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FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7455
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000110 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KPKO CG
SUBJECT:  CNDP Returns to Military Committee in Goma 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  After a rocky couple of days, with revolts first 
by CNDP and then by Mai Mai, Vice-Admiral Etumba's effort to bring 
armed groups in North Kivu together concluded with symbolic success 
January 31, even if confusion continued to reign.  MONUC announced 
setting up a cell for verifying ceasefire violations with the object 
of reducing the groups' tendency to resort to the media.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) After the CNDP walkout January 29 of the second meeting 
with armed groups in North Kivu under the co-chairmanship of FARDC 
Vice-Admiral Didier Etumba and MONUC SRSG Chief of Staff John 
Almstrom and Eastern Division commander General Bikram Singh, MONUC 
and international facilitators (EU, UK, U.S.) spent the day January 
30 trying to salvage the effort to bring some consensus on next 
steps, with a particular focus on how to handle ceasefire 
violations.  In a long meeting with Etumba and 8th Military Region 
commander General Vainqueur Mayala, Almstrom, Singh, and 
facilitators stressed that it was essential not to corner CNDP and 
ineffective at this stage to try to get consensus on a timetable for 
disengagement and brassage (Article 2 of the Kivus conference's Acte 
d'Engagement), when the first step was to promote respect for the 
ceasefire (Article 1). 
 
¶3. (SBU) Etumba said that he well understood the real weight of CNDP 
versus the Mai Mai groups.  CNDP should, he said, understand that 
there would be no decisions without consensus.  Singh said that CNDP 
would have to have more -- some direct acknowledgement of its status 
as prima donna.  Etumba said that he had specific instructions from 
Interior Minister Denis Kalume (who, he said, would not after all be 
coming to Goma) to get agreement on a structure for the military 
committee and on a timetable, even though he said that no one 
expected the timetable to be followed.  He had garnered Kalume's 
agreement to secure the release of the seven prisoners transferred 
from Uganda, who were the proximate cause of the CNDP's walkout of 
the meeting the day before.  However, he was concerned that the CNDP 
could advance new pretexts for walking out of every meeting. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In a subsequent brain-storming session among MONUC and 
international facilitators, Singh pointed out that there were only 
two significant actors (Kabila and Nkunda) and that the Mai Mai had 
only been "woken up" for purposes of bloating the Kivus Conference. 
International facilitators undertook to contact the CNDP 
representatives attending a reconciliation workshop in Goma being 
conducted by a Wilson Center partner, while Almstrom said he was 
trying to contact SRSG Doss in Addis Ababa for authorization to meet 
or call Nkunda.  (Note:  Almstrom later said he eventually received 
authorization to call, but not visit, Nkunda, by which time the 
issue had been resolved by international facilitators at the CNDP 
delegation level.  End note.)  Singh noted that one of the most 
difficult issues would be handling the FDLR, which was not a 
signatory of the Acte d'Engagement.  He said that the three 
ceasefire violations since the signing of the Acte -- while claimed 
to be between CNDP and PARECO -- largely involved FDLR, with whom 
PARECO was, he said, acting as a front. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The international facilitators proceeded across Goma to the 
Karibu Hotel and, to the consternation of the workshop organizers, 
called the CNDP delegation out of the seminar for a pivotal 
fifteen-minute conversation.  In addition to the military officer 
who had attended Etumba's meetings January 27 and 28, Capt. B. 
Masuzera, two of the most important CNDP political figures, Didier 
Muiti Ngashani and Bertrand Bisimina (both of whom had been members 
of the CNDP delegation to the Kivus conference) participated. 
International facilitators urged them to return to the fold, 
stressing that Etumba was a man of good will and his effort was of a 
technical and ad hoc nature, intended to protect the ceasefire. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The three CNDP representatives were, to start with, angry 
and emotional.  Bisimina condemned Etumba's approach to the 
meetings.  CNDP had not been consulted in advance.  Etumba had 
commenced with a focus on Article 2 instead of Article 1, putting 
the cart before the horse.  He had pressed for acceptance of a 
structure, without any decree from the president as required in the 
Acte.  The CNDP would not accept any structure or timetable imposed 
by the government.  As for the seven persons arrested in Uganda, 
their transfer to Goma had occurred after the signing of the Acte. 
Bisimina and Muiti said that these arrestees had been mistreated and 
meticulously interrogated by military intelligence.  CNDP had 
delivered this information to Kivus conference leader Vital Kamerhe 
before he had left Goma, and Kamerhe had promised that Etumba would 
see to their prompt release, which had not occurred.  There had been 
other harassment of CNDP in Goma.  CNDP needed a strong signal that 
its representatives would be safe in Goma.  Poloff suggested that 
CNDP resume its attendance at Etumba's forum, with a larger 
delegation to include political as well as military representatives, 
in the spirit of discussion of interim technical modalities.  EU 
 
KINSHASA 00000110  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
poloff called Etumba and got his accord to meet these CNDP 
representatives at MONUC within an hour, and -- by now markedly 
mollified -- they agreed. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Etumba-CNDP meeting at MONUC appeared to go off track 
as Etumba assumed a paternalistic air, commencing with half an 
hour's monologue.  He recalled his participation at the Sun City 
negotiations, where he had been as isolated as the CNDP 
representative had been at the meetings January 27 and 28.  It was 
essential that CNDP continue to participate, he urged.  He was 
willing to talk to CNDP privately whenever necessary.  Every subject 
was open to discussion.  It was time for all Congolese to put the 
past behind and build a better future.  As for the seven prisoners, 
he promised that they would be released within 24 hours.  Almstrom 
stressed the need for resuming the meeting, to establish an interim 
mechanism for dealing with ceasefire violations. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Rather than bristling at Etumba's gentle paternalism, 
Bisimina said that he and his colleagues were reassured by his 
words.  They could see that Etumba had the desire to make peace. 
"It is important that Papa have the courage to listen to his 
children."  CNDP insisted that the seven be released, as Kamerhe had 
promised.  They were concerned about the several ceasefire 
violations since the Acte was signed, some of which they claimed had 
some FARDC involvement.  They were also concerned that Etumba had 
proposed a structure and timetable that had not been discussed in 
advance.  Muiti said that, having heard Etumba's words, he would 
sleep better now.  He saluted the initiative of the international 
facilitators to bring them together.  What CNDP had wanted most was 
a chance for a direct talk.  CNDP wanted to work for the good of the 
country, but their members were discriminated against and threatened 
constantly and they needed guarantees for their safety.  An ad hoc 
structure for dealing with ceasefire violations would be a good 
thing for everyone, including CNDP, but they needed more specific 
information. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Etumba said that he was deeply gratified by the 
conversation.  He said that he had feared it could have turned in a 
negative direction.  The government and CNDP would of course quarrel 
in the future, but it was essential that they go forward together 
for the sake of the country.  The parties agreed to resume the 
meeting with all the armed groups the next morning. 
 
¶9. (SBU) MONUC now began to contact the Mai Mai groups to set up the 
next day's meeting and learned that they now refused to participate. 
 The Mai Mai leaders made several complaints:  lack of presidential 
decree, confused objectives, inadequate time to get back to their 
cadres, and -- most important -- insufficient monetary assistance. 
(Note: Before his departure from Goma, conference leader Malu Malu 
had handed 25,000 dollars to every Mai Mai group for the stated 
purpose of informing their men in the field about the Acte, but they 
evidently felt this amount insufficient.)   Repeated efforts over 
the evening and next morning, January 31, brought about a reluctant 
willingness at least to hear MONUC out, on the margin of the 
workshop at the Karibu Hotel. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Almstrom and Singh convened the armed groups (both Mai Mai 
and CNDP), with international facilitator present, and got their 
agreement to attend Etumba's meeting, to occur immediately after. 
They stressed that the meeting would serve all parties' interest in 
promoting an interim means to deal with ceasefire violations.  There 
had been confusion where this effort fit into the overall scheme, 
and in particular how it fit with the Task Force on Peace and 
Security contemplated by the Acte, but it was essential to keep the 
discussion going.  Mai Mai representatives vented their grievances, 
asserting that they were not a tool of the FARDC and could not be 
ordered around.  UJPS Mai Mai asserted that one of their 
representatives had been arrested by FARDC at the previous meeting 
in MONUC itself.  Almstrom promised an immediate investigation. 
Mollified, the armed groups agreed to be present at a follow-on 
meeting with Etumba. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Etumba followed his normal practice, with a monologue.  He 
recalled his meeting the previous evening with CNDP, and praised 
CNDP for its willingness to work together for peace.  He said he 
understood well the Mai Mai groups' complaints and would address 
them.  The timetable would be adjusted by making "D-Day" the date of 
the soon-to-come presidential decree establishing the Technical 
Commission, and the Mai Mai groups would be given seven days within 
that timetable for "sensitization" of their cadres.  The calendar 
would not be "fixed" but rather indicative.  He would address the 
need to "supplement" the funds they had already been paid for this 
sensitization process.  He would also intervene to ensure the 
release of the UJPS officer, as he had done with the seven CNDP 
prisoners.  Without taking any vote or entertaining any discussion, 
Etumba said that he believed he could now assume that all parties 
 
KINSHASA 00000110  003 OF 003 
 
 
agreed to the organigram and chronogram the he had proposed at their 
first meeting, "modified as discussed." 
 
¶12. (SBU) MONUC used the occasion to announce its setting up of a 
24-hour "focal point" for the ceasefire, and handed out an 
information sheet with six points: 
 
-- In the event of information on a ceasefire violation or direct 
threats: 
 
-- Immediately inform MONUC by contacting its special verification 
cell at a given telephone number (MONUC noted that for the time 
being the cell would be staffed by non-French-speaking Indian 
officers, but it would very soon be able to staff the cell with 
francophone personnel); 
 
-- Do not contact the media before receiving the result of the 
initial investigation by MONUC; 
 
-- MONUC will quickly dispatch its emergency verification unit to 
lead the initial investigation; 
 
-- MONUC will re-contact you within 36 hours to inform you of the 
results of the investigation; and 
 
-- If necessary, a meeting will be organized to examine the results 
of the investigation, with the following participants around the 
table:  (a) MONUC, (b) FARDC, (c) international facilitators, and 
(d) the armed groups implicated in the violation in question. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Etumba adjourned the meeting, noting that the next meeting 
would take place after President Kabila issued his decree (date 
unknown). 
 
¶14. (SBU) In a discussion after this meeting, Etumba (wishing to get 
back to Kinshasa) pressed MONUC to travel as soon as possible with 
him to Bukavu to convene a similar meeting with armed groups in 
South Kivu.  It was agreed, however, that partly because of the 
ongoing workshop at the Karibu hotel, such a meeting could not take 
place before Monday, February 4. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The prisoners -- previously talked about by the CNDP to be 
seven, but actually eight -- were delivered to the CNDP shortly 
afterward and their liberation was witnessed by MONUC and the 
international facilitators.  It did not appear that any had been 
physically harmed during interrogation, although CNDP had claimed 
that one had been badly beaten.  Human Rights Watch interviewed them 
all in advance of release, and learned that there were only two real 
CNDP, the rest from Ituri, and they had gotten together in Uganda 
just for the ride to DRC. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Comment:  The three meetings led by Etumba in Goma January 
28-31 served to keep the momentum of the Kivus conference going in a 
positive spirit.  Confusion about the objectives of a Goma-based 
security task force was to be expected, in the context of the 
conference leader's inherently confusing and much wider concept for 
the Task Force for Peace and Security, possibly based in Kinshasa. 
It would have been better if one of the conference leaders -- or 
some other senior political figure -- had remained in Goma, but 
Etumba managed well enough.  The key point was his willingness to 
meet CNDP directly, because face-to-face contact seemed to be what 
the CNDP wanted most. End comment. 
 
GARVELINK