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Viewing cable 08HAVANA182, CUBA: LOOKING AHEAD TO 24 FEBRUARY -- SEEMINGLY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HAVANA182 2008-02-22 22:54 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET US Interests Section Havana
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0182/01 0532254
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 222254Z FEB 08
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2918
INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0183
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/MARINCEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T HAVANA 000182 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR D (CONAWAY), P, WHA A/S SHANNON 
WHA ALSO FOR PDAS KELLY, DAS MADISON, TRANSITION 
COORDINATOR MCCARRY, WHA/CCA (WILLIAMS) 
DEPT ALSO FOR INR (CARHART), S/P (MCILHENEY) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINT CU US
SUBJECT: CUBA: LOOKING AHEAD TO 24 FEBRUARY -- SEEMINGLY 
ROUTINE, BUT UNPRECEDENTED IN MODERN CUBAN HISTORY 
 
Classified By: COM MICHAEL E. PARMLY FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D 
 
SUMMARY 
 
1. (S) FEBRUARY 24 WILL, ON THE SURFACE, BE STRAIGHTFORWARD: 
SELECTION/CONFIRMATION OF WHO FIDEL AND RAUL WANT AS THE NEW 
CHIEF OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE, FOLLOWED BY NAMING OF THE 
CABINET.  WHAT IS UNIQUE ON THIS OCCASION IS THAT THERE HAS 
NEVER BEEN SUCH A SELECTION WITHOUT FIDEL BEING FORMALLY IN 
CHARGE.  FIDEL COULD REVERSE HIS 18 FEBRUARY "SHERMAN 
STATEMENT," AND HE IS CHARACTERISTICALLY TRYING TO 
MICRO-MANAGE THE TRANSITION, BUT WE ALREADY SEE HIS GRIP 
SLIPPING AS CUBANS HAVE STARTED MOVING ON.  THE SPOTLIGHT IS 
ON RAUL.  WE BELIEVE RAUL WILL ESCHEW FIDEL'S MEDIA-CONSCIOUS 
AND MONOPOLIZING STYLE OF RULE; THERE IS EVEN A GOOD CHANCE 
HE WILL NOT CLAIM THE SPOT HEADING THE COUNCIL OF STATE, AND 
RETURN TO HIS CONCENTRATION ON THE CUBAN MILITARY, GIVEN WAY 
TO MORE COLLEGIAL, IF STILL DICTATORIAL RULE.  WHAT WE DO NOT 
EXPECT TO SEE RIGHT AWAY IS WHAT THE NEW CUBAN GOVERNMENT 
ORGANS WILL DO IN POWER, AND THE INABILITY -- OR 
UNWILLINGNESS -- OF RAUL TO LEAN STRONGLY TOWARDS ORTHODOXY 
OR IN THE DIRECTION OF REFORM MAY KEEP US GUESSING FOR A 
WHILE.  HOWEVER, RAUL HAS LIFTED THE LID WITH HIS TALK OF THE 
NEED TO REFORM THE WAY CUBA WORKS, AND POPULAR EXPECTATION OF 
CONCRETE IMPROVEMENTS IN THEIR LIVES IS PUSHING GOVERNMENT 
POLICY LIKE IT NEVER HAS BEFORE IN THE 49-PLUS YEARS OF 
CASTRO'S REVOLUTION.  WHILE IT WILL NOT BE TAKEN UP RIGHT 
AWAY, THE ISSUE OF DEALING WITH THE UNITED STATES WILL BECOME 
EVER MORE THE OBSESSION OF RAUL AND HIS TEAM.  RAUL AND THOSE 
HE HELPS NAME ON 24 FEBRUARY WILL THUS FACE CHALLENGES 
UNPRECEDENTED IN MODERN CUBAN HISTORY.  IF IT IS A TALL 
ORDER, IT IS OF HIS AND HIS BROTHER'S MAKING.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
THE 24 FEBRUARY EVENT:  STRAIGHTFORWARD 
 
2. (SBU) WHAT HAPPENS IN HAVANA ON SUNDAY 2/24 IS AT FIRST 
GLANCE STRAIGHTFORWARD.  "GRANMA" LAID IT OUT IN ITS 2/21 
EDITION.  THE 614 DELEGATES "ELECTED" ON JANUARY 20 WILL 
ASSEMBLE AT THE PALACIO DE CONVENCIONES (JUST DOWN THE ROAD 
FROM THE COM'S RESIDENCE).  THE SESSION WILL BE PRESIDED OVER 
INITIALLY BY MARIA ESTHER REUS, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL 
ELECTORAL COMMISSION.  REUS WILL CERTIFY THE DELEGATES.  THEN 
WILL COME TWO DECISIONS, SUPPOSEDLY VOTED ON BY ALL 614. 
FIRST, TO CHOOSE THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY (CURRENTLY 
RICARDO ALARCON), AS WELL AS VICE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF 
THE ASSEMBLY.  AND THEN, TO SELECT THE NEXT PRESIDENT OF THE 
COUNCIL OF STATE (CURRENTLY FIDEL), THE FIRST VICE PRESIDENT 
(CURRENTLY RAUL), OTHER VP'S (CURRENTLY FIVE -- COMANDANTE 
JUAN ALMEIDA BOSQUE, CARLOS LAGE, ESTEBAN LAZO, JOSE RAMON 
MACHADO VENTURA, AND GEN ABELARDO COLOME IBARRA), AND THE 
REMAINING MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL (WE CURRENTLY COUNT 28 TOTAL 
MEMBERS).  "GRANMA" DOES NOT THEN SPECIFY, BUT CUBAN CONTACTS 
TELL US THAT THE 24 FEBRUARY SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY WILL 
ALSO CONFIRM THE MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT; THERE ARE 
CURRENTLY 34 MEMBERS, INCLUDING FIDEL AND RAUL.  THE SUNDAY 
SESSION IS NOT EXPECTED TO TAKE UP ANY FORMAL BUSINESS OTHER 
THAN THIS CONFIRMATION OF NAMES.  DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES 
REPORT ALREADY GETTING INVITES TO WITNESS SOME OF THE 
SESSION.  (WE AT USINT DO NOT, SURELY BECAUSE WE DO NOT HAVE 
FORMAL DIPLOMATIC PRESS RELATIONS WITH CUBA.)  PRESS CONTACTS 
ARE HOPING PART OF THE SUNDAY SESSION WILL BE OPEN TO THEIR 
PRESENCE.  (WE ARE HOPING IT IS AT LEAST TELEVISED.)  THEN 
THEY ALL GO HOME.  NO BIG DEAL, RIGHT? 
 
WHAT WILL NOT HAPPEN ON SUNDAY:  NO PARTY CHANGE, AND THAT'S 
IMPORTANT 
 
3. (S) WELL, NOT EXACTLY.  AS IMPORTANT AS WHAT WILL HAPPEN 
SUNDAY IS WHAT WILL NOT.  THE PARTY STRUCTURE WILL NOT BE 
TOUCHED FOR NOW.  ALL THAT WILL BE AFFECTED ON SUNDAY IS THE 
GOVERNMENT, WHEREAS THE KEY DECISION-MAKING BODY FOR NOW IS 
THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC).  FIDEL IS THE FIRST 
SECRETARY OF THAT BODY.  IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT IN HIS 
 
SIPDIS 
MUCH-TOUTED VERSION OF A "SHERMAN STATEMENT" OF 18 FEBRUARY, 
FIDEL ONLY TALKED ABOUT HIS ROLES AS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL 
OF STATE AND HIS TITLE OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF.  HE DID NOT 
RELINQUISH HIS ROLE AS FIRST SECRETARY OF THE PCC, AND HE 
REITERATED HIS TITLE AS EDITORIALIST IN CHIEF, SAYING THAT 
ALL SHOULD CONTINUE TO COUNT ON HIS "WEAPON" AS WHAT ONE 
LOCAL JOURNALIST CALLS "OP ED WRITER-IN-CHIEF."  FIDEL HAS 
NEVER REALLY CARED ABOUT THE PARTY, PREFERRING A MORE 
PERSONALIST LEADERSHIP STYLE.  THAT PARTLY EXPLAINS WHY THERE 
HAS BEEN NO PARTY CONGRESS FOR TEN YEARS.  RAUL BY CONTRAST 
 
 
HAS REPEATEDLY STATED IN THE PAST TWO YEARS A NEED FOR THE 
STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY.  (THERE ARE CLEAR STEPS BEING TAKEN 
TOWARDS HOLDING A PARTY CONGRESS, AND WE WOULD EXPECT IT IN 
2008:  THE "CONSTITUENT BODIES" UNDER THE PCC UMBRELLA -- THE 
YOUTH ORGANIZATION, THE LABOR UNION, THE WRITERS AND ARTISTS 
UNION, THE WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION -- HAVE EITHER ALREADY HELD 
OR ARE PREPARING TO HOLD IN THE MONTHS AHEAD THEIR 
CONGRESSES, AN EXPECTED PRE-REQUISITE FOR THE FORMAL 
CONGRESS.  BUT THAT IS NOT ON THE AGENDA FOR THIS COMING 
SUNDAY.)  AND WHEREAS FIDEL CLAIMED ON 18 FEBRUARY TO BE 
RENOUNCING HIS "COMANDANTE EN JEFE" ROLE, THAT POSITION IS 
NOT SUBJECT TO ELECTION.  THERE ARE FIVE INDIVIDUALS IN CUBA 
WHO CARRY THE TITLE OF COMANDANTE, BUT THERE HAS BEEN -- AND 
CUBANS ARE CONFIDENT, WILL FOREVER BE -- ONLY ONE COMANDANTE 
EN JEFE -- FIDEL.  THAT JERSEY WILL BE RETIRED FOR GOOD. 
 
WHY SUNDAY IS IMPORTANT:  IN A WAY, IT'S A FIRST IN THE 
CONTEXT OF A GENERATIONAL CHANGE 
 
4. (C) SO THAT MEANS SUNDAY WILL BE ANTI-CLIMACTIC, A TEMPEST 
IN A TEAPOT, OF INTEREST TO JOURNALISTS AND LEFTISTS THE 
WORLD OVER BUT WITH NO CONSEQUENCE FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE, 
RIGHT?  EVERYONE WE TALK TO HERE CLAIMS TO BE CYNICAL, WITH 
THE RHETORICAL QUESTION: "WHAT HAS THE GOVERNMENT DONE FOR ME 
LATELY?" ON THEIR LIPS, BUT EVEN THE CYNICS ARE WATCHING THIS 
ONE OUT OF THE CORNER OF THEIR EYE.  FOR ONE THING, NEVER 
SINCE 1959 HAS THERE BEEN THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF NO FIDEL 
ACTUALLY RUNNING THINGS.  THIS TIME IT LOOKS LIKE HE WON'T BE 
THERE.  THUS ONE OF THE FIRST QUESTIONS TO BE SETTLED ON 24 
FEBRUARY IS WHETHER FIDEL MEANT WHAT HE SAID ON 18 FEBRUARY. 
THERE IS A REMOTE CHANCE FIDEL WOULD ENGINEER A DRAFT, TO 
STROKE HIS EGO IF NOTHING ELSE, BUT MOST BETTING -- AND OUR 
BET -- IS THAT HIS WORDS MEANT SOMETHING, THAT HE REALLY DOES 
PLAN TO SHIFT ROLES.  THE PREDICTABLE MESSAGES OF ADULATION 
AND PRAISE OF FIDEL'S 2/18 ANNOUNCEMENT -- EVERY DAY'S 
NEWSPAPER BRINGS ANOTHER SLEW OF THEM -- ALL STOP SHORT OF 
BEGGING HIM TO STAY ON.  THE REGIME'S OWN POLLING REPORTS 
ARE, WE ARE CERTAIN, BRINGING BACK WHAT WE ARE HEARING:  THAT 
NOBODY REALLY CARES THAT FIDEL IS GOING.  AND EVEN IF FIDEL 
IS STILL AROUND IN PCC AND EDITORIAL WRITER MODES, HIS ROLE 
HAS CLEARLY DECLINED SINCE HIS JULY 31, 2006 "PROCLAMA". 
FIDEL'S OWN STATED SENSE OF HIS ROLE REMAINS THAT OF INSPIRER 
AND SAGE.  WE HAVE SEEN HIM MORE AS A CHECK ON THINGS GOING 
OFF THE IDEOLOGICALLY PURE, ORTHODOX TRACK.  HIS ABILITY TO 
EXERCISE THAT ROLE WILL DIMINISH WITH THE SHIFT IN 
INSTITUTIONAL TITLES. 
 
RAUL'S CORONATION?  NOT FOR SOMEONE SEEKING A MORE COLLEGIAL 
STYLE OF MANAGING 
 
5. (C) SO WILL THIS BE RAUL'S CORONATION?  WE DON'T THINK SO, 
NOT AS SUCH, NEITHER IN A PERSONAL SENSE NOR IN POLICY TERMS, 
AND FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS.  HISTORICALLY, BUT ESPECIALLY 
SINCE THE JULY 31, 2006 PROCLAMA, RAUL HAS SOUGHT TO PROJECT 
A DIFFERENT STYLE:  MUCH MORE UNDERSTATED, MUCH LESS FLASHY 
THAN HIS BROTHER FIDEL.  HE HAS EVEN SAID AS MUCH PUBLICLY ON 
MORE THAN ONE OCCASION IN THE PAST 19 MONTHS.  THE NARCISSISM 
OF FIDEL IS NOT RAUL'S STYLE.  MORE IMPORTANTLY, WHEN IT 
COMES TO THE CIRCLE OF POWER, RAUL PREFERS IT WIDER AND LESS 
UNI-CENTERED THAN FIDEL.  PROOF?  HIS PUSHING THROUGH IN 
MID-2006 THE RESTORATION OF THE PCC CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
"SECRETARIAT," SOMETHING FIDEL HAD LONG ESCHEWED.  RAUL 
CLEARLY FEELS HE NEEDS THAT KIND OF HELP.  THE COMPOSITION OF 
THE SECRETARIAT ALSO POINTS TO THE MANAGEMENT PATH WE WOULD 
EXPECT A RAUL-LED REGIME TO FOLLOW.  LIKE A BRIDE HEADING TO 
THE ALTAR, RAUL'S 12-PERSON SECRETARIAT HOLDS SOMETHING OLD 
AND SOMETHING NEW, SOMETHING BORROWED... YOU GET OUR POINT. 
THERE ARE OLD-TIME/OLD-THINK HARD-LINERS LIKE MACHADO VENTURA 
AND ESTEBAN LAZO (AS WELL AS FIDEL HIMSELF) AND YOUNGER, 
REPORTEDLY RELATIVELY MORE OPEN-MINDED FIGURES SUCH AS 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARY FERNANDO REMIREZ DE 
ESTENOZ AND TRANSPORT MINISTER JORGE SIERRA.  LOOK FOR 
HETEROGENEITY, NOT HOMOGENEITY. 
 
WHEN WILL WE SEE CHANGES, IF ANY?  NOT RIGHT AWAY 
 
6. (S) OKAY THEN, SO WE WILL SEE BIG CHANGES RIGHT AWAY, 
CORRECT?  WELL, NOT EXACTLY.  WE SEE RAUL BIDING HIS TIME, 
AGAIN FOR SEVERAL REASONS.  FIRST, BECAUSE HE IS CAUTIOUS BY 
NATURE, AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN, SINCE THE SIERRA MAESTRA 
CAMPAIGNS OF THE LATE 1950S.  SECOND, BECAUSE HIS BROTHER IS 
STILL AROUND, AND RAUL FEARS WHAT HAS ALREADY HAPPENED TO HIM 
SEVERAL TIMES:  GETTING HIS WRISTS SLAPPED BY FIDEL (E.G., ON 
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES).  THIRD AND PROBABLY MOST 
 
IMPORTANT, BECAUSE RAUL DOES NOT DOMINATE THE PCC OR THE GOC 
LIKE FIDEL, ABLE TO IMPOSE A DECISION WITH THE FLICK OF A PEN 
OR THE GLARE OF A FACE-TO-FACE MEETING.  WE DO SEE 
UNMISTAKEABLE SIGNS OF AN INCREASINGLY FRACTIOUS LEADERSHIP 
IN CUBA.  IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, ALL-IMPORTANT GIVEN THE 
INTENSE PRESSURE THE REGIME IS UNDER TO PRODUCE TANGIBLE 
RESULTS FOR THE POPULATION, THE ORTHODOX CROWD (MACHADO 
VENTURA, BALAGUER, LAZO, CENTRAL BANK HEAD SOBERON, AMONG 
OTHERS) WANT TO STICK WITH TRIED-AND-TRUE METHODS OF CENTRAL 
PLANNING AND CENTRAL CONTROL, WHILE OTHERS, REPORTEDLY 
INCLUDING RAUL HIMSELF IF WE ARE TO BELIEVE HIS 26 JULY 
SPEECH, RECOGNIZE THAT THE MACHINE IS IRREMEDIABLY BROKEN AND 
NEEDS TO BE OVERHAULED.  ON FOREIGN POLICY, THERE ARE THOSE 
(A DECIDED MINORITY) WHO WANT TO STAY WITH VENEZUELA WHILE 
OTHERS, TO INCLUDE -- WE BELIEVE -- RAUL HIMSELF WANT TO RELY 
MORE ON OTHERS SUCH AS BRAZIL AND MEXICO.  CATHOLIC CHURCH 
AND DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES TELL US THE SPLITS EVEN EXTEND TO 
AS SENSITIVE AN AREA AS HUMAN RIGHTS, WHERE THE HARD-LINERS 
SAY "KEEP THE DISSIDENTS IN JAIL FOR DECADES" WHILE OTHERS 
ARGUE FOR GETTING CUBA OUT FROM UNDER THE BURDEN OF A LARGE 
POLITICAL PRISONER POPULATION BY RELEASING SOME, IF NOT ALL. 
CARDINAL ORTEGA, WHO HAS NEGOTIATED HUMAN RIGHTS WITH THE 
GOC, HAS TOLD US IN THE PAST HE SEES ALL THE POLITICAL 
PRISONERS AS "FIDEL'S."  WELL, SOMEONE HAD TO BE NEGOTIATING 
WITH THE SPANIARDS ON THE RELEASE OF THE FOUR LAST WEEK, AND 
JURISTS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY, AS WELL AS CHURCH 
FIGURES, HAVE PASSED ON RUMORS OF MORE RELEASES IN THE WAKE 
OF THE CURRENT VISIT OF VATICAN SECRETARY OF STATE BERTONE. 
SOMEBODY IN THE GOC IS CLEARLY ARGUING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF 
A DIFFERENT LINE ON HUMAN RIGHTS.  THIRD, THERE ARE THE 
NUMEROUS MILITARY AND FORMER MILITARY COLLEAGUES IDENTIFIED 
AND GROOMED BY RAUL IN HIS MILITARY ROLE.  THAT SECTOR IS 
MOST OPAQUE, AND WITH RARE EXCEPTIONS, WE DO NOT HAVE ANY 
HANDLE ON WHERE THEY COME DOWN ON POLICY ISSUES.  FROM WHAT 
WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DISCERN, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE 
TO CALL THE MILITARY REFORM-MINDED.  AS A GROUP, THEY, LIKE 
RAUL HIMSELF, FAVOR EFFICIENCY AND CONTROL, AND NOT 
NECESSARILY IN THAT ORDER.  THOSE UNIFORMED OFFICERS TO WHOM 
RAUL HAS GIVEN BROADER ECONOMIC/BUSINESS RESPONSILITIES ARE 
THEMSELVES A MIXED BAG, FROM REPORTEDLY CORRUPT (CASAS 
REGUIERO) TO DRACONIAN DISCIPLINARIANS, AND THOSE TWO SCHOOLS 
ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.  WHAT APPEARS TO CHARACTERIZE THE 
MILITARY OFFICIALS WHOSE ADVANCEMENT TO THE TOP RAUL HAS 
PROMOTED IS A FIRM LOYALTY TO RAUL HIMSELF. 
 
RAUL:  TRYING TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF AN INCREASINGLY 
EFFERVESCENT SITUATION 
 
7. (C) IS LOYALTY THE ONLY THING RAUL IS LOOKING FOR?  NO, IT 
IS MORE THAN THAT.  RAUL AND HIS CRONIES ARE IN A DIFFERENT 
POSITION THAT FIDEL EVER WAS, AND FACE A BIGGER CHALLENGE 
THAN ANY FACED BY THE REVOLUTION SINCE 1959.  IT IS NOT THAT 
THINGS WERE BETTER BEFORE WITH FIDEL RUNNING THINGS, BUT 
FIDEL DOMINATED THE SCENE IN WAYS RAUL AND COMPANY CAN ONLY 
DREAM OF.  IT IS LIKE WITH THE QUESTION OF WHO CAN SUCCEED 
FIDEL AS COMANDANTE EN JEFE.  THE ANSWER IS NOBODY.  THE 
STATE OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY -- IN TERMS OF THE PERSONAL 
ECONOMIES OF YOUR EVERYDAY CUBAN CITIZENS, NOT THE MACRO 
NUMBERS BATTED AROUND BY THE REGIME PROPOGANDISTS -- HAS 
NEVER BEEN LOWER.  THAT IS A SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENT OF CUBANS, 
BUT IT IS THE ONE THAT COUNTS.  EVIDENCE AND THE RARE 
RELIABLE GOVERNMENT STATISTIC POINT TO THINGS BEING SLIGHTLY 
BETTER IN SOME SECTORS THAN IN THE RECENT PAST, AND CERTAINLY 
SINCE THE SPECIAL PERIOD OF THE 1990S.  THERE HAVE BEEN 
SLIGHT IMPROVEMENTS IN URBAN TRANSPORT, AND THERE ARE 
NUMEROUS REPORTS OF THE CUBAN STATE PAYING FARMERS FOR PAST 
PRODUCTION.  CUBAN NEWSPAPERS REPORT THAT OBESITY, NOT HUNGER 
AND MALNUTRITION, IS NOW THE MAIN PROBLEM OF CUBANS.  THAT 
DOES NOT MATTER TO THE AVERAGE CUBAN, HOWEVER.  THEIR 
PERCEPTION IS THAT THEIR OWN PERSONAL LIFE HAS NOT GOTTEN 
BETTER, AND INCREASINGLY, THEY ARE SAYING SO OUT LOUD. 
CUBANS ARE GENERALLY AWARE OF HOW MUCH BETTER LIFE OUTSIDE 
CUBA IS, EITHER THROUGH RADIO MARTI OR OTHER PRESS SOURCES, 
OR THROUGH CONTACT WITH FAMILY OFF THE ISLAND.  REGIME 
PROPAGANDA THAT CUBA IS DOING WELL IS PERCEIVED AS JUST THAT: 
 TALK.  RAUL AND COMPANY ARE CAUGHT IN THE VICE OF A 
REVOLUTION OF RISING EXPECTATIONS, AND IF CUBANS HAVE MORE 
HOPE THESE DAYS, IT IS BECAUSE THEY SEE FIDEL ON HIS WAY OUT; 
AND BECAUSE RAUL HAS HIMSELF SPOKEN OF THE NEED FOR THINGS TO 
GET BETTER, MOST DRAMATICALLY LAST JULY 26 BUT ACROSS THE 
ISLAND IN THE MONTHS SINCE THEN.  IT IS NOT AN ENVIABLE 
POSITION FOR ANY GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY ONE WITH FEW 
RESOURCES AND LITTLE LEGITIMACY TO FALL BACK ON.  RAUL KNOWS 
HE HAS TO GET HIS SUPPORT THE OLD-FASHIONED WAY:  HE HAS TO 
 
EARN IT.  NOT EASY WITH A MACHINE AS BROKEN AS HIS. 
 
BACK TO 24 FEBRUARY:  NOT YET AN ISSUE OF WHAT, BUT WHO 
 
8. (C)  SO WHERE DOES THE REGIME GO?  IT TRIES TO KEEP THINGS 
HANGING TOGETHER, MAKING DEALS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND 
COMPANIES TO FILL THE POCKETS OF THE FAVORED FEW, AND MOST OF 
ALL, DOING THE NECESSARY TO RETAIN POWER.  THAT REQUIRES, IN 
THE FIRST INSTANCE, THE RIGHT PEOPLE, NAMELY RAUL'S PEOPLE. 
RAUL IS BEING CAREFUL NOT TO ALIENATE PRECIPITOUSLY FIDEL'S 
CRONIES, BUT HE EVINCES NO AFFECTION FOR THEM, AND WE HAVE 
HEARD RUMORS, ORIGINATING ON THE ISLAND EVEN IF FILTERED 
THROUGH OFF-ISLAND COMMUNITIES, OF THE LIKES OF ALARCON, 
MACAHDO VENTURA, FELIPE PEREZ ROQUE AND OTHERS ON THE WAY 
OUT.  RAUL'S CAUTION MAY DICTATE THAT HE ONLY UNDERTAKE SOME 
SHAKE-UPS GRADUALLY, SAY, OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS, AND NOT 
ALL AT ONCE.  IN ANY EVENT, THAT IS WHAT SUNDAY IS ALL ABOUT. 
 WHAT THE OFFICIALS DO ONCE CONFIRMED OR CARRIED OVER IN 
OFFICE IS ANOTHER MATTER, BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE ALL THE TIME 
IN THE WORLD.  ON THE CONTRARY, THEY NEED TO PRODUCE RESULTS 
IN FAIRLY SHORT ORDER IF THEY WANT TO HOLD OFF WHAT CARDINAL 
JAIME ORTEGA FEELS ARE THE IMPATIENT MOBS.  THAT ABOVE ALL 
ELSE IS THE INEXORABLE PRESSURE FOR CHANGE.  REGIME 
PROPAGANDISTS BOAST OF IMPROVING TIES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, 
AND IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS, THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS OF MARKED 
IMPROVEMENT WITH BRAZIL AND MEXICO.  THAT IS USEFUL FOR THE 
U.S., TO THE EXTENT IT HOLDS THE PROSPECT OF FREEING CUBA'S 
HAND FROM THE UNILATERAL GRIP OF THE ERRATIC VENEZUELA. 
FIDEL WAS CONTENT WITH CHAVEZ AS PRINCIPAL PARTNER; RAUL IS 
CLEARLY LOOKING ELSEWHERE, AND AS MUCH AS HE CLAIMS IT IS NOT 
THE CASE, HE HAS ANOTHER GOAL:  A MODUS VIVENDI WITH THE 
UNITED STATES.  FOR SOMEONE WHO REPORTEDLY HAS ONLY EVER BEEN 
IN THE UNITED STATES ONCE (IN 1960 IN HOUSTON), RAUL'S 
OBSESSION WITH US IS UNUSUAL.  NONETHELESS, HIS REGULAR 
MENTION OF A DESIRE FOR NORMALIZED TIES WITH WASHINGTON, EVEN 
IF COUCHED IN OH-SO-CUBAN PUFFING UP OF CHESTS AND 
RECITATIONS OF "I DON'T NEED YOU," IS REAL. 
 
WASHINGTON:  STILL CANNOT FIGURE US OUT 
 
9. (C) THE REGIME WOULD BE STUNNED IF IN THE WAKE OF 24 
FEBRUARY IT WERE TO RECEIVE A CONGRATULATORY NOTE FROM THE 
U.S.  THERE IS LITTLE IT WOULD WANT MORE.  RAUL AND CO. KNOW 
THEY LACK LEGITIMACY.  THEY CAN WHISTLE PAST THE GRAVEYARD 
ALL THEY WANT, BUT THEY, UNLIKE THE LEGEND OF FIDEL, HAVE NO 
STORIES WITH WHICH TO BACK UP THEIR POSITION.  CERTAINLY NOT 
ECONOMIC, BEYOND THE CURRENT PRICE OF NICKEL AND THE HOPES 
DOWN THE ROAD OF OIL AND GAS OFF THE NORTH COAST. 
DIPLOMATIC?  WELL YES, TO SOME EXTENT, BUT THEY ARE SO 
INSECURE THEY FRET EVERY TIME AN ISSUE ARISES IN 
INTERNATIONAL CIRCLES AND THEY HAVE AN INTEREST AT STAKE. 
THE UNITED STATES REMAINS CUBA'S OBSESSION, THAT OFTEN DEFIES 
COMPARISONS.  WITH MEXICO, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CUBANS HAVE A 
FINITE (THREE) LIST OF IDENTIFIABLE ISSUES, AND APPEAR TO BE 
RESOLVING THEM, ONE BY ONE, IN A METHODICAL WAY.  WITH THE 
U.S., THE CLASH IS MORE EXISTENTIAL, BECAUSE OF WHAT WE 
REPRESENT IN THEIR HISTORY AND THEIR PRESENT.  RAUL KNOWS HE 
DOES NOT HAVE A VERY STRONG HAND, ESPECIALLY WITH A RESTLESS 
POPULATION.  THE CUBANS ARE AMAZED AT OUR PERSISTENT LOYALTY 
TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY CLUSTER OF ISSUES, AS THEY 
ARE BY THE COURAGE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 
DEFENDERS ON THE ISLAND AND THE GROWING NUMBERS OF AVERAGE 
CUBANS WILLING TO SPEAK OUT.  HOWEVER, HELPED BY THE FLANKING 
(IF UNEVEN) PRESSURE FROM EUROPEANS AND OTHERS, SOME CUBAN 
OFFICIALS  HAVE STARTED TO GET THE MESSAGE, AS WITNESSED BY 
THE DEALS WITH THE SPANISH AND RUMORED ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE 
VATICAN.  24 FEBRUARY, UNLESS FIDEL DOES A SUDDEN ABOUT-FACE 
AND INSISTS ON RE-EMERGING, WILL BE RAUL'S MOST IMPORTANT 
STEP TOWARDS SETTING A NEW PATH FOR CUBA.  ABOVE ALL, IT WILL 
PROVIDE HIM WITH A BASIS TO MOVE FORWARD.  WE BELIEVE HE 
WANTS TO BECAUSE HE KNOWS HE HAS TO.  HOW FAR HE CAN GO WHILE 
STILL RETAINING HIS CONTROL IS THE QUESTION THAT NEITHER HE 
NOR WE CAN ANSWER.  AS MUCH AS HE DISLIKES COMPARISONS WITH 
ANY OTHER COUNTRY, HE APPEARS TO BE HEADING DOWN A GORBACHEV 
PATH OF GLASNOST (MARGINAL FREEDOMS IN THE CULTURAL REALM AND 
EYE-DROPPER RELEASES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS).  IF HE GETS TO 
START TO PUT IN THOSE PEOPLE HE WANTS ON 24 FEBRUARY, RAUL 
MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO TRY A LITTLE PERESTROIKA IN THE ECONOMIC 
AND MANAGEMENT AREAS.  THEN HE AND HIS COHORTS BELIEVE THEY 
WILL BE ABLE TO MANAGE THE PRESSURE FOR CHANGE.  THEY MAY BE 
RIGHT, BUT WE WOULD NOT BET ON IT.  CUBANS ARE RESTLESS, IF 
REALISTIC PEOPLE.   WHEN THEY SENSE THAT CHANGE IS IN THE 
AIR, THEY WILL KEEP PRESSING FOR IT. 
 
PARMLY