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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000209 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN AND DRL 
NSC FOR ALVARADO/FISK 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR BONICELLI, CARDENAS, KITE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA: THE PACTO STRIKES A DOUBLE BLOW AGAINST 
THE OPPOSITION AND FREE ELECTIONS 
 
REF: MANAGUA 153 
 
Classified By: Charge Richard Sanders, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) On February 20, the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) 
delivered a double blow to democratic opposition efforts to 
unify in the November municipal elections.  First, ignoring 
an appeal by all parties (other than the FSLN), the CSE voted 
to confirm the municipal electoral calendar which requires 
all political alliances to register by March 3 and all 
candidates to register by March 14.  In a second, and more 
devastating decision, the CSE stripped Eduardo Montealegre of 
the presidency of the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) party 
and handed it to his arch-rival Eliseo Nunez.  Montealege has 
reorganized his earlier movement, "Vamos con Eduardo," and is 
urging his former supporters to register under the banner of 
the Independent Liberal Party (PLI).  The CSE decision 
effectively eliminates the ALN as the leading anti-Pacto 
party, exacerbates the division among the Liberals, and 
leaves little time for the opposition parties to find and 
register a suitable alternative for the upcoming elections. 
Moreover, the decisions will reinforce the control of 
ex-President Arnoldo Aleman over the Liberals and the 
continuing power of the Pacto between Aleman and President 
Ortega for the foreseeable future.  End Summary. 
 
 
MOVING UP THE ELECTORAL CALENDAR 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) On February 20, the CSE issued a decision to confirm 
its earlier draft electoral calendar for the November 
municipal elections.  The new calendar requires that all 
political alliances register by March 3 and that all 
candidates for the elections be registered by March 14. 
Candidates names will be published by April 14.  By 
comparison, in the November 2004 municipal elections, 
candidates could register between May 7 and July 16 and 
alliances had to be declared by May 7.  The leading political 
parties had written to the CSE opposing the draft calendar 
and requested at least a one month delay in registration. 
Unlike in previous elections, when the calendar was mutually 
agreed by the parties and CSE through negotiation, the CSE 
summarily rejected the parties' request and voted to uphold 
the initial draft.  Magistrates Emett Lang, Jose Luis 
Villavicencio, Jose Miguel Cordoba and Roberto Rivas voted in 
favor the decision.  Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC) 
magistrates Luis Benavidez, Jose Marenco Cardenal and Rene 
Herrera voted against the new calendar. 
 
¶3. (U) CSE Chief Magistrate Rivas explained that the decision 
to move up the calendar was made because all the parties had 
sufficient time to prepare for the elections and that the CSE 
needed additional time to prepare due to the lack of 
resources.  He noted that all parties were informed of the 
elections on November 5, 2007 and thus had a year to prepare, 
while in the previous elections parties were not notified 
until January or February of the election year. 
 
¶4. (C) The change in the dates for alliance and candidate 
registration effectively ends the agreement between the ALN 
and PLC to put up joint candidates, selected via primaries 
(reftel).  The agreement called for candidates to be selected 
at the municipal level by consensus and, if consensus could 
not be reached, by means of primary elections to be held in 
April.  With slightly more than two weeks until candidate 
registration, ALN and PLC party officials tell us that 
organizing primaries will be practically impossible.  PLC 
President Jorge Castillo Quant, cynically shedding crocodile 
tears, publicly "regretted" the decision and suggested it 
would "force" the PLC to individually select candidates 
("dedazo") instead of through an open primary process -- an 
outcome the PLC leadership had been seeking for some time. 
PLC Deputy Enrique Quinonez, who is running for vice-mayor of 
Managua against Aleman's hand-picked crony, Maria Haydee 
Osunza Ruiz, denounced the decision "a fraud," called upon 
the Liberal magistrates of the CSE to renounce the decision, 
and is now urging the PLC leadership for the Managua 
municipality to convene primaries on March 10.  
 
CSE STRIPS ALN FROM MONTEALEGRE 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) On the same day, the CSE delivered a second and more 
serious blow the democratic opposition when it voted to strip 
the presidency of the ALN from Eduardo Montealegre and return 
it and legal authority over the party and its assets to rival 
(and Aleman confidante) Eliseo Nunez Sr.  Nunez, the original 
founder of the ALN and its predecessor the Movement for 
Liberal Salvation (MSL), has long opposed Montealegre's 
leadership and had appealed to the CSE to overturn the 
decision April 2006 ALN convention that elected Montealegre 
president. 
 
¶6. (C) ALN officials believed that the issue had been settled 
earlier this year.  They received a preliminary finding late 
in 2007 from the CSE upholding Montealegre's election and 
multiple communications from the CSE formally recognizing 
Montealegre as ALN president.  On February 20, however, in a 
surprise move, the CSE issued a new ruling that the executive 
committee at the time of the April 2006 convention did not 
have the authority to merge the MSL and Montealegre's 
organization, Vamos con Eduardo, into the ALN and thereby 
nullified Montealegre's election.  It also determined that 
there were a large number of "irregularities and 
deficiencies" in the ALN's statutes that need to be resolved, 
including the election of several new municipal and 
departmental level structures, notably those in Matagalpa. 
 
¶7. (C) The CSE decision will also affect the upcoming process 
to form new Municipal and Departmental Electoral Commissions 
(CEMs and CEDs), for the purpose of conducting the municipal 
elections.  Electoral regulations award seats on the CEMs and 
CEDs to the two top vote winners from the previous election. 
For the November 2008 elections, that would mean the FSLN and 
ALN get to split the seats to the exclusion of the PLC.  The 
CSE decision will mean that the ALN under Nunez gets to form 
the commissions.  However, as most members of the ALN are 
expected to defect the organization (see below), the ALN will 
not have sufficient members to staff the commissions. 
Conveniently, in a February 20 press conference, Aleman 
offered to "help" Nunez with activists from the PLC to help 
form the commissions.  In effect, the PLC will be able to 
retain its seats on the commissions and continue to control 
vote counting and election results with the FSLN. 
 
 
NEXT STEPS - VAMOS CON EDUARDO AND PLI 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) In a later conversation with us, Montealegre told us 
the "ALN is dead."  They have switched to calling their 
organization "Vamos con Eduardo" and have begun re-painting 
party headquarters signs in Managua and other municipalities 
with the new name.  The movement will run under the 
Independent Liberal Party (PLI) in the local elections and 
PLI president and National Assembly Deputy Indalecio 
Rodriguez publicly appeared with Montealegre in a series of 
press events to offer full backing to Montealegre and all 
ex-members of the ALN.  Montealegre noted that they 
immediately began receiving calls from party members 
renouncing their membership in the ALN and requesting to 
become formal members of PLI.  Montealegre suggested that 
they had been prepared for this to happen, though the timing 
was terrible, and most of their activist members and 
sympathizers would have little difficulty making the switch 
from ALN to PLI.  "They will see the ALN for what it now is - 
an arm of the Pacto." 
 
¶9. (C) The more difficult question facing Montealegre is 
whether to proceed with his run for Mayor of Managua. In a 
late meeting with party organizers and PLC dissident Enrique 
Quinonez, opinions appeared to be evenly split.  Some are 
urging Montealegre to withdraw from the race, citing the 
clear intention of the FSLN and PLC to prevent him having a 
chance to win and instead urging Montealegre to remain a 
National Assembly Deputy and re-organize Vamos Con Eduardo 
and PLI.  They fear the political damage of an electoral loss 
would be too great for Montealegre to sustain his political 
career.  Others, including Quinonez, want Montealegre to push 
back, announce his formal candidacy for Mayor, and call the 
CSE moves for what the are - a failed effort by the Pacto to 
eliminate him.  They believe he has not made the case yet for 
being a political martyr and that his early withdrawal from 
the race would doom his political career.  Montealegre had 
not made a decision either way and will use the coming 
weekend for further consultations with party leaders and 
activists to determine a way forward. 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) The decisions by the CSE provide further evidence 
that the Pacto between Aleman and Ortega is alive and well 
and has no intention of letting Montealegre and a united 
opposition gain a foothold in the November municipal 
elections that could damage the power sharing agreement.  The 
decisions render the ALN-PLC agreement essentially 
meaningless and will ensure that, to a large extent, the 
Liberal forces remain divided.  The advanced calendar will 
facilitate Aleman's efforts to keep tight control over the 
PLC structure and select candidates at the local level 
beholden personally to him alone.  Moreover, the PLC and FSLN 
will continue their control over the electoral commissions, 
reducing the likelihood that the elections will be free and 
fair.  The anti-Pacto Liberal movement will continue, despite 
the setbacks created by these decisions, and over the 
long-term may be able to build a better political 
organization from a stronger position without the internal 
divisions and legal problems.  However, their task to gain 
seats in the municipal elections has become much more 
difficult and they will have little resources on hand to 
initiate the rebuilding effort. 
SANDERS