused elsewhere 
and not particularly receptive. 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
GARZA