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S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PTER SY LE
SUBJECT: HIZBALLAH'S IMAD MUGNIYAH KILLED BY CAR BOMB IN 
DAMASCUS 
 
Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin, reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Syria's tightly controlled press remained silent 
on reports of Imad Mugniyah's death in a car bomb that 
exploded near Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) headquarters 
in the neighborhood of Kafr Sousa at approximately 10:00 pm 
local February 12.  According to contacts who were on the 
scene, SMI secured and cleared the area and kept other police 
services away.  Tow trucks removed several vehicles within 45 
minutes after the explosion which jarred surrounding 
buildings and could be felt at the American Ambassador's 
residence three miles away.  Syrian officials reported the 
blast had been the result of a butane gas leak and that one 
unidentified person (later two) had been killed. 
 
¶2.  (C) Media and other contacts reported mid-morning 
February 13 that unknown assailants had launched a car bomb 
attack against notorious Hizballah military operative Imad 
Mugniyah.  The story broke simultaneously on wire services 
and Arab satellite television stations al Jazeera, al 
Arabyia, and al Manar.  Western press was also reporting that 
the second victim was Hizballah MP al Hajj Hussein, although 
Hizballah denied this.  As of COB local, Syrian authorities 
had yet to provide any further comment on the incident.  (A 
Fox News affiliate told us MFA officials seemed "shocked" by 
reports of Mugniyah's death but offered no comment.) 
 
¶3.  (C)  The most frequent theory suggested by media and 
diplomatic contacts was that Israel conducted the attack to 
embarrass Syria on the eve of a previously scheduled visit by 
Iranian FM Manuchehr Mottaki.  Going to the other extreme, 
others were unwilling to rule out that Hizballah itself had 
conducted the assassination to neutralize Mugniyah's 
challenge to Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. 
One contact even suggested that Syria could have undertaken 
the operation as a sign of its desire to engage Israel and 
the West. 
 
¶4.  (S)  Saudi XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect) 
told us Mugniyah's presence in Damascus might have been 
related to a possible February 13 meeting in Damascus among 
Lebanese March 8 MPs with SARG officials.  He also noted that 
SMI Director Assaf Shawkat's offices were close to where the 
explosion occurred, and Mugniyah could have been going to or 
coming from the meeting.  British and Egyptian Embassy 
sources suggested Iranian FM Mottaki planned to meet with 
Hizballah and March 8 representatives during his February 
13-14 visit to Damascus as a counter to March 14's planned 
public demonstration to mark the third anniversary of the 
February 14 assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri. 
 
 
¶5.  (C)  Comment: This apparent targeted assassination of one 
of Hizballah's most notorious operatives coincides with a 
busy week of official visits meant to refute suggestions that 
Syria's Lebanon policy is resulting in a new period of 
Western and Arab diplomatic isolation.  Syria's ongoing 
silence regarding the attack is a characteristic regime 
response, most recently observed (and still in effect) after 
Israel's September 6 air strike near Deir az-Zur.  This 
silence likely reflects a deep sense of regime embarrassment 
from the acknowledged assassination of a wanted-terrorist 
whose presence in Syria it denied for years.  The event also 
impacts Syrian-Iranian-Hizballah cooperation on the eve of FM 
Mottaki's visit likely meant to bolster Syria's position in 
the face of escalating March 14 rhetoric and growing Western 
impatience with Syria's Lebanon policy. 
CORBIN